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Rethinking absence: 
Art practice and the critical metaphysics of Jacques Derrido and Jocques Lacan. 
lt is my intent, in this practice-based research, which includes painting, supporting 
video sketches and photomontages, to rethink the way in which absence might 
signify. This problematic comes out of questions arising in my own art practice. I 
contend that there is a disjunction between, on the one hand, what visual art can 
offer for the consideration of absence, and on the other, the way in which it is 
actually framed in extant art criticism where an a priori understanding of absence 
based on the metaphysics of presence is assumed. This disjunction gives rise to an 
excess which has on important critical force. 
The nature of this possibility is considered in relation to two intersecting axes; how 
and why something is considered to be constitutive of absence, and how this gets 
structured through specific ways of knowing in the visual arts. 
The research is approached through a series of encounters with different concepts 
of absence. Section one considers the discourses constructed around absence in the 
visual arts, with specific reference to the work of Rachel Whiteread, Doris Salcedo, 
Luc T uymans and Klaus Scherubel. Section two explores Jacques Derrida's 
proposition of difference and considers how it generates undecidability and 
provisionolity of meaning, offering a way to rethink the way in which absence might 
signify. Section three explores Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic proposition of the 
real, which positions a certain kind of structuring around absence, informed by the 
psychical, and realised through the construction of the subject. Section four presents 
a critical framing for the visual engagement with the possibility of absence. 
The methodology aims to demonstrate that absence is not reducible to one 
approach or another but plays on the incommensurabilities, commensurabilities and 
gaps between the different concepts presented. The 'motions of absence', which are 
textual insertions interspersed between the sections, directly articulate the 
methodology of the thesis by responding to and exploring the thinking in each 
section. The methodology therefore both produces and addresses the tensions and 
gaps available in visual and theoretical discourses to demonstrate absence. lt 
thereby allows for the possibility of a re-inscription of signification for absence to 
occur. 
CONTENTS SECTION Ill JACQUES LACAN 
Abstract I) Between Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan 41 
List of contents 11) The problem of absence and the Lacanian real 42 
List of illustrations ii Ill) Locating the real: the imaginary, symbolic and real 42 
Acknowledgements iv IV) The mirror stage 44 
Author's declaration V V) Reformulations of the real 45 
VI) DiHerence and language: the symbolic register 46 
SECTION I INTRODUCTION: ABSENCE AND THE VISUAL ARTS VII) Linguistic limits 48 
I) Thinking through frames: some introductory thoughts 6 VIII) Heidegger and Lacan 49 
11) Absence and the visual arts: contextualization 9 IX) Psychical shadows: the unconscious 49 
X) Driving towards absence: from dos Ding to ob;et a 51 
XI) The space of absence 53 
SECTION 11 JACQUES DERRIDA 
I) Absence and the proposition of difference: SECOND MOTION OF ABSENCE: 55 
some introductory thoughts 18 Self reflected, self doubled: flat against the mirror stage 
11) Towards the metaphysical 21 
Ill) Derrida and the metaphysical 22 THIRD MOTION OF ABSENCE: 58 
IV) Heidegger: being and presence 24 Into the shadows: woman of the dunes 
V) Oppositions 26 
VI) Against the transcendental signified: SECTION IV. 
a sign of inaudible disruption 28 I) Painting as a faulty vehicle for absence? 61 
VII) Etymological considerations: Difference 31 11) Reflection on practice 63 
VIII) Supplementary clause 32 Ill) Reflection on methodology 65 
IX) The limits of knowledge 33 IV) Contribution to the significance of absence 66 
X) Shadows of the unknown 36 
XI) Some concluding thoughts 37 FOURTH MOTION OF ABSENCE: 68 
Spectrality: video work absence 
FIRST MOTION OF ABSENCE: V) Towards a critical reframing 71 
Two hands and a repeated confession: 
illusory positions 38 
APPENDICES 
FIFTH MOTION OF ABSENCE: 
20 paintings: beyond the frame 
i) "Freud et apres" article clipped from the Observer newspaper 
(Sunday Plus section). Undated cutting (c.1980), found in bought 
second hand copy of Lacan, J. The Four Fundamental Concepts 
of Psycho-Analysis, London: Penguin Books, 1977 
ii) Photomontages from sketch book, 2002 
iii) Studio shot of hotel montages 
iv) Date stamped library books withdrawn from Exeter library, 
July 2006. Date stamped library books (withdrawals) Rolle College. 
list of conferences /exhibitions attended 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
73 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
1 Rachel Whiteread, Unfilled (Double Amber bed), 1 991 . 
2 Rachel Whiteread, Ghost of Ghost, 1990. 
3 Rachel Whiteread, Ghost, 1990. 
4 Rachel Whiteread, Untifled (Twenty-Four Switches), 1998. 
5 Rachel Whiteread, Unfilled 1991. 
6 Rachel Whiteread, Unfilled (Bath) 1990. 
11 
11 
11 
12 
12 
12 
7 Doris Salcedo, La Casa Viuda 11 (The Widowed House), 1993-1994, 13 
wood, fabric, 258 x 39 x 60cm. collection, Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto. 
8 Klaus Scherubel, Mallarme, Le Livre (Reading Room), 14 
1999-2005. Optica, Montreal. 
9 Luc T uymans, Schwarzheide, 1986. Oil on canvas, 60 x 70cm. 17 
1 0 Luc T uymans, Gas Chamber (detail), 1986. Oil on canvas, 50 x 70 cm. 17 
11 Luc T uymans Body, 1990. Oil on canvas, 49 x 35cm. 17 
Collection Museum of Contemporary Art, Ghent. 
12 Luc T uymans, Silence, 1991. Oil on canvas, 86 x 78.5cm. 17 
Collection Kunstmuseum, Bern. 
13 Douglas Gordon, Confessions of a Justified Sinner (still) 1995-1996, 39 
video installation, Fondation Cartier pour I' art contemporain, Paris. 
14 Janieta Eyre, Fish Merchant's Daughters, 1996. 56 
Diane Farris Gallery, Vancouver. 
15 Janieta Eyre, Tweeting, 1996, C-print, 20.5 x 17 .5. 
Diane Farris Gallery, Vancouver. 
16 Janieta Eyre, Lost Persons, 2000. Photograph. 
Diane Farris Gallery, Vancouver. 
57 
57 
59 1 7 Woman of the Dunes. Film. Dir. Hiroshi T eshigahara. 
Argos Films and the British Institute, Japan, 1964. (video still) 
18 Spectrality: video work Absence (still) 2003 69-70 
11 
19. Fifth Motion of"Absence: 
20ipointings~ beyondJhe JroiTle: 
Aii Y-(orks acrylic on: board (2004"6). 
21 4'x.3' 74 
22: 2' x3' 75 
23: 2'-x:3' 75 
24 2' x'3' 76 
25: 2'x3' 76 
26, 2'·x3' H 
27 2!x.3' 71 
28 31/2' xAl/2' 78 
29 3',1/2' x4' 1/2' 78 
30: j! x;4' 79 
3t1! 2'x'3' 79 
82 2' x2' :80 
33 2' x'3; '81 
'34 2:.1k x,3 W· 81 
35 3f 4.' X, 82. 
36 3~ X 4.' 82 
3·7 2,Wx,3 lf2' ;83 
38 2.Wx3 w 83 
39 3, 1/2' x4 112'' '84' 
40: 1; lf:; '2'' 2 •X' ... '8~· 
73 
Ill 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express sincere and warm thanks to my supervisors: Director of 
Studies, Jem Southern, supervisors, Katy Macleod and Jeff Collins who have worked 
together as a team to support this research. A special expression of thanks to Jeff 
for his invaluable input on Derrida and Lacan, his intellectual acuity managing to 
help render even the most difficult text exciting. 
In particular, I would like to thank the Art History Research Group, run by Professor 
Sam Smiles, for the dynamic, weekly research seminars held at Earl Richards Road 
North. My research has been enriched by contact with and input from this 
consistently vibrant group of staff and fellow postgraduate students. I would also 
like to thank Katy Macleod and Malcolm Miles for their enthusiasm and support, 
and for organising and presenting the Postgraduate Research Workshops. The 
workshops have fostered interesting and necessary debates around methodological 
and theoretical issues in practice-based research. In this regard, Thinking Through 
Art, 2006 (eds) Katy Macleod and Lin Holdridge, has been an invaluable exemplar. 
Thanks also, to Liz Wells for her input, and for the research leminars held at Queen 
Street. Special thanks to Graham Clucas and Deborah Robinson for the very helpful 
and interesting discussions on practice-based research. 
Special thanks to Julie McGregor for her meticulous photography and for 
documenting the paintings in this thesis. Also, many thanks to Peter Jones for his 
expertise and advice with the layout. 
I would like to thank all the library and computing staff at Exeter who have 
collectively provided excellent and friendly support for my research. I am also 
indebted to Rosemary Hatch and Anne Jervoise in the Research Office for their 
support and guidance. Appreciative thanks to Chris Cook for his support and the 
provision of studio space, and to all my kind friends at Spacex. I would like to thank 
the University of Plymouth for the award of a research studentship (2002-2005), 
without which, this research would not have been possible. 
IV 
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION 
At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the 
author been registered for any other University award without prior agreement of the 
Graduate CommiHee. 
This study was financed with the support of a research studentship from the 
University of Plymouth, Faculty of Arts (2002-2005). 
Exhibitions: 
2004 Max 10, Exeter Phoenix Arts Centre, Exeter, Devon {November). 
2004 MaxlO, Newlyn Gallery, Cornwall (October). 
2003 New Aquisitions {Collection) University of Minnesota, Minnesota, U.S (June). 
{Work acquired for the collection following on from solo show in April 2002) 
University af Minnesota, Coffman Memorial Union, Minneapolis. 
2002 Ideas Need Space, Ontario College of Art and Design, Toronto, Canada. 
2002 Reconfiguring Absence, Wilfrid Laurier University, Robert Langen Gallery 
Canada, curated by Suzanne Luke (October- Solo show). 
Research seminars and conferences were regularly aHended at which work was 
presented including: 
2005 "Negotiating the unrepresentoble: Jocques Locon's real and concepts of 
absence" Glasgow School of Art, AAH summer school. 
2005 University of Plymouth, Art History research seminar: 
"Jocques Locon's real and concepts of absence. 
2004 University of Plymouth, Art History research seminar: 
"Jocques Derrido and "concepts" of absence". 
2003 University of Plymouth, Art History research seminar: 
"Absence and 'place.'" 
2003 University of Plymouth, Postgraduate Research Workshop: 
"Writing into practice." 
2002 University of Plymouth, Postgraduate Research Workshop: 
'work in progress'. 
Published articles/reviews: 
Roulstone, K. (2006) Thinking Through Art: reflections on art os research [eds.] Katy 
Mocleod & Lin Holdridge, London: Routledge [book review] in PARACHUTE 122, 
Travail-Work, spring issue, Montreal, Canada. 
Roulstone, K. {2005) The Oxford Companion to the Photograph {contributor, artist 
biographies) Editor: Robin Lenman, Oxford University Press. 
Related 
2005 Postgraduate Postcard Project, Bristol School of Art, University of the West of 
England (UWE). 
2005 Contributor: text panels, "Provincial Beauties" University of Plymouth, Exeter 
Museum (RAMM). 
Signed __ _.1(_~-~------------
Date -----"-~-_1-~QQ _____________ --------
V 
INTRODUCTION: RETHINKING ABSENCE 
CONCEPTS. 
My interest in rethinking how absence might signify surfaced initially out of questions 
arising from my own artistic practice and was later developed in the context of this 
practice-based doctoral research. The central research question: Rethinking 
Absence: art practice and the critical metaphysics of Jacques Derrida and Jacques 
Lacan, positions four main propositions relating to rethinking absence. 
The four propositions are identified as follows: 
Firstly, in section one, there is an exploration of absence and the visual arts in 
Absence and the visual arts: contextualization. This section considers some of the 
critical interpretive discourses constructed around absence and the visual arts which 
assume an a priori understanding of absence based on the metaphysics of 
presence. The metaphysics of presence sets up presence in hierarchical opposition 
to absence and this dynamic conditions the way in which absence might be seen to 
signify within the artworks. An exploration of the methodologies and strategies of 
artists Rachel Whiteread, Doris Salcedo, Luc T uymans and Klaus Scherubel attempts 
to demonstrate that their artwork disrupts and complicates this appositional 
interpretation offering instead the possibility of an excess of meaning (that which 
appears to exceed the discursive frames constructed around absence and the visual 
arts). 
The second section, Jacques Derrida: absence and the proposition of diHerance 
explores Derrida's critical engagement with the "metaphysics of presence" through 
a consideration of his proposition of diHerance. The proposition of diHerance offers 
the possibility for a 're-inscription' of the way in which absence might signify by 
demonstrating that the oppositions on which the precepts of the metaphysics of 
presence ore founded ore contested. Derrido proposes that meaning is provisional 
and differential rather than appositional, full and present. Differance con not be 
described or understood according the conceptual paths metaphysics has to offer, 
consequently, it offers o different approach to the way in which absence might 
signify. 
The third section Jacques Lacan: the problem of absence and the Lacanian "real," 
explores Jacques locan's psychoanalytic thought and his proposition of the real. 
The real describes o pre-subjective stole, namely, the stole before the 'subject' 
enters into the symbolic order (the order of culture and language) where it is 
constituted and situated through the complexities of language, sexuality and the 
social. Whilst his thinking engages with absence in o way that could be considered 
to be metaphysical (in Derrideon terms) in that it contains and pins down o concept 
of absence, the real is not on absence that is subject to definition, but o 
complicated, multi-layered problematic. 
The fourth section, Painting as a faulty vehicle for absence, explores the problem of 
rethinking absence through art practice. lt considers the need for a critical position 
that recognises or acknowledges the limits constructed around and in painting 
practice. These limits ore related to modernist precepts, and the interpretive and 
analytical approaches used to negotiate content. Importantly, through considering 
these limits, the section explores what is provoked by and goes beyond this 
modernist analysis and indeed the interpretive and analytical, namely, what might 
be seen to be the excess of art practice. The reconsideration of absence and on 
identification of this excess of art practice ore inter-related. 
These four propositions, whilst offering individual engagements with the way in 
which absence might signify, also introduce their own complexities relating to 
different orders of absence. They attempt to offer on insight into the irreducibility of 
the significance of absence to any singular engagement, indeed position the 
differences between ideas and o consideration of excess of meaning os components 
of o methodological approach. 
METHODOLOGY. 
The methodology for the research con be identified through four key points: 
1 . I approached the research in o way that explored the issues stated above and 
took into account the relationship between theory and practice. In order to achieve 
these aims, I approached the central research question of rethinking absence os o 
series of encounters with different concepts of absence. This strategy, which hod 
been generated through thinking through my own pointing practice and 
consideration of the discourses constructed around absence and the visual arts, 
suggested the ideo of on excess. Importantly, this ideo relates to lrit Rogoff's 
description of the shift in understanding on artwork from the interpretive and 
analytical to that of interlocution. She neatly delineates the need to acknowledge the 
performative and active dimensions of thinking through art: 
The shift from artwork to that of interlocution takes place in the demise of a 
perception of the artwork finished at its point of origination and going beyond the 
notion of reception in which meanings ore completed through encounters with 
different subjeclivities. In the processes of interlocution we may shift from the critical 
analysis which stands outside, to a participation in which we transform that which 
we are taking part in. 1 
Therefore, interlocution suggests a conversation which is participatory, involving 
thinking and speaking within and beyond on artwork rather than a purely external 
analysis of it. In my research concerning discourses of absence in the arts (namely, 
the extant art criticism), the critical interpretation of the ortworks under consideration 
tended to be largely confined to the structuring of an opposition between presence 
and absence. I considered this approach to be inadequate to the task of describing 
the full complexities of what the ortworks positioned and how absence might signify. 
1 See Rogoff, 1., "Art as Interlocutor-The Flight Lines of Address" in Bond, A., Re: Trace Dialogues Essays on 
Contemporary Art and Culture, Liverpool: Liverpool School of Art and Design, 1999, p.47. 
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lt was the reflection on the disjunction between what art practice can offer and the 
way in which it actually gets critically framed that gave rise la a consideration of the 
excess of the art work. I considered this disjunction to have an important critical 
force. Rather than focus solely on an interpretive analysis of absence, I took the 
question of this excess of art practice, (namely, that which appeared to be 
exceeding the discursive frames constructed around a customary understanding of 
absence) as a starting point for an approach to the research. 
2. This methodology was necessary because my intent was for the disparities 
between the different approaches to absence to be understood within the same 
frame of engagement. Consequently, the tensions were to reside with the 
negotiation of how absence might signify which was expressed through the 
differences between the lour sections and the distinct and respective handling of 
absence. In proposing the separate explorations: the engagements with art 
criticism, Jacques Derrida's proposition of difference, Jacques Lacan's rea/ and the 
limits constructed around painting practice, there was a purposeful selection to 
reflect the tensions within art practice in relation to an understanding of absence. 
Consequently, each section works with different limits and approaches to the way in 
which absence might signify. 
3. The consideration of concepts and of theoretical positionings included art 
practice itself and this was important. In order for the art practice to be lifted from 
the reductive approach of analysis and interpretation, the work had to be presented 
as what I refer to as a motion of absence. The motions of absence are textual 
insertions which present an artwork and a written text. They work within the thinking 
of the artwork and respond to the section or sections which precede it. They are 
interspersed between the sections and present a direct and important contribution to 
the methodology. The motions operate on a different level to the lour sections but 
are invoked by the thinking in each section. From a methodological perspective, 
each motion attempts to work through one aspect of the complexities of each 
section by thinking through an artwork2 and the way in which absence is signifying 
within it. The motions act as a response to and an exploration of the propositions of 
each section and function in a performative way within the methodology. 
Performativity in the context of this research refers to the movement across 
propositions. Consequently, I wanted the artwork to be presented in its own right, 
positioning its own tensions. 
4. I wanted the performativity and excess of art practice to be demonstrated in the 
research. I worked through concepts of absence in my painting practice, for 
example, and this demonstrational approach came out of and led back into the 
different sections. My intent was for a rethinking of absence to occur through and 
between the different explorations of absence and how it might signify. 
INTERRELATIONSHIP of THE FOUR SECTIONS 
Section I, Absence and the visual arts: contextua/ization, considers the tensions 
between interpretations of absence and the visual arts and the actual complexity of 
what the art works position through the artists' methodologies and strategies. The 
artworks present a complication and disruption of the way in which absence might 
signify which is not simply reducible to the opposition of absence and presence. The 
different possibilities for absence are explored through the layered and nuanced 
engagements of artists Rachel Whiteread, Doris Salcedo, Luc T uymans and Klaus 
Scherubel. Each artist's work demonstrates an engagement with absence which 
disrupts and complicates what might be considered to be an a priori understanding 
of absence found in the interpretation of the works. This consideration sets up points 
2 The idea of 'thinking through art' is an expression which is ubiquitous In practice-led research at doctoral 
level. In the foreword, to Madeod, K., and Holdridge, L., Thinking Through Art. London: RouUedge, 2006. 
Professor Sir Chrlstopher Frayting, Rector of the Royal College of Art, suggests that the editors have "stolen 
his tiue· but qualifies this statement by admitting that he stole it from Hertlert Read, p.xiv. The phrase 
suggests a complex process of thinking that is not easily contained within conventional academic evaluative 
methods. 
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of commonality and tension with the next section, section 11, where part of what is 
proposed regarding the excess of the artworks and the disruption of the appositional 
understanding of absence and presence has resonance with Jacques Derrida's 
proposition of differance. The extant critical interpretation of the works could, in the 
light of the next section, be construed as metaphysical. 
Section 11, Jacques Derrido: absence and the proposition of differance, explores 
Derrida's critical engagement with what he refers to as the "metaphysics of 
presence" through a consideration of his proposition of differance. This section 
purposefully presents a position which allows for a rethinking of the way in which 
absence might signify. The proposition of differance offers the possibility for a' re-
inscription' of absence by rethinking metaphysical precepts which are founded on 
the hierarchical opposition of presence and absence and the assumption of full and 
present meaning. This latter conceit is frequently found in the interpretation of 
artworks in section I, yet is confounded by the strategies and methodologies 
employed by the artists under consideration. Section lilies in critical tension with 
section Ill, Jocques Lacon and the real. 
Section Ill, Jacques Lacan: the problem of absence and the Laconion real, in 
contrast, submits absence to what could be considered to be thoroughly 
metaphysical notions by containing and defining it. However, through the idea of 
the reo/, Lacan positions a certain kind of structuring around absence which is 
informed by the psychical, and realised through the construction of the subject, but 
which remains outside of the social and cultural order. However, the tensions 
between the Oerrida and Lacan sections are not reducible to appositional positions 
because there are commensurabilities and gaps in their differences. These sections 
lie in a critical relationship to section IV. 
Section IV, Pointing os a faulty vehicle for absence, considers the problematic of 
understanding absence through painting practice. In light of the concepts of 
absence forwarded by Jacques Derrido and Jocques Lacan, involving metaphysical 
thinking, challenges to metaphysical thinking, and spaces of indeterminacy of 
meaning, this section explores the specific issues that arise relating to painting and 
absence. These issues include modernist precepts of painting which condition many 
of the discourses around painting and how it might be understood. Also, there is 
consideration of how this approach to the artwork might be challenged by thinking 
through art practice which has been demonstrated in section I through 
consideration of absence and the visual arts. 
The four main sections are to be considered as theoretically and visually concurrent 
but not necessarily fully reconcilable with each other. In other words, the ordering is 
set up to juxtapose ideas rather than present the line of a linear argument and the 
tensions are as important as the similarities between ideas. 
INTERRElATIONSHIPS of THE MOTIONS of ABSENCE and THE FOUR SECTIONS. 
The first motion of absence is presented through the film clip: Two hands and a 
repeated confession: illusory positions. lt explores a clip from a Douglas Gordon 
film: Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1995-1996) and follows on from the section 
on Derrida's proposition of differonce. Although the double screen format that 
Gordon sets up immediately positions the possibility of on appositional and 
'metaphysical' reading of the two images, the play of the two hands confounds the 
visual polorities suggested by the placement. 
The second motion of absence: Self reflected, self doubled: flat against the mirror 
stage, looks at three photographs by Jonietta Eyre. lt follows the section on Jocques 
Lacan which explores the psychoanalytic encounter with the way in which absence 
might signify. The photographs explore the conceit of the double, identical twins: 
The Fishmerchont's Daughters (1996), Tweelings (1996) and lost Persons (2000). 
The photographs are in fact fictional doubles as Eyre reproduces herself for every 
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positioning. The works pose critical questions relating to the replication of self, 
Lacan's mirror stage, and the gap between self and other. 
The third motion of absence: Into the shadows: Woman of the Dunes, works 
through a scene from the film: Woman of the Dunes by Hiroshi Teshigahara (1964). 
This motion gestures towards the absence of one of the main protagonists, a man 
who goes missing and stays with the woman of the dunes. Initially, this motion 
would seem to propose an empirical or interpretive understanding of absence but, 
in fact, it offers different readings. The way in which the couple survive in the desert 
is by removing the continuous flow of sand into the hollow in which they live. A 
complicated engagement with the way in which absence is signifying is 
demonstrated by the performativity of their existence to preserve the ever-
diminishing space in which they exist within the dunes; it is there and not there. The 
motion consequently links into section I, Absence and the visual arts and section 11, 
Jacques Derrida: absence and the proposition of differance by challenging and 
confounding an appositional reading of absence. 
The fourth motion of absence: Specfrality and shadows: videowork Absence, follows 
on from Section IV, Painting as a faulty vehicle for absence? lt explores the video-
work Absence which works through the possibilities of spectral traces of meaning, 
the transposability of images and the possible slippage between visual ideas. These 
ideas have resonance with section IV, Painting as a faulty vehicle for absence? In 
terms of how ideas are framed, and also the proposition of differance in section 11, 
Jacques Derrida, where meaning is understood in a differential way. 
Finally, the fifth motion of absence: 20 paintings: beyond the frame, presents 20 
paintings coming out of the research process. The paintings are presented in a way 
that is not chronological but represents the dialogical processes of studio practice 
and thinking. They attempt to explore the complexities of using painting as a 
research tool and the limits and possibilities it constructs. The paintings attempt to 
hit against these critical limits and explore the possibility for meaning exceeding 
these frames. 
FORMAT OF THE RESEARCH. 
In keeping with the rationale of this research, I have presented the formal of the PhD 
in A3 layout so that the visual might be allowed to work alongside the written and 
be generative of another set of tensions or points of convergence. The intent here is 
not to achieve the containment of an idea but to work through it in a way that 
allows absence to signify within, across and between propositions. What might be 
considered to be the performalivity, or movement across propositions, extends to the 
appendices where I have included some photographs of books checked out from 
libraries and cancelled during the process of the research. My intent was for the 
books to function on another register in terms of bodies of knowledge no longer in 
circulation. Each consideration of absence and the way it might signify points to 
both the fugitive stability and critical permeability of these spaces of meaning. I 
would suggest that there is a critical force residing in an idea of excess positioned 
by arlworks and evidenced through the different registers of absence. I am aiming 
for a more unpredictable unfolding of the idea of absence, which also surfaces from 
the spaces between conceptual frames. 
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ABSENCE AND THE VISUAL ARTS 
Thinking through frames: 
some introductory thoughts 
In my various theoretical engagements with the binary structures of 
absence/presence I had not found a way to exit them, only ways to refine the 
argument and la augment my critique of a condition I found for loo limiting for the 
requirements of living in o post colonial, past migratory culture, and looking back 
la its links with same originotory European movements. The encounter with Body 
Missing become a possibility of exiling this structure and entertaining a completely 
different one in which the stricture of 'cultural haunting' could act simultaneously os 
the marker of on absence, and of its creative passibility la produce a presence. 11 is 
not that these bodies of thought hod not existed elsewhere in fiction and in other 
intellectual analyses, it was that their conjunction seemed impossible before this act 
of interlocution. 3 
Everyone carries a room about inside him. This fact con be proved by means of the 
sense of hearing. If someone walks last and one pricks up one's ears and listens, 
say in the night, when everything round about is quiet, one hears, for instance, the 
roHiing of a mirror not quite firmly fastened to the wall. 4 
My interest in thinking about absence in the visual arts has come out of a critical 
visual engagement with the ways in which it is normally understood and framed; 
namely through its visual articulation and interpretation and the respective limits 
associated with this framing. These limits are certainly not fixed but retain what 
might be seen as a residual 'weight of significance'. This significance is determined 
by what I would suggest to be the repetitive and normalised employment of 
interpretive models which might be seen to be constitutive of discourses of absence 
in the visual arts. These discourses include, but are not limited to, reference to 
degrees of materiality relating to the body/object/place. At times, they gesture 
towards the phenomenological, (where the meaning of objects, (phenomena), is 
constituted through our consciousness of what they are), or the psychical where a 
3 Rogoff, 1., "Art as lnter1ocuter- The Flight Lines of Address• in Re:Trace Dialogues, Liverpool: Liverpool 
School of Art and Design, 2002, p.51. 
4 Katka, F .. The Blue Octavo Notebooks, Cambridge: Exact Change, 1991, p.1. 
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visceral response exceeding an intellectual reasoning to absence is marked. 
These discourses are nuanced and complicated, certainly surfacing in different 
ways, but are largely conditioned by the metaphysics of presence whereby an 
understanding of absence is conditioned by an appositional and subordinate 
relational dynamic to presence.5 In a direct sense, the limiting nature of this 
'appositional' approach to understanding is touched on in part, by lrit Rogoff in the 
introductory quotation. In reference to the international exhibition Trace, she posits 
'cultural haunting' as a way of thinking outside of the structures set up around 
thinking through the absence/presence structure. Later, in reference to the work of 
artist Vera Frankel, she puts forward the possibility of 'absence' as a structure of 
difference.6 This proposition consequently draws on certain aspects of the 
problematic of absence that are central to this inquiry, specifically relating to 
rethinking the limits around the way in which absence is understood. However, 
although this is key, and a central concern, I would argue that through my research, 
there is a kind of excess which occurs when thinking about absence, the discourses 
constructed around it and artworks. lt neither resides entirely with the nature of 
representation, nor with a contemplation of how absence is understood or 
positioned within this context. This marks the conceptual substance of the thesis and 
will be explored at length in the following sections relating to ansence and the visual 
arts, Jacques Derrida's proposition of difference Jacques Lacan's concept of the 
'real', painting as a faulty vehicle for absence and my own practice. 
5 See Section If Jacques Derrida for a detailed exploration of this proposition. 
6 Trace was an international conference held at the Uverpool Biennal in 2003. The reference to 'cultural 
haunting' was made in relation to Vera Frankel's touring exhibition Body Missing at the Freud Museum, 
London, March 19th- April 27th, 2003. Frankel presented a six channel 'video-photo-web work' which took 
the Kunstraub (art theft) of the Third Reich as a point from which to explore a number of issues cited as 
ranging from 'collective madness' to the nature of memory'. Critical issues arising from this were 
contextuallzed and discussed at the conference: Structures of memory/Structures of Information: From Theft 
to Virtuality: Considerations of the meaning of Absence, organised by Professor Griselda Pollock, AHRB 
CentreCATH, University of Leeds, in conjunction with the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, March 21-
22, 2003. lrit Rogoff suggests that Vera Frankel's work presents "different orders" of absence, with her work 
edged by a "narrative of cultural haunting". In order to negotiate the 'absence' relating to the Holocaust. 
Frankel formulates lists, 'absence' somehow strangely articulated through a sort of systematic accountability. 
This tangibility is understood by Rogoff within the parameters of 'cultural haunting· and consequently is 
noted as offering the possibility of both marking an absence and generating a presence. See See Rogoff, 
2002, pp.48-51. 
I would suggest that this 'excess' surfaces out of the dialogical relationship between 
all these things. This research attempts to grapple with some of these complexities 
and precarious threads, which I would suggest are specific to a negotiation of the 
visual. These considerations seek then, firstly, to consider how absence is woven into 
an understanding of the visual and how this might be rethought, and secondly, to 
think about how absence might also exceed this framework and function as a way 
of rethinking the way in which its meaning might be inscribed. 
Certainly, it could be justifiably argued that any consideration of the problematic of 
absence and artworks is fraught with many difficulties right from the start. With the 
hierarchical, appositional premise of presence and absence structuring the extant 
critical interpretation of artworks, part of the first main problem coming out of this is 
that absence tends to be understood in relationship to the economy of the 
absent(ed) object or subject. 7 This is complicated by two issues, firstly, relating to the 
premise of working through an idea that perhaps has no object but is frequently 
evoked through objects employed as metaphorical conceits,8 and secondly, to the 
status of any art form, and how this might be reconciled with a rethinking of 
absence. Certainly, no visual form can possibly arise in a heterogeneous way and 
this inquiry takes this into account, having engaged with a variety of forms of 
exploration including photomontages, video sketches, and adjunct visual 
considerations, all of which have been integral to the process of working through 
these ideas.9 Moreover, visual ideas surface in a way that is not confined to one 
medium or source and what comes out of the art work might be seen to be a sort of 
synthesis of all these things. 
However, as the body of the research has largely been negotiated through pointing, 
7 See: Section If Jacques Denrida, for an in depth exploration of the implications of this hierarchical and 
appositional structuring. 
8 This is particularly evident in the work of Christian Boltanksi, where he uses discarded shoes, clothing and 
objects as material metaphors for mourning and loss. See for example, The Clothes of Fran9f)is C, (1972), in 
Van Elphen. E., M in Mind, The University of Chicago Press, 2005, p.41. 
9 See especially, Fran.,oise Parfait's article: "Immobile movement and the speeds of emotion" in Relocating 
Victor Burgin, Amolfini, 2002, for an insightful consideration of video as an "evanescent ontology". She 
suggests that video is 'situated' between possessing the "visible and the invisible" and as a medium is 
constitutive of loss: "what il brings to light are the already ruined forms of a visibility always incomplete", 
p.123. 
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I shall later discuss the particular problems posed by pointing as they offer a very 
specific and tangible point of departure in relation to the way in which we might 
consider a rethinking of absence. In a certain sense, it is these very difficulties 
around painting that have provided a certain kind of contradictory frame that has 
dis/configured thinking. In carrying out my research I initially hoped to get a sense 
of how this was working as a means of critically thinking through the parameters 
within which absence might normally be understood in relation to the visual arts. 
Therefore, it would not simply be a question of how absence was understood to be 
manifesting through or in relation to the visual, but also because of the interpretive 
limits this seemed to generate, as a result of, or through the discourses habitually 
constructed around it. 
Consequently, this rethinking has not simply been confined to singular images but 
has depended on the spaces in between, thoughts and the dynamic between them. 
This dynamic has produced and addressed the gaps in available discourse allowing 
for a re-inscription of absence's signification. In working through these discourses, I 
have found that meaning has come out of something that is beyond these 
parameters, beyond these conceptual lines. What has been missed by the 
established or normalised ways of interpreting or understanding absence is revealed 
through working through them, allowing for that which is inarticulable or rendered 
silent in this context to be understood as a shadow on thought and meaning, 
hovering strangely in indeterminate spaces. 
I would add, as a qualification for this proposition, however, that what might be 
loosely seen to be the edges of understanding absence through the visual are 
certainly not clearly discernable, but rather moveable, elusive and uncertain. This 
has been a highly nuanced engagement, at times a speculative, precarious and 
somewhat contradictory encounter. However, what has been necessary, for 
purposes of clarity in this research, is to critically consider the possibility of edges in 
relation to two particular intersecting axes. These axes have related to, firstly, an 
understanding of how and why we might categorise something as being constitutive 
of, or generative of o visual absence or sense of absence. This consideration has 
involved a practical enagement with absence and its negotiation in the visual arts. 
And secondly, the axes have addressed the way in which we organise or structure 
this placement of absence through engaging with specific ways of 'knowing'. I 
would argue that these considerations broadly organise our engagement and 
generally condition it through reference to a particular set of epistemological 
frameworks relating to materiality, the body and place, phenomenologicol and 
psychical dimensions and a specific kind of interpretation of absence, which in 
Derridean terms would be considered to be metaphysical. 
With this in mind, I propose to firstly look at the way in which absence is seen to 
manifest in reference to the work of four artists employing a variety of artistic 
practices; Rachel Whiteread, Doris Salcedo, Klaus Scherubel, and Luc T uymans. I 
have chosen these artists for two specific reasons. Firstly, although they are 
individually cited as negotiating absence in recognised ways, I would argue that 
they all complicate an engagement with 'absence' and problematise conventional 
interpretive frames. Secondly, through this complication, I would suggest that their 
work gives rise to a certain kind of rethinking of the way in which absence might be 
understood. My intent is that this consideration will serve as a means of 
contextualizing and negotiating some of the complexities associated with 
understanding how absence might be rethought in relation to the visual arts. 
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11 ABSENCE AND THE VISUAL ARTS: CONTEXTUAUZATION 
The conceptual frameworks relating to absence in the visual arts frequently carry the 
weight of discourses shoring the some repetitive assumptions of interpretation 
relating to the opposition of absence with presence. Critiques of ortworks tend to 
focus on on a priori understanding of what constitutes absence in place of a critical 
engagement with the term and how it might signify. The methodologies and 
strategies used by artists frequently confound the opposition of presence and 
absence, presenting work which complicates and exceeds this understanding. 
Discourses on absence ore complex in that they are not easily discernible or 
expressed in the visual arts. Threads that con be pulled through seem, however, to 
be generally focused around very specific ideas in this context. These ideas normally 
involve, but ore not restricted to, on engagement with absence that describes it as 
actually being marked or traced, or by leaving on imprint or mork. 10 In this 
particular instance, absence is repeatedly drawn into on economy of the material 
form or body, which is no longer present. lt presents on ideo of absence in relation 
to a signifying framework that poses 'moteriality' as a [post] possibility and through 
this, a relational sense of how absence might be understood. This is at limes 
expressed through referencing the emptying or voiding of spaces normally inhabited 
by people. This proposition consequently creates a specific kind of engagement with 
'absence' connected to the body and its 'absence'. At times the suggestion of 
absence is pushed towards the idea of memory and loss and the possible 
articulation of 'absence' through abandoned buildings, possessions or objects 
serving os visual metaphors for that which is no longer present. 
10 See especially, Merewether C .. "A Lasting Impression" in Bond, A., Trace, Uverpool Biennal of 
Conlemporary Art, Tale Uverpool, 1999, (pp.164-171 ), where he discusses the possibility of the foolprinl, for 
example, as "the mark of absence" (167). The trace in !his case is seen as having no originary state as il 
comes into being through the process of erasure and in so doing indicates an absent origin. This 
consideration of 'trace' does not engage with the idea of the remnant, but the idea that it is constituted 
through "erasure and division" (p.169]. Merewhether suggests that this takes the trace out of the polemic of 
absence and presence and delivers it into the terrain of "repetition and difference" [168]. 
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This approach to on understanding of absence might be critically considered in 
relation to Rochel Whitereod's work, for example, os it is frequently described os 
recording or marking 'absence' through everyday objects and sites. lt offers a 
particularly interesting case of the way in which absence is understood os 
'materialised' and categorised through the visual arts. This approach is reflected in 
the pamphlet accompanying Whitereod's show at the Serpentine Gallery, London, 
2001, in which her works ore described os "records of obsence". 11 Resonating 
within this approach is the ideo of recording or transcribing on 'absence', on ideo 
which includes the costing of the inferior of on empty room. 
This interpretation and 'location' of 'absence' is crucial because it would seem to be 
used to strangely delineate the unmarked, but familiar spaces of our day-to-day 
living in specific and contained ways, positioning absence with a possible tangibility. 
In this sense, at limes, an acknowledgement of these 'absences' becomes enclosed 
and specific os they ore mode into material objects. The costs simultaneously 
represent the absence of the actual objects and ore objects themselves. They ore 
frequently referred to as 'imprints' or 'records of absence'. So here, on 
interpretation of 'absence' would appear to be trading on two seemingly different 
registers. Firstly, there is on encounter with the possibility of moteriolity and its 
inverse, and secondly, with a specifically 'human' centred or corporeal approach to 
the conceptualizotion of absence where there is on allusion to a body, or to a space 
a 'body' has once used. Whilst both approaches interestingly trade on the basis of 
the opposition of absence and presence, and further to this, hove recourse to a 
material register, I would argue that there is also something that comes out of these 
works that exceeds these frameworks of understanding. Something disrupts a neat 
and secure containment of ideas and seems inadequate to the task of visual 
reasoning in this context and it is to be found in part by exploring the strategies 
Whitereod deploys in her work and the context in which it is understood. 
Whitereod's familiar three dimensional sculptures, which ore frequently cost from 
11 See Matthai, C, 'Rachel Whileread at the Serpentine Gallery in London', (Online] 
htlp://swissart.netle/news/archive-artide. 30th June 2001, [13 October 2004]. 
the spaces everyday objects such os old mattresses and wash basins generate and 
occupy, might be said to also engage with the hollow inside space of the negative 
form. The outline of the object is followed and mode material through the costing 
process. However, the strange imprints and forms that ore left in this process are 
testament to the perceptual ambiguity and confusion engendered by the costing 
process and the way in which Whitereod deploys it. The ambiguity this generates is 
due to the fact that some sculptures ore cost from objects, others from the space 
around them. Her use of materials in this process counfounds a conventional notion 
of 'presence'. In Amber bed ( 1991) (see: fig 1 ), the mattress rests inert, positioned 
halfway between the wall and floor. Its positioning is suggestive of a discarded 
mattress, a makeshift arrangement for living that might be found in on empty house 
occupied by squatters. However, the glowing orange hue of the bed unsettles the 
squalid implications of its placement. Its vibrant resin density makes the sculpture at 
once heavy and olive. (Whitereod's work is politically informed, marked by living in 
London throughout the years of the Thatcher government. She uses second hand 
objects deliberately; mattresses ore stained and worn. 12). In spite of the compelling 
draw of the deep orange tones, Amber Bed offers a sophisticated ploy on specific 
cultural knowledge of homelessness, disaffection and poverty played out through a 
visual recognition of the abandoned mattress. "I use furniture os a metaphor for 
human beings" .13 As Jon Debbout and Selmo Klein Essink point out, the symbollic 
significance of on object is determined by the memory of it rather than by its 
physical presence. 14 However, this understanding is discursive os well. 
Whitereod ploys on the disparity between the simple recognisability of the abject 
and the way it functions in her sculptures. This space of interpretive complexity is 
played out strategically by her through the costing process. For example, in Ghost 
(1990) (see: fig 3), a strange inverse moteriolity is presented. On first inspection 
Ghost would appear to be the form of an overbearing tomb or building. However, 
12 "Rachel Whiteread in conversation with lwona Blazwick" in Rachel Whileread, Stedelijk Van 
Abbemuseum catalogue, 1992-3 p.14. 
13 Rachel Whiteread quoted in the "foreword" by Jan Debbaut and Selma Klein Essink to Rachel Whileread, 
1992-3, p.3. 
14 "Foreword" in Rachel Whileread, 1992-3, p.3. 
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the sculpture reveals traces of an impression of a house interior. Oddly, the 
structures that would normally be protruding are impressions working their way 
inwards creating a strange inverse reality. This inverse materiality awkwardly slips 
past a complete match of the object cast, producing an unnerving mimetic jolt. 
Consequently, W hiteread's work is often presented through the opposition of 
inferiority and exteriority which is suggested through an exploration of 'voids' and 
negative spaces. lt is suggested that this kind of "materialization of space, of the 
void, the simultaneous absence and presence of a thing"15 is woven into her desire 
to hold onto, to "preserve the memory of the world of things" which are presented 
as" 'negatives' of a 'positive' space." 16 However, whi lst Whiteread's methodology 
might be seen to easily fit into an interpretive frame of inferiority and exteriority and 
is frequently described in terms of the appositional of absence and presence, the 
strategies she employs complicate and disrupt this interpretation. 
For example, in Untitled (Twenty Four Switches), 1998 (see fig.4) , the sculpture 
elicits the desire to visually enage with the impossibility of the switchplate. The on/off 
function of the switch is apparent but the casting process achieves an inverse 
impression which confounds the possibili ty of it functioning. The switchplate presents 
as a visual puzzle playing on the disparity between what we think should be there 
and what is actually there. Moreover, like Ghost, it exceeds the appositional 
proposi tions used to describe it. lt is more than the materialization of a space or 
void, or the negative of a positive space. W hiteread's strategies wh ich are, in part, 
related to the disparity between a familiari ty with the objects and their everydayness, 
and the way in which they occur, have an effect on our reception of the sculptures . 
lwona Blazwick, for example, asks W hiteread whether Ghost acts as a monument, a 
suggestion which brings with it a complex set of propositions relating to cultural 
memory and loss. 17 Rosalind Krauss describes her plaster casts as "announcing their 
own sufficiency, their status as ghosts." 18 The light plaster blocks of Ghost certainly 
15 The Henry Moore Foundation, The British Council, London, catalogue, Double Vision, 2001 , p.56. 
16 Borchardt-Hume, A., Rachel Whiteread catalogue, The Serpentine Gallery, London: 2001 . 
17 "Rachel Whiteread in conversation with lwona Blazwick" in Rachel Whiteread, Stedelijk Van 
Abbemuseum catalogue, 1992-3 p.1 0. 
18 Krauss, R., "X Marks the Spor in Shedding Life, Tale Gallery Liverpool, Tale Gallery Publishing, 1996. 
have a funerea l quality. Mausoleum-like in its appearance, Ghost retains an aura of 
fina lity and closure on first impression. Whiteread cleverly left gaps in the sculpture 
reminiscent of an old tomb.19 As with Amber Bed, the work benefits from specific 
cultural knowledge of the mausoleum, unkempt graveyards and monuments.20 Her 
strategies put the oppositions of presence/absence, interiority/exteriory into question 
whilst her practical methodology realised through the casting process, invokes the 
oppositions at every turn. The multi-layered readings of her processes is further 
demonstrated in Ghost of Ghost, 1990 (see fig. 2). Presented in relation to Ghost 
and its 'disappearance' the photograph of the shadowy outline of Ghosts' physical 
impression adds another layer of complexity to an understanding of the work. 
2 3 
Rachel Whiteread 
1. Double Amber bed, 1991 . 
2. Ghost of Ghost, 1990. 
3. Ghost, 1990. 
19 Whiteread comments that she spent some time working in Highgate cemetery in North London. She 
mentions that the graves were in a state of disrepair and some of the crypts were ajar. See Rachel 
Whiteread, Stedelijk Van Abbemuseum catalogue, 1992-3. 
20 See Sinclair, 1. , "The house in the park: a psychogeographical response " in Rachel Whiteread, House, 
Phaidon Press Ltd., 1995, p.18., where he suggests: "Ghost outreached pathos: it was crueller and brighter 
than that. The allusions are to Egyptian and Babylonian plunder in the British Museum and not to the 
sentiments of false memory, colonized domestic enclosures". 
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4 5 
Rochel Whi tereod 
4 . Untitled (Twenty. four Switches), 1998. 
5. Unfilled, 7991. 
6.Untitled (Both), 1990. 
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To develop part of this thought further, I want to refer to the work of Doris Salcedo 
as her installation pieces are similarly recognised as offering a kind of ' haunting 
absence' . In ridding her work of any human presence, it is all the same implied by 
the use of ' abandoned' or 'discarded' domestic objects. She fills furniture, chairs, 
wardrobes and cupboards with plaster, rendering them visually oburote and 
divested of their normal uses around the home. Familiar pieces of domestic furniture 
are weighed down and anchored in their awkward and functionless states. The 
works serve as indicators of 'absence'.21 Our fam iliarity with the objects used, such 
as the well-worn shoes, stiffened white shirts and empty functional spaces has an 
interpretive resonance with Whiteread's work, however, there is an underlying horror 
to Salcedo's works. The shirts and the shoes will never be worn again. They are cast 
forever in the weight of loss. The furniture sets up a resistance to use, protesting 
against the loss of the occupiers. Her work communicates the tragic loss of those 
21 See Best, S., "The Trace and the Body" in Bond, A., (ed), Trace, The Liverpool Biennal of Contemporary 
Art, Tale Liverpool 1999, where she argues for what she refers to as the "ontological slipperiness" of Doris 
Salcedo's work claiming that Merleau Ponty's aesthetics, with its focus set neither squarely on inner nor on 
outer bodily experiences, offers an apposite context far consideration of Salceda's work. She suggests that 
the 'objects' (Salcedo's sculptures), "enact a slippage between building, furniture, and the body: between 
holding the body - its life, weight, touch - and being bodies themselves, • p.177. 
.• 
who fell victim to the horrors of the civil war in Columbia. lt speaks of the violence 
meted out to those who were forcefully taken from their homes and made to 
'disappear'. 
The violence and loss is demonstrated in L~ Coso Viudo (The Widowed House, 
1994), see fig 7, which is one of a larger series of works on the same theme carried 
out over a number of years by Salcedo. Through its title the house takes on the 
emotions and qualities of a widow whose husband has been murdered or killed. 
What appears to be a cupboard door is attached to a small cabinet. The door con 
no longer be opened and the cabinet appears to be functionless. Familiar pieces of 
household furn iture appear to set up a sense of resistance through their structure 
and modified appearance. The resituation and weighting of the work suggests an 
immovable barricade. The work communicates the painful absence of the original 
occupiers. The work paradoxically functions on the psychical emptiness of fil led in 
furniture. Salcedo has carefully placed white buttons in the gap between the boards 
on the cabinet top. This placement when viewed in tandem with the zipper placed 
on the side of the cabinet offers a disturbing and confusing frame of understanding. 
Nancy Princethal suggests that: 
th is rather remarkable perceptual transposition between the tacti le and the visual 
has a counterpoint in her ability to invert perceptions of inanimate and animate 
object.22 
There is a sense of deathly permanence to the works yet also a refusal to 
participate, a finality to the possibility of use and abuse. In the absence of the 
owners, the house and its contents are forcib ly there, the house widowed and 
mourning with the door permanently adhered to the cabinet. 
Through Salcedo's methodology and visual strategies a set of critical questions are 
raised about the way in which absence is understood through the visual. Her 
processes go beyond, and problematize, a material description. Part of th is 
22 Princethal, N., "Silence Seen" in Doris Safcedo, Phaidon Press, 2000, p.62. 
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7 Doris Solcedo 
La Coso Viudo 11 (The Widowed House), 1993 -4. 
theoretical tension is connected to the impossibility of containment which appears to 
be attempted nonetheless. This dilemma leads into another facet of this problem, 
namely, the notion of suggesting and then negotiating what might be paradoxically 
regarded as ' embodied absence'. By this, I mean to suggest another negotiation of 
absence that attempts to parcel it up into a containable, manageable mass through 
conflating a projected (or imagined) absence with its material realisation. This 
proposition is distinct from that concerning the consideration of Whiteread and 
Salcedo as it attempts to negotiate something that has never existed. In this regard I 
want to consider the work of Klaus Scherubel, specifically his piece: Mallarme, Le 
Livre (Reading Room), 1999-2005 presented at Optica, Montreal, Canada, 2005. 
In the project Mallarme, Le Livre (Reading Room), 1999-2005, artist Klaus 
Scherubel, constructed Le Livre [The Book], a project proposed by Malla rme, which 
would supposedly uncover the relations that 'exist between all things', or to 
'symbolically encompass all of literature'.23 Mallarme's project never came to 
23 See http://www.optica.ca/cataloqenq.html, publications page. See also Wright, S., Art Papers 29 noS 60-
1S/O 2005, Montreal , http://vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com. Where he argues that ScherObel was attempting to 
address an "impending absence of an absence by making it present", further, that the absence of presence 
fruition, but Scherubel took the absence of this tome as the impetus to create what 
he imagined to be the form of the object. The work positions a complicated 
engagement with absence. The plain blue book is instantly recognisible and 
classifiable as an object. The book form communicates accessibility to knowledge 
through recognised codes of -presentation; the book is given a dust jacket complete 
with synopsis on the back with ISBN number and numerical library assignation. 
Scherubel 's name is boldly on the front giving him the status of editor or author of 
"Mallarme, Le Livre". The placement of his name suggests a purposefully mediated 
approach. No words are typed or written on the pages as styrofoam is used to 
replace paper leaves and the volume of possible words is suggested by the width of 
a lightweight rectangular space. The work offers accessiblity on the surface but this 
accessibility is confounded by the fact that the book cannot be opened or read; it 
remains a replica of a book. 
Several complex issues are invoked by the work and the strategies employed by 
Scherubel. lt awkwardly hovers on the edge of disrupting the conceptual worth of 
Mallarme's project. This awkwardness partly resides with the fact that the 'absent' 
book, which was imagined and projected as a possibil ity by Mallarme was never 
actually produced by him. Scheurbel, however, gives material form to Mallarme's 
project. In attempting its inception, Scheurbel introduces the possibil ity of something 
unrealised being made physically tangible. In a sense, a recognition of its 'absence' 
is only made possible through Mallarme's expressed intent to produce the 'object'. 
This is a suggestion which is marked by copious handwritten notes compiled by 
Mallarme. His project explores the relations that exist 'between all things' but this 
practically involves describing its physicality and composition but not its actual 
should not be conflated with absence. Ultimately, he maintains that the work aims to 'absentify' art from the 
material to the cerebral. 
For a comparative interpretive treatment of another of Mallarme's works see: Krauss, R., Voyage on the 
North Sea: Art in the Age of the Post-Medium Condition, London: Thames and Hudson Ltd, 1999. Krauss 
discusses Marcel Broodthaers's revision of Baudelaire's poem La Beaute, suggesting that it follows 
Mallarme's approach to 'Un coup de des jamais n'abolira le hazard', but posits that this is not In keeping with 
what actually occurs in Baudelaire's poem, see especially pp.47- 52. I would suggest that arguably in the 
case of Le Livre, the production of an actual object contradicts the spirit and conceptual worth of Mallarme's 
project which was surely a symbolic book which marked the 'end of the book'. William Barker in his paper: 
"Je suis moi-fidele au livre, Mallarme and the End of the Book", refers to the possibility of Le Livre being 
considered as an "Unbook" as there is an absence of narrative or structure. See 
httpJ/www.ucs.mun.ca/-wbarker/mallarme.htlm. 
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content. The omission of this information points towards the 'absence' of an 
imagined object being described by Scherubel through a material substitute for a 
conceptual proposition. Moreover, it is an imagined idea of what is actually 'absent' 
constructed in relation to a specific framework: strangely, the constructed absence 
displacing the 'imagined' absence. I would argue that this gestures towards a desire 
to contain on instability that conditions absence's possibility. Through negotiating 
the strange 'absence' of the book through its production, Scherubel has, to a 
certain extent, brought light to bear on its earlier status, the force of which, I would 
argue, was contingent on evading materiality. 
With this in mind, however, the tension between Mallarme's conceptual project and 
the paradoxical materialisation of the work disrupts the reception of the book as a 
book and as an artwork. lt provokes a retracing of theoretical steps, a hesitancy 
concerning the reconciliation of the two facets of the work which reside wi th the 
imagined project and the later interpretation and materialisation by Scherubel. 
8 Klous Scherubel 
Mollorme, Le Livre (Reading Room), 1999-2005. 
Through his methodology, Scherubel draws the viewer relunctantly into the form of 
the book, the physicality of which seems to contradict Mallorme's project. However, 
the omission of the written content and the inaccessibility of the work creates an 
impasse for the project to ever 'symbollically encompass all of literature'. lt is not 
simply a question of embodied absence, the work repeats the impossibility of the 
theoretical project through its material approach. 
Scherubel, Whiteread and Salcedo's works collectively complicate and disrupt the 
limitations conferred on an understanding of absence, and consequently invoke a 
reconsideration of the inadequacy of how absence is seen to function or signify 
within the visual arts. To complement these considerations, I want to consider 
another kind of frame relating specifical ly to the critical consideration of painting as 
a vehicle for absence. Again, as with the artists previously considered, the work of 
Luc T uymans demands attention with regard to the discourses that a rise around the 
work presented. I am interested in the spaces that his work opens up for rethinking 
the perceived lim its of visual forms and the impl ications this might hove for the 
construction of meaning with regard to absence. 
Specifically, in relation to T uymans' paintings I would isolate three main concerns 
that have relevance to my research and which open up possibil ities for how absence 
might be understood. Firstly, I would suggest that his desire for the meaning of his 
work not to be limited to the frame of ' pictorial representation' arguably articulates 
a condition of all visual work, nonetheless, it reasserts a chal lenge to the perceived 
limitations of painting and this is crucia l.24 Secondly, that th is frame of expanded 
understanding is based, at times, on negotiating that which is 'unrepresentable' -
which has resonance for a consideration of absence os a space of indeterminacy. 
Thirdly, the difficulties arising from his work demand a reconsideration of how 
meaning gets constructed through the work. When Ulrich Loock, for example, 
suggests that meaning in T uymans's work is more important to the artist than the 
picture he is, in part, gesturing towards a decentring of pictorial privilege. This 
decentring is based on the premise that representations are 'missing' their object and 
24 See Loock, U., "On layers of sign-relations, in the light of mechanically reproduced pictures, from ten 
years of exhibitions" in Luc Tuymans, London: Phaidon Press Ltd., 1996, pp.32-94 
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meaning is gleaned through whot he refers to os 'external discourse' such os titles. 25 
Further to this, through the use of these 'external discourses' his paintings might be 
seen to generate wider questions relating to what pictorial representation can 
actually achieve26 . This consideration has importance for understanding how we 
negotiate the limits of painting. 
For him there is no autonomy of pointing, no symbolic value of pointing itself. tt is 
deployed, used. Overall, however, his statements must be correctly understood. His 
works make it plain that it can only ever be a question of failed meoningY 
Certainly, arguably, the meaning of any pointing is never entirely confined to 
pictorial representation anyway, but of key importance here, I would suggest, is that 
an economy of understanding is founded on a gesture towards that which is not 
representable, in that it its full weight cannot be grasped by oHempting to point it. 
Moreover, this gesture towards the unrepresentable moves some way towards 
destablizing the normalized interpretive approach which prioritizes what is held 
within the frame. Of course, something gets 'presented' but there is a subtle slippage 
which is achieved, in part, through the fragmentary nature of the image which helps 
to disrupt the location of meaning. The possibilities for disruption of meaning reside 
at times in a psychical, and consequently, periodically, imagined physical domain 
because T uymans frequently tries to represent what is not representable. This 
approach to his work is specifically resonant in his paintings dealing with 
concentration camps and the Holocaust. For example, in Schworzheide, 1986 (see 
fig 9) T uymons points a haunting image of dark, truncated trees in a forest set 
against an oddly lined background. The vertical umber lines create a repetitive 
background to the dark treetops which form an apex on the canvas. As Loock points 
out, the pointing appears truncated, "as though the image had slipped" suggesting 
a misjudged photograph where the content has been missed.28 lt is a sombre, 
25 Loock in T uymans. 1996. p.48 
26 Loock in Tuymans, 1996, p.55 
27 Loock in Tuymans. 1996, p.51 
28 Loock in Tuymans, 1996, p.48. 
disturbing image. The dark treetops evoke a sense of hopelessness which is 
compounded by the title of the work, Schwarzheide. Schwarzheide was a 
concentration cornp, the material evidence of which is no longer accessible. The 
sinister and tragic undercurrents of the work are exacerbated by T uyman's 
conversation with Loock where he reveals that the camp inmates secretly mode 
drawings and cut them up into sections. The underlying intent suggested by this 
process was that the different sections would, at some point in the future, be 
reassembled. The possibility of such a drawing (and the horrible truth of its almost 
certain lack of completion) reinfuses the pointing with greater depth of meaning. By 
bringing up the story T uymons is establishing a relationship between it and our 
reading of the linearity of the pointing. Furthermore, the tensions that both the title 
and this story create with the image presented before us are palpable in spite of 
T uymon's suggestion that it is not based on an existing drawing. The strange view of 
the truncated treetops suggests a restricted view from within. Without the prior 
knowledge from T uymons regarding the strips of the drawing, the vertical lines 
present a visual barrier, a sense of containment or imprisonment. With the 
knowledge of the possibility of the tragic reconstructed drawing our understanding 
of the image is stained by an awful anticipatory fear, a prior knowledge of the 
impossibility of this painting. 
T uymon's strategy allows the force of the painting to reside with the disconcerting 
disjunction between what is seen and what the title describes. The pointing is 
awkwardly reconciled with its title, inadequate to the task it claims to take on. This 
awkwardness generates painful questions about the possibilities and inadequacies 
of representation which will always fall short of describing such horror. The 
methodology that T uymons employs positions the viewer in a way that allows for a 
powerful questioning to occur. In this case, the viewer is left to construct an 
imagined position within the camp in relation to the trees which is suggestive of an 
awful, smothering psychical space. 
T uymans' mourning consists in creating, with pictures of empty rooms and isolated 
things, the incommensurable insufficiency of pictures, in order to do justice to 
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something thot must remain outside our grasp.29 
Horror hangs with the stark inadequacy of the image and its inability to describe 
what has occurred. 
Similarly, the metaphor of the empty room in Gas Chamber 1986 (see fig 1 0) and 
the title given to the work to communicate the unspeakable horrors of the space 
seems wholly inadequate to the task. T uymans paints a seemingly empty room 
bathed in a confusingly warm light. Held within this image is a "betrayal" T uymans 
suggests, and this is where its meaning resides. 30 The aesthetic pleasure gained 
from the deep warm colour deceptively lures us into the frame. If the image did not 
make an aHempt at concealing that to which it alludes, T uymans maintains that it 
would become "absolutely inaccessible" to us.31 Without the ti~e the painting would 
appear to possibly depict the austere interior of an industrial space. The title Gas 
Chamber leaves no space for interpretive maneouvre, the dark irregular shapes on 
the ceiling and the walls are murderous tools. We are reluctantly drown into the 
deathly interior, to witness a distanced fragmentary flashback to an unspeakable 
evil. T uymans painting, which is taken from a photograph of a gas chamber, binds 
us to a visual detachment which accentuates the painting's failure. As T uymans 
suggests, the "ungraspability" of "historical reality" is "preserved in pictures"32 
The work can only gesture towards the horror of the Holocaust and our 
understanding of what is implied by the title Gas Chamber. The emptiness and 
austerity of the room pulls us into the horror of what has gone on there but there is 
a distancing from the reality of the situation through the inadequacy of the work to 
describe the tragedy. The failure of the pictorial to communicate tragedy and horror 
is used purposefully in T uymans' work. This strategy allows for the disjunction 
between what gets presented and what gets described through oblique references 
and implications, to vibrate with horrible intensity. In reference toT uymans' 
29 Loock in Tuymans. 1996, p.57. 
30 Tuymans, L, in Tuymans, 1996, p.130. 
31 Tuymans, L., in Tuymans, 1996, p.133. 
32 Tuymans, L., in Tuymans, 1996, p.BB. 
paintings that allude to the Holocaust, Gregory Salzman suggests that: 
in being repressed, the ghastly secret the painting harbours continues to haunt the 
present. The effedive dissolution of meaning in the work is the basis both of its 
horror ond its weightlessness. 33 
This disconcerting disjunction is evident in other works such as Body, 1990, where 
what appears to be a headless torso is presented as awkwardly stiff and doll-like 
(see fig 12). T uymans' advises that the painting is of a cloth doll with a zip fastner in 
the middle so it can be stuffed. He states that the lines on the torso "create the 
impression that the body is opening up" .34 However, this reading is not enitrely 
clear. The rough mark making around the body in the painting is suggestive of a 
child-like engagement with materials. The flaHened perspective and the crude 
rendition of a body with strangely rendered hands and no visible head is 
disconcerting in its detachment. The 'body' appears to be a child wearing a 
swimming suit but the body is marked with dark lines of paint on the rib cage which 
do not appear to be shadows or part of the costume design. The painful vulnerabilty 
of the 'body' in the painting and its title, lacking any specificity or personal features, 
alludes to subjection and violence and evokes fear in the viewer. The fragmented 
framing and sinister omission of information generates a deep felt unease regarding 
the well-being of the 'body' in spite of claims that it is an inert object. 
The process of strange detachment is re-iterated in Silence, 1991 (see fig 11) where 
a baby's head with yellowed, closed eyes floats detached from its body in an 
ethereal, ghostly plane. The strangely disembodied head is reminescent of a late 
Victorian photograph depicting a child laid out for mourning. The stains of dirty 
orange on the closed eyelids suggest illness resulting in death. The economical use 
of brushstrokes and the positioning of the head on a blank plane communicate a 
sense of loss. Loss is further outlined by the painting's title Silence which could be 
33 Satzman. Gregory, "Intoxicating Void" in Luc Tuymans, catalogue, The Art Gallery of York University, 
Toronto, 1994, p.20. 
34 Aliaga, Juan Vicente, • Juan Vicente Aliaga in conversation with Luc Tuymans• in T_uymans, 1996, p.16. 
See also Salzman, G., "Intoxicating Void" in Luc Tuymans, The Art Gallery of York Umverslty, Toronto 
catalogue, 1994, p.24. 
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understood to articulate mourning and the inadequacy of words to describe the 
pain. 
What comes aut of this consideration is perhaps a sense of the inadequacy of 
painting in this extreme instance to negotiate an idea. Crucial to this thinking is the 
idea that these inadequacies reveal that meaning can seem to, or even needs to, 
fail in this instance. This understanding opens up a way to consider the visual 
process as a way of thinking through and around propositions. The meaning 
arising from what is depicted exceeds the pictorial limits presented. In other words, 
meaning is not solely derived from what is represented. Meaning also resides, in 
part, in the framing of a work by title and the ideas the artwork generates. In the 
case ofT uymans's work, the disparity between what the title suggests and what is 
actually represented in the painting creates a particular kind of critical tension. 
However, this critical tension, I would argue, also comes out of the complex 
processes involved in producing an artwork. When the title provides a context for, 
or disrupts what is represented, it gestures towards the visual processes having a 
malleability where meaning is concerned. 
With this in mind, I would suggest that the work of Whiteread, Salcedo, Scherubel, 
and T uymans points up the limitations of the prevailing discourses constructed 
around absence. Interpretations of their work, based on an a priori understanding of 
absence and the opposition of absence and presence, tend la contain, categorise 
and silence certain aspects of it. Crucially, their work disrupts and challenges this 
categorisation and suggests an excess of meaning coming out of the discursive 
frames constructed around absence and the visual arts. With this in mind, I now 
want to turn to the thought of Jacques Derrida and specifically his proposition of 
difference. 
9 
Luc T uymans 
11 
9 Schwortheide, 1986. 
1 0 Gas Chamber, 1986. 
11 Silence , 199 1. 
12 Body, 1990. 
10 
12 
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SECTION 11 JACQUES DERRIDA. 
ABSENCE AND THE PROPOSITION OF DIFFERANCE. 
Problematic. 35 
But his word is "trace" (the French word carries strong implications of track, 
footprint, imprint), a word that cannot be a master-word, that presents itself as the 
mark of an anterior presence, origin, master. For "trace" one can substitute "arche-
writing" ("archi-ecriture"), or "difference," or in fact quite a few other words that 
Derrida uses in the same way.36 
For Derrida, however, a text, as we recoil, whether "literary," "psychic," 
"anthropological," or otherwise, is a play of presence and absence, a place of the 
effaced trace. (If it is to be radically conceived, [the play[ must be thought of before 
the alternative of presence and absence. 37 
Some introductory thoughts. 
This introductory sub-section will offer an overview of Section 11. Jacques Derrida' s 
particular strategies will be identified and laid out briefly, but will also be explored in 
more detail in the following sub-sections. Importantly, as Derrida's contribution to 
thinking about absence is bound up in his questioning of metaphysics, this will 
especially include the term/question of metaphysics in sub-section 11 and his position 
in relation to it. 
Derrida suggests that Western metaphysics, the branch of philosophy concerned 
with the principles of being and knowing, confers primary importance on the 
significance of presence and indeed is dominated by it. He posits that metaphysics is 
35 lt is worth noting. and keeping in mind Paul de Man's point regarding the 'academization' of Derrida. He 
suggests that what might be seen to be "subversive and incisive" in Derrida's work is diminished or removed 
by the academic process, resulting in the danger of his thought being reduced to a methodology. This sort of 
reduction is certainly not what I am suggesting by referring to Derrida's thought in this way, rather more a 
consideration of what might be seen as 'strategic' approaches. A cautionary note, however, may be made. 
See Rosso, S., "An Interview with Paul de Man", pp.115-121, in De Man, P., The Resistance to Theory, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986, pp.116-117. 
36 "Translator's Preface" by Gayatri Spivak in Derrida, Jacques Of Grammatology, London: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. xv. 
37 ·Translator's Preface· by Spivak, G., in Derrida, 1997, p.lvii. 
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structured by appositional terms which are dependent on one position being set up 
against another. These binaries are structured in a hierarchical way allowing one to 
be cost as the inferior, negative term. For example, presence is set up against 
absence, speech against writing and inferiority against exleriority. This 
understanding, he argues, is backed up by the authority of reason and is reflected in 
language. This connection of being with presence and critique of metaphysics may 
be said, to a certain exlenl, to be a development of Heidegger's thought, 
specifically in the laHer part of Being and Time. 38 
Derrida picks up particular threads of Heidegger's thinking, particularly relating to 
the importance of language, "Being" and presence, as he rethinks the way in which 
Being and presence might be understood. This thinking will be explored in sub-
section Ill. Derrida takes up elements of Heidegger's thought and develops them in 
a distinctive way. This approach involves picking up some of his conceptual threads 
and developing them in a way that is commonly referred to as 'deconstructive'. This 
term has evolved from Heidegger's term "destrukfion", but marks a distinct 
engagement with the interpretation of a lex! and its possible meanings. Rather than 
aHempling to reconstruct a unified meaning through a particular interpretive stance, 
Derrida seeks to demonstrate the points at which this possibility fails. He makes no 
distinction in the category of works he explores and considers these complexities 
across any number of texis including the literary and philosophical. He argues that 
knowledge is always disrupted by the play of language and rhetoric, although 
metaphysics tries to repress this play. Deconslruction is, in part, the unravelling of 
these points of vulnerability, developed from Heidegger's thought. 
Derrida achieves a radical challenge to what he considers to be Western 
metaphysical assumptions relating to the status of being and its relationship to 
presence through his proposition of differance. Extraordinarily, difference is 
38 There is a problem with the capitalization of "Being" when writing about Heidegger's propositions which 
are dearly delineated by Gregory Fried and Richard Poll in the "Translator's Introduction to Heidegger. M .• 
Introduction to Metaphysics. Yale University Press. 2000. They suggest that many Heideggerean scholars 
use the lower case "being" to avoid the implication of a "Supreme Being" that stands above all others; "das 
Sein must not be mistaken for a subject deserving the substantiation that capitalization can imply in English. 
(In German. all nouns are capitalized so there is no such implication)". p.xi. However, they suggest use of the 
capitalized term so that "being" (da Sein) is not confused with "beings" (das Seiende) (see p.xi). For darity, I 
will observe this rule. 
expressed by Derrida as something that would seem to name 'nothing', have 'no 
weight' and to exceed conventional linguistic definition. He completely refuses to 
confine illo one singular word or name. it is presented as one of many 
interchangeable terms, including (but not limited to), trace, supplement and 
pharmakon. These terms constitute a series of "non-synonymous substitutions" which 
articulate a repetition of meaning but displace it through slight differences. 
Differance presents as something that cannot be reduced down and contained. This 
process in the construction of meaning allows for conceptual openness to be 
maintained, indeed, exceeds a conventional notion of 'concept'. If we were talking 
in any other terms, we might consider referring to 'conceptuality' to describe the 
possibilities of this proposition. However, as a concept generally functions as a 
method of containment, belonging to a particular and distinct set of ideas, this runs 
against the notion and 'effects' of differance which is neither a 'concept' as such, 
nor belongs to a set of applicable ideas in any conventional sense. I will go on to 
explore further facets of differance and its functioning in greater depth in sub-
section IV. Etymological considerations: difference. 
Derrida's use of language and rigorous textual engagement demonstrates that the 
oppositions on which the precepts of metaphysics are founded are contested. For 
the purposes of this inquiry, these ideas, coming out of a critique of metaphysics, 
have a bearing on how absence might be understood and be thought to signify. 
Whilst this challenge to metaphysics might be seen, on a general level, as being 
connected to a philosophical thread challenging certainties of thought reaching 
back to Decartes, the effects of difference produce their own, very particular, 
disruptive waves in thinking. 39 I would argue that through its effects, the proposition 
of difference forcefully articulates a challenge to the metaphysical idea of absence 
as an absolute, appositional and subsidiary condition. Indeed, it demonstrates that 
39 See Norris. C .. Deconslruclion. Oxon: Roulledge. 1991, p.43 where he discusses Descartes" systematic 
doubting of 'everything that could be doubled' resulting in a repositioning of the "certitudes of reason". 1t 
might be said that each challenge ultimately becomes an entrenched certainty waiting to be overturned. As 
Derrida states. the "concept of structure" is organised around a "series of substitutions of centre for centre". 
See Derrida. J .. "Structure. Sign. and Play" in Writing and Difference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
1978. p.279. 
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absence is not containable and can never be a complete proposition in spite of the 
fact that it is often presented as being so. 
I propose that the importance of Derrida's thought in relation to the problematic of 
'absence' lies, in part, in his proposition regarding the provisionality of meaning 
within thought which gets expressed through language, and how the possibility of 
this gets articulated through the effect of differance, the trace.' This crucially 
communicates a way of rethinking the way in which absence might signify. Further 
to this, the resistant tension that the play of differance creates is at times dynamic 
and active and at times passive. lt plays across different registers, but is however, 
neither suggestive of a theoretical rubric nor does it lend itself to any sense of 
"taxonomical closure." lt alludes to something that must be thought of as exceeding 
signification. 
By definition the list has no taxonomicol closure, and even less does not constitute a 
lexicon. first, because these are not atoms, but rather local points of economic 
condensation, sites of passage necessary for a very large number of marks, slightly 
more effervescent crucibles. Further, their effects do not simply turn back on 
themselves by means of an auto-affection without opening. Rather they spread out 
in a chain over the practical and theoretical entirety of a text, and each time in o 
different way. 40 
Consequently, what is suggested by this approach is a way of thinking that is non-
deterministic and expansive. An understanding of the way in which meaning is 
rendered malleable and undecidable through this proposition has particular 
resonance for a consideration of how absence might be re-inscribed and rethought 
in relation to the visual arts. 
In order to get a purchase on what Derrida's thinking offers to the problematic of 
absence, there are some useful initial distinctions to be made.' 1 Firstly, it is worth 
40 Derrida, J., Positions, The Athlone Press, 1961b, p.40. 
41 This is not to ove~ook the direct implication of absence in the gesture of writing, where the addressee is 
absent. See Derrida, J., "Signature Event, Context" in Derrida, J., Margins of Philosophy, Brighton: The 
Harvester Press. 1962, for an engagement with the concept of absence in relation to writing, especially, pp. 
307-330. 
pointing out that the question to be asked is not 'what is absence?' as this repeats 
the metaphysical premise of containment and authority. 
What the thought of the trace has already taught us is that it could not be simply 
submitted to the onto-phenomenological question of essence. The trace is nothing, 
it is not on entity, it exceeds the question What is? And contingently makes it 
possible. Here one may no longer trust even the opposition of fad and principle, 
which, in all its metaphysical, ontological, and transcendental forms, has always 
functioned within the system of what is. ' 2 
The proposition of differance consequently allows us to think outside of a particular 
kind of structured thinking that prioritizes an engagement with empirical worth 
relating to being and consciousness. Differance cannot be subjected to analysis that 
seeks to establish its inherent qualities. lt is seen by Derrida as the "absolute origin 
of sense in general". As Derrida points out, this "amounts to saying once again that 
there is no absolute origin of sense in genera1".43 The methods of description or 
ways of understanding differance exceed the conceptual paths that metaphysics has 
to offer. Such an approach breaks down the conventional ways of understanding 
how ideas might signify. Consequently, it is neither a question of 'what is absence' 
nor is it a question of going back to attempt to locate an 'originary absence'. Such 
an approach would not only conflate the idea of the anteriority of the trace (the 
proposition that the trace comes before presence and absence) with a palpable and 
definable space of meaning, but in so doing would haul thinking back into the 
metaphysics of presence.'' This critical engagement with questions of ontology will 
be further explored in sub-sections II.Towards the metaphysical, and Ill. Heidegger: 
being and presence. 
What is of importance is to critically consider how differance effects and makes 
possible meaning in a way that allows us to reconsider how 'absence' might signify. 
42 Derrida, 1997, p75. 
43 Derrida, 1997, p.65. 
44 See Derrida, 1997, where Derrida cautions against employing the notion of 'origin' or 'ground' when 
considering differance, as this enters into an 'onto-theological' framing which might be said to erase 
difference. Also see pp.74-75 for a discussion of the problems of origin being inextricably linked to the 
metaphysics of presence. 
20 
In this regard, care needs to be taken not to confer differance with constitutive parts, 
but rather with 'effects'. Secondly, to be careful not replace a consideration of 
'presence' with 'absence' but to think about it in relation la the dynamic movement 
of the trace. (Here, too, a cautious and qualified use of terminology is in play, as 
'effect' might be bound into 'cause', which is, again, antithetical to the proposition 
of diHerance). 
This must be an engagement with the way in which Derrida's thought allows for a 
reconfiguring of theoretical spaces and their possible mutabilities in relation to an 
understanding of absence. This rethinking is achieved through a consideration of 
the 'conceptual effects' of diHerance. DiHerance might be viewed in a strategic 
sense, with its 'transformalive' possibilities presented as residing in language, but 
with the implications of its possible 'conceptual' worth in a wider sense {in terms of 
the theoretical possibilities it might generate), going far beyond this partial 
delineation. 
11 TOWARDS THE METAPHYSICAL. 
In order to consider what Derrida's thinking might offer to a rethinking of the 
problematic of 'absence', it is important to consider the nature of the thought it 
challenges. Derrida's contribution to thinking about absence is bound up in his 
particular questioning of metaphysics. To understand his position in relation to 
metaphysics this sub-section will explore what it lays out and how Derrida stands in 
relation to it. 
The term "metaphysics" is from the Greek to meta to phusika- the thing after the 
physics, which is from Aristotle. 45 lt is used to refer to any exploration into 
dimensions of reality that reside outside of scientific methodologies. For example, 
what do we understand by reality or indeed God? Metaphysics as an inquiry has 
45 Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933. 
generated many questions including those relating to the nature of presence, the 
mind, knowing, the existence of God, truth and being. In response to these 
questions, metaphysics attempts to establish a basis on which these enquiries might 
be understood. Namely, there is a desire to find a single focal point of truth or 
origin on which to found these questions. Metaphysics is defined as: 
That branch of speculative inquiry which treats of the first principles of things, 
including such concepts as being, substance, essence, time, space, cause, identity, 
etc.; theoretical philosophy as the ultimate science of Being and Knowing. 46 
This attempt to categorise in order to achieve an understanding is linked to 
ontological questions which seek to explore being in the world. Ontology is the 
branch of metaphysics which is concerned with being. lt establishes different 
categories of being so that 'entities' (that which has a particular and distinct 
existence but is not necessarily understood in a material way), might be identified. lt 
questions how something might 'be' and how entities might be understood in 
relation to each other and being in the world. 
A critical engagement with metaphysics as an inquiry has a longstanding history. 
lt has been viewed with ambivalence and scepticism by thinkers such as 18'h century 
Scottish philosopher David Hume, for example, and critiqued by Nietzsche in the 
19"' century and Heidegger in the 20"'. Hume dismisses the claims of metaphysics 
suggesting that knowledge is derived through what he refers to as "perceptions" 
which are composed of ideas and impressions. 47 Hume's 'dictum' posits that 
statements may be understood in two ways. Statements are either analytic 
propositions, that is, propositions about ideas which are separate from experience, 
or synthetic propositions, ideas that are knowable and derived from experience. He 
asserts that the latter {namely synthetic propositions) are not certain in that ideas 
expressed through experience may be falsified. This thinking has repercussions for 
46 OED, 1933. 
47 See Norton, D., (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Hume, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993. He suggests that Hume: "degrades to the status of fictions everything that transcends impressions and 
ideas. On the other hand, he ascribes to the processes of mind the same sort of reality as the transcendent 
things that we would reach if we could somehow break out of the cirde of immanence." P.18. 
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expressed through experience may be falsified. This thinking has repercussions for 
the claims of science, for example. Moreover, he establishes that 'truths' about the 
world and the relations within it cannot be definitely verified. This critical 
engagement with metaphysics is also demonstrated in the thought of Nietzsche 
specifically in The Will to Power (1885), Beyond Good and Evil (1886) and in 
Heidegger's thought which I shall explore in section IV. 48 
Ill DERRIDA AND THE METAPHYSICAl. 
Derrida views the metaphysical approach to understanding as logocentric. 49 The 
term logocentric is derived from the Greek word logos which might be understood 
as the word, reason, unquestionable authority, God. Derrida engages critically with 
the tenets of Western metaphysics which he suggests seek to establish particular 
foundations or ideas of truth and origin, the logos. In particular, he posits that these 
foundations achieve an alleged 'truth' through establishing binary oppositions which 
privilege one term over the other. Importantly, the first term is given full presence 
and the second subordinated and is understood in relation to absence. Derrida 
maintains that the "matrix" of the history of metaphysics is always the "determination 
of presence in all senses of the word."50 As Spivak stales: "Derrida uses the word 
"metaphysics" very simply as shorthand for any science of presence".51 Derrida 
refers to this "science of presence" as "the metaphysics of presence" throughout his 
thought. 52 Importantly, the connection of being to presence (the metaphysics of 
presence), is communicated through language. 
According to Derrida, the ruling illusion of Western metaphysics - that reason can 
somehow dispense with language and achieve a knowledge ideally unaffected by 
such mere linguistic foibles 5 3 
48 Hollingdale, R.J., Nietzsche, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. 
49 See Derrida, 1981b, p.51, for a consideration of /ogocen/rism. Derrida suggests that it may be seen in 
part as "the matrix of idealism", but lt is complex and its architecture exceeds this frame. 
50 Derrida, J., Writing and Difference, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978, p.279. 
51 Spivak, G., "Translator's Preface· in Derrida, 1997, p.xxi. 
52 Spivak, G., "Translator's Preface" in Derrida, 1997. 
53 Norris, C., Deconstruction, RouUedge, 2002, p.19. 
Derrida posits that in metaphysical thinking the central focus for meaning is on 
speech and ideas expressed through speech. This proposition places importance on 
the presence of both the person speaking and the person who is listening to the 
spoken word. Writing, which out of this logic is set up against speech, necessarily 
becomes cast as definitively inferior because it is consequently understood in 
relation to absence. With the written word the writer is no longer present and it 
therefore lacks the immediacy and presentness of the spoken word. Furthermore, 
rather than being understood for its own worth it is presented as that which 
represents the spoken word. Instead of bringing with it immediacy of meaning, in 
metaphysical terms, the wrillen word brings with it the implication of distance. 
Consequently, the word, or logos is expressed in a phonocentric way. In other 
words, writing is seen as a shadow of speech because the spoken word has 
presence and writing implies absence. Moreover, through this proposition there is a 
suggested transparency between the spoken word and meaning which Derrida 
challenges. 
Further to this, Derrida suggests that metaphysical thinking posits that there is a 
central truth which exists, a transcendental signified, namely one meaning that 
overshadows all others. 'Signs' conveying these authoritative meanings are 
presented as external to the movement of language. This idea notionally articulates 
a particular assumed condition for meanings to arise; namely, it follows the 
logocentric premise that meaning is internal to consciousness and needs no external 
interaction. 11 puts forward the proposition that there is an assumed ground of truth 
which gets established through language. So perhaps rather than the transcendental 
signified being interpreted as a signified (a meaning) that overshadows all others, it 
is seen by Derrida as a general, assumed, structural condition of meanings in 
metaphysical thought. This structural condition gets expressed through language, 
the spoken word. This premise, in turn, is based on an assumption of generalised 
truth. Meaning is seen to arise from ideas that defer to 'reason' where an overriding 
truth presides over and determines what is to be understood. The central focus is on 
meaning and/or ideas expressed through speech, then writing. This means that 
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there is no consideration of how meaning gets constructed in the first place and 
writing is cast definitively as inferior to speech. 
The transcendental signified is identified with the "intelligible" which is set up against 
the "sensible". This is an opposition which finds its roots in Aristotlean thought and 
the premise upon which the concept of the sign is founded. 54 Metaphysical thought 
then relies on meaning not being seen as an 'effect of language' but as that which 
stands as an overorching truth for an interpretation of the world. 55 Crucially, Derrida 
suggests that meaning is an effect of language rather than what precipitates it. This 
allows for any claim for 'centrality' or 'truth' of meaning to be disrupted. He argues 
for undecidability at the origin of meaning through asserting that any meaning 
depending on speech is already conditioned by difference. He suggests that 
meaning communicated through speech is already structured by the very differences 
(and consequently temporal distances) seemingly conferred on writing. In effect, this 
idea complicates the possibility of the opposition in language between speech and 
writing suggested by metaphysics. Consequently, the differential within meaning is 
allowed to surface. As the 'metaphysics of presence' is seen by Derrida to work 
through these foundational mechanisms of opposition, it importantly establishes 
'Being as presence'. This premise is of central importance because it has an 
immediate impact on the way in which absence might be understood. Coming out 
of metaphysical logic where presence is connected with "Being" and consciousness 
and absence is constructed in opposition, absence might in an absolute sense be 
read as 'non-presence' and therefore 'non-being'. 
54 See Howells, C., Deconstruclion From Phenomenology to Ethics, Polity Press, 1999, p.44, where she 
points out that the transcendental signifed is identified with the intelligible, which in tum connects it 
theologically to the divine Logos "from which the sensible signifier represents a fall" (Gram, 25). Aristode's 
engagement with Being in Metaphysics, Book 4 is cited as being the basis from which Martin Heidegger 
developed his thought surrounding phenomenological ontology. See Sedgwick, P., Edgar, A., Cultural 
Theory, London: Routledge, 2002, p.11. 
551n Denida, 1981b, p. 52, in discussion with Houdebine (in reference to the Cluny colloquium), Denida 
defends himself against the suggestion that his "grammatic" is based on Heideggerean metaphysics which "it 
attempts to 'deconstruct' by substituting the anteriority of the trace for the 'presence of the logos; it 
constitutes itself as an onto-theology based on the trace as 'ground,' 'foundation' or 'origin'." He asserts that 
the trace is not a foundation or origin and questions how the notion of a Heideggerean metaphysics can be 
so easily put forward as a proposition. 
In order to contemplate the complexities and impact of Derrida's critique of Western 
metaphysics, it is important to reflect on how some aspects of these conceptual 
possibilities find earlier resonance in Heidegger' s thought. Derrida suggests that 
Heidegger questions the centrality of presence, and through this, consciousness as 
the locus of Being. 
Thus one comes to posit presence- and specifically consciousness, the being 
beside itself of consciousness - no longer as the absolutely central form of Being 
but as a "determination" and as an "effect." A determination or an effect within a 
system which is no longer that of presence but of diHerance, a system that no longer 
tolerates the opposition of activity and passivity, nor that of cause and effect, or of 
indetermination and determination, etc., such that in designating consciousness as 
an effect or a determination, one continues -for strategic reasons that can be more 
or less lucidly deliberated and systematically calculated- to operate according to 
the lexicon of that which one is de-limitings6 
However, this proposition demands some careful qualification. Derrida defends 
himself against the suggestion that his "grammatic" is based on what is referred to 
as a 'Heideggerean metaphysics'. "How does one model oneself after what one 
deconstructs? Can one speak so simply of Heideggerean metaphysics?" 57 
Crucially, Derrida carefully positions himself in a way that acknowledges the 
immense importance of Heidegger's texts whilst distancing his work from the 
suggestion that it might "resemble a text of Heideggerean filiation". 58 His work 
always constitutes a movement away. With this in mind, it is important to consider 
Heidegger's thinking around 'presence' and 'Being' and how his thinking opens up 
conceptual and interpretive possibilities. Some of these points are later picked up 
and developed by Derrida through the effects of differance, the trace. 
56 Denida, 1982, p.17. 
57 Denida, 1981b, p.52. 
58 Denida, 1981b, p.54. 
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IV HEIDEGGER: BEING AND PRESENCE 
Specifically, from a 'philosophical' point of view, Derrida's proposition of differance 
finds qualified conceptual threads in Heidegger's thinking regarding his critical 
engagement with the concept of 'being'. This consideration is important because 
Heidegger rethinks the way in which being and presence might be understood and 
this has o bearing on Derrida's thinking.59 
Heidegger's initial proposition of o fundamental ontology aims to uncover the 
structures of being. He oHempts to rethink the way in which Being and presence 
might be understood. 60 This inquiry, through its need to establish the basis or 
'foundation' for his understanding, is held within the remit of Western metaphysical 
thinking. However, Heidegger later develops his thought in a way that opens up 
certain kinds of theoretical possibilities. By allowing presence and being to be drawn 
out of the presuppositions of metaphysical frames he offers an alternative approach 
to interpretation. Certain dimensions of this thinking impact and shed light on 
Derrido's formulation of differance. 
Heidegger's initial engagement with Being is distinct from understondings 
formulated after 1927 when his thought went through some radical conceptual 
changes. In the intial phase, his concern with fundamental ontology and the 
revealing of the structures of being focuses on human centredness and conscious-
centred philosophy. Central to his thinking at this stage is his proposition of 'Da-
sein', or 'there-being' ('do-there' and 'sein-being1 which is connected to his own 
particular interpretation of 'human modes of being'. Heidegger casts Dosein as the 
central site for disclosure for beings and confers on it primary importance and 
focus. Human beings ore presented as central within this configuration.61 As Dasein 
59 As previously mentioned Heidegger asserts that he is not a 'philosopher' as such and prefers to refer to 
'thinking'. 
60 Chartes Guignon points outlhatthe idea of a 'fundamental ontology'. revealing the way in which or the 
structures through which 'being' exists. is later held to be problematic by Heidegger. He felt that perhaps it 
gestured towards metaphysical precepts, namely the revealing of something 'foundationat'. See Guignon, 
1993, p. 65. 
61 See Collins. J., Introducing Heidegger, Icon Books Ltd., 1999, p.117. 
is, at this time, presented by Heidegger as the focal point for the disclosure of 
beings, the idea of this space where beings come forth is formulated and referred to 
as the clearing by Heidegger. 
The clearing (/ichlung) is on enigmatic term, and etymologically speaking, it presents 
in an ambiguous and mysterious way. lt oilers both illumination, lighting and o 
space or opening.62 lt is in the clearing that the presencing and absencing of being 
occurs; what is later described os the "conceo/ing-unconcea/ment", or "disclosure-
undisclosure". Here, entities come forth and ore unconcealed (presencing), whilst 
others are concealed through this coming forth (obsencing). 
Importantly, when Heidegger mode changes to this early formulation, he recast 
Dasein as one element amongst others. Consequently, human modes of being 
become port of o wider understanding of Being rather than human understanding 
providing its only frome. 63 This distinction is of central importance because it allows 
for a re-conceptuolization of the clearing to occur; Dosein is now in the clearing 
along with every other mode of being. His thought consequently moved away from 
humon-centredness and conscious-centred philosophy. This thinking allows for a 
sense or understanding of 'Being' to be challenged. This change was specifically 
related to preconceived notions which linked Dosein to ideas of centrality and 
presence. lffoundotionol presuppositions ore mode about 'Being' then there is on 
implication that o complete understanding might actually be oHained, or as 
Heidegger puts it, these meanings point towards "a definite horizon by which the 
understanding is fulfilled". 64 lt is in the process of unravelling these problems that 
Heidegger seeks to re-evaluate what we understand by 'being'. 
The boundary drawn around the sense of "Being" stays within the sphere of 
presentness and presence {Gegenwartigkeif und Andwesenheil}, subsistence and 
62 As Colt ins points out. clearing is Uchtung in German which means both an opening or space and lighting; 
a space of darity or illumination. See Collins. 1999. p.118. 
63 See Zimmerman, M., in Guignon, 1993, p.247, where he suggests that 'human understanding' could now 
be conceived as "as aspect of being itselF, rather than being framed by human understanding. 
64 Heidegger, M., Introduction to Metaphysics, London: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.96. 
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substance {Bestehen und Bestand}. slaying and coming forth. 65 
Thus Being is understood within the realm of presentness {Gegenwatiigkeit), which 
refers to 'now' and is therefore temporally infonmed, and presence (Andwesenheit). 
Port of this understanding of the limits of "Being" occurs through distinguishing 
between the ontic and ontological. In other words, Heidegger makes a distinction 
between how entities ore defined and categorised on the one hand, and the way in 
which they might occur, or 'be' on the other.66 This distinction is crucial because, os 
Derrido points out, Heidegger wants to mark the difference "between Being and 
beings, the forgotten of metaphysics", that which has "disappeared without a 
lrace".67 This delineates what he refers to os the "erasure of the early trace" (die 
fruhe Spur). 68 
This manifestation of entities or consideration of the way in which they might occur, 
is presented by Heidegger os surfacing through the clearing. Heidegger's Dasein, 
'there-being,' which describes the human mode of being, is now in the clearing 
along with all other modes of being. Heidegger proposes that in order for 
something to appear, something else must be concealed. lt is not a case of 
something either being present or absent, what is written into the possibility of 
presencing is what does not appear, or is not disclosed. In other words, that which 
is absent presents os a reverberating shadowy underside to whatever appears. 
Therefore, implied in every "concealment" is on "unconcealment". This thinking 
crucially underlines the ideo that different ways of appearing ore possible but 
through surfacing in one way, other ways ore blocked out, concealed. The act of 
coming into presence for being must necessarily be laced with absences that occur 
through this process of "conceolment-unconcealment". 
65 Heidegger, 2000, p.96. 
66 See Collins, 1999, p.22; Sedgwick, 2002, p.97. 
67 Derrida, 1982, p.23-25. Derrida quotes Heidegger: "However, the distinction between Being and beings. 
as something forgotten, can invade our experience only if it has already unveiled itself with the presencing of 
what is presence (mit Anwesen des Andwesenden): only if it has left a trace (eine Spur gepragh hat) which 
remains preserved (gewahrt bleibt) in the language to which Being comes". 
68 Derrida, 1982, p.24. 
Port of this complexity is articulated through a notion of temporality that informs 
Heidegger's proposition of being. Heidegger equates human existence with 
temporality; it is lemporolity.69 Being is presented os being connected to three 
engagements with lime, which ore concurrent, but different, incorporating the 
future, post and present and communicating a crucial openness. T emporolity is not 
seen os being separate from being but port of it, and this in turn, is seen os port of 
what Heidegger refers to os a care structure. 70 In other words, everything that is in-
the-world, Being-in-the-world, has significance and is seen os a whole. The concept 
of core (Sorge) is bound into temporality and stoles of temporality ore seen os 
integral to each other. 71 Heidegger suggests that: 
the formally existential totality of Dasein' s ontological structural whole must 
therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-
of ilself-Being-already-in-(the-world). This Being-alongside (entities encountered 
within-the-world). This Being fills in the signification of the term "care" !Sorgej, 
which is used in a purely ontalagica-exislenlial manner. 72 
Consequently, if modolities of being ore connected to on integral temporal frame 
then being cannot be connected solely to the present. This means that being is 
equally connected to the post, future and present. The possibility of being then, 
cannot be tied into a notion of presence alone os it is inextricably linked to absence, 
which is written into all temporal stoles. As a consequence of this thinking, the 
dynamic of presencing is not simply reducible to on appositional conceit of absence 
or presence. Integral to this is the ideo that withdrawal and coming into presence 
ore concepts that are difficult, if not impossible, to separate from each other. This 
complex ideo of presencing serves to challenge the way in which we understand 
coming into being. 73 
In the inceptive disclosure of the Being of beings, then becoming, as well as 
69 Mulhall, 1996, p.145. 
70 Mulhall, 1996, p.193. 
71 For a more in depth understanding of Serge in relation to Oasein see: Heidegger, M., Being and Time, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962, (Translators: Macquarrie & Robinson), p.237. 
72 Heidegger, 1962, p.237. 
73 Heidegger, M., Introduction To Metaphysics (translators: Gregory Fried & Richard Poll), London: Yale 
University Press, 2000, pp. 121-122. 
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seeming, must be opposed to Being. Yet becoming, as "arising" nevertheless 
belongs to phusis. If we understand both in a Greek manner, becoming as coming-
into-presence ond going-away out of presence, Being as emergent and appearing 
coming to presence, not-Being as absence, then the reciprocal relation between 
emerging and decaying is appearance, Being itself. Just as becoming is the 
seeming of Being, seeming as appearing is the becoming of Being?• 
Paradoxically, as Being is presented as both definite and indefinite, Heidegger 
suggests that it cannot be delineated, it is not a tangible entity, and he warns 
against trying to secure its meaning, yet strangely, we have an assured sense of it. 75 
Heidegger suggests Dasein is complicated by its inability to be compared to 
anything else: "its only other is Nothing, Das Nichts", and "here there is nothing to 
be compared". He also suggests that "no thing corresponds to the word and the 
meaning Being". However, even this stale of 'nothingness' might be seen or 
interpreted as a state of Being, as it presents as a singular and loaded term. 
"Everything that is not simply nothing, is- and for us, even Nothing "belongs" to 
"Being". Crucially, too, he proposes that Being "must be indeterminate in order to 
be susceptible to determination". 76 This gestures towards the idea of anteriority; 
Being is beyond signification, it exceeds articulation. Moreover, the idea of 
presencing alludes to a sort of trace structure; withdrawal and coming into being. 
The slipperiness of these ideas works against the normalised 'constitutive parts' or 
definitive determinations of metaphysical precepts. 
lt is important to cautiously reassert that these points might be suggestive of 
conceptual possibilities. Perhaps we might glean from this that the mutual inscription 
described by Heidegger's 'being' might be suggestive of a reciprocity of state; that 
withdrawal and coming into presence could be seen to be part of the same dynamic 
thread, woven together. Where ever there is presence it is conditioned by absence 
and vice versa. The undulating quality of thought relating to withdrawal and coming 
into presence might have resonance with certain effects of diHerance as there is 
74 Heidegger, 2000, p.121-122. 
75 Heidegger, 2000, p.82. 
76 See Heidegger, 2000, pp.83-95. 
perhaps a sense of 'differencing' between what is there and what does not appear. 
Moreover, Heidegger's conceptualization of presence and its withdrawal confers a 
fluidity of matter and meaning, a vague dissolution of one idea into the other. 
Absences are presented as occuring in the clearing but there is a blurry, evanescent 
quality to this manifestation which is necessarily linked to presences. In this 
approach, one idea might be said to be implicated in the existence of the other but 
does not confine it. This way of thinking sets up the possibility of an engagement 
with the non-appositional and in turn, throws the idea of a stable condition or reality 
of interpreting the world into question. 
Thus, Heidegger's conception of being and presence and its complexities draws us 
back into rethinking the way in which the metaphysics of presence sets up 
oppositions. His thinking conditions certain ideas relating to signification and 
temporality. We are provided with a broad context of conceptual possibilities from 
which to consider how Derrida picks up and develops threads of this thinking 
through the play of diHerance. A fundamental part of this unfolds with a critical 
engagement with the opposition of terms. 
V OPPOSITIONS 
In general what these hierarchical oppositions do is privilege unify, identity, 
immediacy, and temporal and spatial presenlness over distance, difference, 
dissimulation, and deferment. 77 
Derrida proposes that the appositional and structured dynamic of 
metaphysical thinking is revealed through understanding what he refers to 
as the 'unmarked' status of the dominant term in language. In this instance, 
the dominant term denotes the term which is structured in language to be 
77 See Johnson, B., "Translator's Preface" in Derrida, Dissemination, Chicago: The Althone Press 
Ltd.,1981a, p.viii where she forwards the idea that Derrida's critique is not simply reducible to appositional 
oonceils, but that implied within this is that one tem1 is less desirable than the other. 
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the more important, positive component of the opposition. For example, as 
presence is conveyed in metaphysical thinking as being connected to being, 
absence is seen as the negative shadow of presence. Presence is understood 
as being inextricably linked to Being and immediacy and absence is the 
inverse of this, connected to non-being and distance. The idea of 'marking' 
allows for a 'natural', marked position to be given to the subordinate term 
in relation to the 'dominant' term. Derrida attempts to demonstrate that this 
constructed opposition is an unfounded, unsubstantiated proposition 
because an understanding of the primacy of the first term is conditioned by 
the necessary subjugation of the 'secondary' one. The 'primacy' of one over 
the other consequently has to firstly involve the negotiation of an acceptance 
of the projected hierarchy. Secondly, it must also, through the very act of 
having established this order, have taken the 'secondary' into account in a 
specific way for its 'authority' to be established. Therefore, it can only be 
understood as a' primary' term if positioned in relation to, or informed by 
another which is cast as a 'secondary' one. This contradiction immediately 
disrupts any notion of a 'pure' or 'complete' positioning being legitimised, 
as the terms are necessarily constitutive of each other. However, in 
recognising this dynamic, Derrida does not suggest that the appositional 
conceit be abolished: 
... but to see what indicates that each of the terms must appear os the difference of 
the other, os the other different and deferred in the economy of the same (the 
intelligible as differing-deferring the sensible, as the sensible different and deferred; 
differing-deferring intuition; culture as nature different and deferred, differing-
deferring; all the others of physis-tekhne, nomos, thesis, society, freedom, history, 
mind, etc.-as physis different and deferred, or as physis in difference. 78 
This proposition is crucial because, drawing from the conceptual frame of 
Heidegger relating to the circle of understanding and the disconnectedness between 
entities, it proposes that we rethink the way in which the oppositions ore understood 
and validated. 
78 Derrida, J., Margins of Philosophy, Brighton The Harvester Press, 1982, p.11. 
Consequently, in proposing that terms ore illuminated through their differences to 
each other, Derrido puts forward the idea of meaning being deferred and displaced 
rather than central and determining. This particular understanding of meaning 
disrupts any supposition that might guarantee it centrality or dominance. Meaning is 
actively decentred in this approach. Instead, we ore confronted with lacerated, 
shaken, and moving edges of meaning. This rethinking of the way in which meaning 
might be constructed has implications for the way in which the authority of 'truth', 
'logos', (that which is seen to constitute meaning, ideas), is understood. Moreover, 
with regard to the metaphysical appositional of presence and absence, this thinking 
presents a challenge to the authority and 'truth' of presence and being. This is key 
to understanding what the ploy of difference effects, as this assumption is integral to 
concepts of being pervading Western thought in disparate forms. As Derrido stoles: 
... all names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center (sic) hove always 
designated on invariable presence - eidos, orche, telos, energeio, ousio (essence, 
existence, substance, subject) olthethio, tronscendolity, consciousness, God, man, 
and so forth. 79 
However, although his project challenges and overturns the assumptions that are 
laid down by Western metaphysical thought there still remains a caveat; a residing 
understanding that whatever gets formulated in language is already laced with 
"presuppositions inseparable from metophysics".80 
The task of undoing the history of logocentrism in order to disinter difference would 
thus appear to be a doubly impossible one: on the one hand, it can only be 
conducted by means of notions of revelation, representation, and rectification, 
which are the logocenlric notions par excellence, and on the other hand, it con only 
dig up something that is really nothing - a difference, a gap, on interval, a trace. 
How then, can such a task be undertaken?81 
79 Derrida, J., Writing and Difference, Alan Bass (ed), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 
279-280. 
80 See Derrida, 1981, p.19, see also Spivak, G., "Translator's Preface" in Derrida, 1997, p.xix where she 
suggests that 'Derrida's philosopher' acknowledges that there is "no toot that does not belong to the 
metaphysical box". 
81 Johnson, B., "Translator's Preface" in Derrida, 1981a, p.x. 
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... the trace is not more ideal than real, not more intelligible than sensible, not more 
a transparent signification than on opaque energy and no concept of metaphysics 
con describe it."82 
This is an important facet of Derrida's thinking because it highlights the idea that 
difference disrupts a stable positioning for meaning, whilst necessarily functioning in 
relation to, and acknowledging, metaphysical thinking. If we are drawn back into a 
critical relationship with the metaphysical premise that speech is privileged over 
writing with language being seen as "the full continuity of speech", and that there is 
a necessary link between signifier and signified, then it is important to consider haw 
Derrida's proposition of difference disrupts at the level of the signifier. 
VI AGAINST THE TRANSCENDENTAL SIGNIFIED: 
A SIGN OF INAUDIBLE DISRUPTION 
. . . They all amount, at one moment or another, to a subordination of the movement 
of difference in lover of the presence of a value or meaning supposedly antecedent 
to difference, more original than it, exceeding and governing it in the lost analysis. 
This is still the presence of what we called above the "transcendental signified." 83 
The idea of a central, present truth implicit in the metaphysical notion of a 
transcendental signified is put forward by Derrida as a containing and limiting 
principle. He proposes that it is an illusory premise that functions on denying or 
covering over difference. Moreover, the supposition of a central, overarching 
signified determines a specific kind of 'originary' meaning predicated on 
establishing a hierarchical structure. This structuring ensures that the play of 
signification is severely restricted and controlled. This restriction occurs through an 
assumption that the signifier has a direct descriptive relation to the 'original' 
signified and that this relationship might be followed and understood in a linear 
82 Derrida, 1997, p.65. 
83 Derrida, 1981b, p.29, in discussion with Julia Kristeva. 
way. Derrida rethinks the way in which meaning might be understood without the 
assumption of a transcendental signified and this entails an engagement with the 
functioning of the sign and its conception. 
In his rethinking of the way in which the sign might be understood, Derrida presents 
a qualified engagement with some of the possibilities held within Ferdinand de 
Saussure's thought. 84 Saussure's proposition of the 'signifier' presents a radical 
challenge to the idea of the sign as received meaning and through this, the 
functioning of the transcendental signified. Saussure introduces the concept of the 
divided sign, positing that meaning in language is constructed; it can only be 
generated in a differential way and is consequen~y contingent. The sign is divided 
into two parts comprising the signifier and the signified. The signifier is the visual 
marker for the word and the signified is seen as the concept for that word. The two 
parts are only distinguishable through phonetic difference and differences in 
relational meaning; they do not necessarily connect to each other nor enjoy a 
mutually logical relationship. The sign is therefore constituted of, and functions 
through difference and undecidability, it does not constitute a presence or absence . 
This radicalisation of how ideas might be understood as arising from the differential, 
uncertain qualities of the sign and the relational context in which it exists, marks a 
disruption to the logic of metaphysical thinking which presents a static, given 
description of an authoritative premise. 
Derrida demonstrates how this play of difference, of undecidability at the level of the 
signifier, might be effected through his proposition of difference. 
The order which resists this opposition, and resists it because it transports it, is 
announced in a movement of difference {with on a) between the two differences or 
two letters, a difference which belongs neither to the voice nor to the writing in the 
usual sense, and which is located, os the strange space that will keep us together 
here for on hour, between speech and writing, and beyond the tranquil familiarity 
which links us to one and the other, occasionally reassuring us in our illusion that 
84 Saussure's thinking is not bereft of the phonacentric noUons that are a part of metaphysical thinking, in 
fact, Derrida suggests that his thinking is forcefully bound into a phonocenlric mode of thought in that speech 
is given a privileged position. See Hawkes, T., Structuralism and Semiotics, London: RouUedge, 2003, p.122. 
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they are two85 
Through the difference of one leHer, namely 'a', Derrida transforms difference into 
differance. Perhaps this change might be considered initially to be a perceptible one 
if considering the wriHen word, but, as Derrida points out, there is no phonetic 
writing, so this small, hidden element is instrumental in generating complexities of 
meaning as it slips through auditory registers. What emerges from this consideration 
of differance is the notion of an 'undecidable', an instability at the level of the 
signifier. This undecidability is expressed through writing, but its possibilities slip 
unnoticed into speech.86 The choice of writing to communicate this instability is 
linked to the idea that implicit in speech is some kind of received sense of an 
accessible 'presence'. There is the suggestion that perhaps through speech we can 
access a verifiable and complete entity, something graspable and whole, a genuine 
truth of presence. This assumption, as discussed earlier, has allowed speech to be 
privileged over writing, with speech seemingly offering the possibility of an 
engagement with 'real presence', and consequently, a run in with the existence of a 
supposed 'transcendental' signified.87 As Derrida suggests, the "formal essence" of 
the signified is presence and the "privilege of presence" is communicated through 
its closeness to the "logos" as "phone".88 
Phone, in effect, is the signifying substance given to consciousness os that which is 
most intimately tied to the thought of the signified concept. From this point of view, 
85 Dellida. 1981a, p.4. 
86 Dellida acknowledges Heidegger's engagement with the 'economy' of differance, where he describes a 
"system" in which presence and consciousness are understood as an "effect" or "determination· of Being. 
He also refers to Nietzsche and Freud's challenge to the stability of consciousness through an idea of 
differance. These engagements rattle the sureity of self presence being conflated with an understanding of 
'consciousness'. See Denida, 1982, pp.16-27. 
87 11 is important to point out here that an issue for Dellida in contemplating the 'transcendental signified', is 
to darify that he is not positing a negative theology where 'emptiness' and the 'void' have positive currency. 
Dellida states that • ... it has neither existence nor essence. 1t derives from no category of being, whether 
present or absent And yet those aspects of differance which are thereby delineated are not theological , not 
even in the order of the most negative of negative theologies ... Differance is not only irreducible to any 
ontological or theological-ontotheological - reappropriation, but as the very opening of the space in which 
ontotheology-philosophy-produces its system and its history, it indudes ontotheology, inscribing it and 
exceeding it without retum." Dellida, 1982, p.6. See also, Easthorpe, A. and Me Gowen, K. A Critical and 
Cul/ural Theory Reader, Open University Press, 1992, p.111, where they consider the issues raised by this 
dilemma. They suggest that whilst diff8rance cannot be affirmatively stated, it also cannot be negatively 
stated, as this merely replaces the presence of being with the absence of being. 
88 See Dellida, 1981b, p.20. 
the voice is consciousness itself89 
In other words, /ogocenlrism, which marks an engagement with the centrality of 
'presence' in relation to being and consciousness, controls and restricts the 
movement of meaning by functioning around the notion of an originary meaning or 
signified. This thinking lays down structured hierarchies that negate and repress 
difference. Due to the structured nature of this thinking, presence is implicit in the 
composition of the 'transcendental' signified. Presence achieves dominance 
through its 'reasoned' relationship to speech. 
To fracture this problem, Derrida takes an idea of differance as a point of entry from 
which to overturn these hierarchical presuppositions and foundational assumptions. 
The process or play of differance functions as a possibility for displacement of 
meaning, a subversive twist in the plot. As the sign is constituted of, and functions 
through difference, it presents the trace of that which is not present, and in so doing 
always precludes the possibility of "plenitude" and unity. This consideration 
consequently presents a particular field of vision for the possibility of meaning 
breaking down. lt dissolves limits and thereby extends the scope of meaning's reach. 
As Derrida suggests, the play of meaning occurs because there is no centre as a 
grounding force; there is no 'transcendental signified'.90 In effect, what occurs then 
is the "movement of supplementarity".91 The sign 'replaces' the function of the 
centre, and acts as a supplement, accommodating the 'lack' on the part of the 
signified, it "represents the present in its absence" and marks a deferral of 
engagement. 92 
Ploy is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a signifying 
and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of 
a chain. Play is always play of absence and presence, but if it is to be thought 
radically, ploy must be conceived of before the alternative of absence and 
presence. Being must be conceived os presence or absence on the basis of the 
89 Dellida, 1981b, p.22. 
90 See Spivak, G., "Translator's Preface" in Dellida, 1997, p.xvi. 
91 Dellida, 1978, p.289. 
92 Dellida, 1982, p.9. 
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possibility of ploy and not the other way oround 93 
This idea of 'play disrupting presence' ruptures the heart of metaphysical notions of 
being. Moreover, what Derrida proposes through this thinking goes beyond the 
conceptual challenges made to metaphysical thinking by Heidegger. 
11 might be said then, that differance marks out a space that can evade a certain 
kind of control, distinct from that marked out by metaphysical thinking. lt floats 
around the "sensible and the intelligible", evading the polarilies of their remit, and 
in so doing it challenges their conceptual parameters. This means that as a term, 
difference's 'difference' is neither audible nor discernable.94 Furthermore, difference 
is not answerable to a solely 'intelligible' or 'sensible' understanding. As Derrida 
suggests, what is of stoke is not a consideration of a "constituted difference", but 
something that exceeds consideration of content. What is being looked of here is 
what he refers to as "pure movement", namely, that which gives rise to difference 
which is the "pure trace". 95 This set of complexities provides the conditions of 
possibility for understanding. The trace, which, by means of strange contrasts, 
necessarily does not actually exist, but would seem, however, conceptually to come 
before the possibility of the sign. That said, it does not answer to accusations of 
'originarity' either os that, too, is under erosure.96 
... it should be recognized that it is in the specific zone of this imprint and this trace, 
in the temporolizotion of a lived experience which is neither in the world nor in 
"another world," which is not more sonorous than luminous, not more in time than 
in space, that differences appear among the elements or rather produce them, 
make them emerge os such and constitute the texts, the chains, and the systems of 
traces. These chains and systems cannot be outlined except in the fabric of this 
trace and imprint. This unheard difference between the appearing and the 
93 Derrida, 1978, p.298. 
94 Perhaps it could be said in this instance that the interpretation of 'sensible' relies more heavily on the 
French weighting of sensory perception and sensitivity than the English sense of good judgement. 
95 Derrida, 1997, p.62. 
96 The term 'originarity' is frequently used in reference to Derrida's thought. Derrida points out that 
differance' must not be understood in relation to an origin (see footnote 29). Questions relating to origin are 
within the remit of metaphysical thinking as Derrida argues that there can be no "simple origin" (Derrida, 
1997, p.74). In order to communicate these complexities the term 'originarity' is often used in reference to 
Derrida's writings (see especially Bennington, G., and Spivak, G.). The term conflates 'originary' and 'origin' 
but playfully submits to neither in a complete sense. 
appearance [l'opparaissant et l'apparaitre] (between the "world" and "lived 
experience") is the condition of all other differences, of all other traces, and it is 
already o trace. This lost concept is thus absolutely and by rights "anterior" to all 
physiological problemotics concerning the nature of the engramme [the unit of 
engraving], or metaphysical problematics concerning the meaning of absolute 
presence whose trace is thus opened to deciphering. The trace is in fact the 
absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to saying once again that there 
is no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace is the differance which opens 
appearance [l'apparaitre] and significotion. 97 
This exteriority which manifests, or con only be recognised of the very point of 
signification, is presented by Derrida as the "opening of the first exleriorily in 
general, the enigmatic relationship of the living to its other and of on inside to on 
outside: spocing."98 This is o perplexing liminolity to consider because it is 
conditioned by both the active nature of the proposition of the differance/troce and 
the fact that the trace is also under erasure. lt cannot then be thought of as 
on' origin' in the conventional sense of the word. 
Differance is the nonfull, nonsimple, structured and differentiating origin of 
differences. Thus the name origin no longer suits it.99 
Consequently, this other kind of 'space' or 'locus' enjoys a certain kind of 
theoretical delinquency (and by this I mean rigorous non conformity) because it 
would seem, in certain respects, to exceed what we might perceive as the 'limits' of 
language and our established understondings. More specifically, it cannot be 
contained by any metaphysical conceptualization. 100 lt suggests a theoretical space 
that must be considered before that of presence/absence, namely, that of 
difference, the trace Wl Through this, the proposition of the trace challenges and 
refuses assimilation into, as Derrida slates, one of the 'founding oppositions of 
philosophy'. 
97 Derrida, 1997, p.65. 
98 Derrida, 1997, p.70. 
99 Derrida, 1982, p.11, see also. Derrida, 1997, p.65. 
100 Derrida, 1989, p.5, see also. Derrida, 1978, p.281 and Derrida,1997, p. 65. 
101 Spivak, G., "Translator's Preface" in Derrida, 1997, p.lvii. 
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Here, therefore, we must let ourselves refer to on order that resists the opposition, 
one of the founding oppositions of philosophy, between the sensible and the 
untelligible. 102 
This is a loaded philosophical opposition and one that depends on specific 
interpretations and suppositions. In order to further explore the way in which 
differance resists this assimilation and its implications for meaning, it is important to 
pick up two threads. These threads relate to the semantic resonances of differance 
and the general system or terrain in which they might be seen to be functioning. 
VII ETYMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: DIFFERANCE 
Etymologically speaking, a negotiation of differance must accommodate the fact 
that it is not a word as such, but is suggestive of other words, that is, it makes 
reference to other meanings. This seemingly contradictory approach demands a 
movement around words which resonate with its apparent meaning. For example, 
differance might be said to be connected to the French verb differer (descendant 
from the Latin differre}. Differer means to delay, implicating [retarder], to send back, 
discharge, or postpone, [renvoyer], to draw back, or put off [recu/er] and to be 
different from something else [contr. :ressemb/er ]. 103 Differre, from the Latin, 
promises both deferral, and difference. Held within this meaning is the idea of a 
postponement, a pushing away, a suspension, which implicates time and space. lt 
suggests a kind of difference, an otherness to that which presents, something 
relationally distinct. Derrida describes Differance as combining the two senses of the 
French verb differer "to differ" and "to defer or postpone", into a noun 
"designating active non-self presence both in space and time" .104 lt consequently 
resists confinement to an active or passive role. With this in mind then, the 
102 Oerrida, 1982, p.5. 
103 Dubois et al., Larousse, Oictionnaire du fran~ais contemporain, Ubrarie Larousse, Paris: 1966, p.377. 
104 Derrida, 1981a, footnote 3, p.5. 
complexities of differance, from a semantic perspective, might be understood to 
function in a way which motions towards a general combination of meanings and 
concepts and their ensuing possibilities. This is qualified by Derrida through 
reference to these configurations as "systematic and irreducible" and therefore 
suspended within a certain set of conditions. As differance, the trace, articulates the 
play of differences, and the fleeting spaces between parts, it is also, crucially, an 
active and passive proposition. 105 
First difference refers to the (active and passive) movement that consists in deferring 
by means of delay, delegation, repreive, referral, detour, postponement, 
reserving. 106 
Consequently, Derrida refers to differance as a 'sheaf' and proposes that an 
engagement with its understanding must only be seen as part of what he refers to as 
"the general system of this economy". 107 
The second facet of this understanding is formulated through the idea that 
differance is one of a number of terms that Derrida uses to describe the complexity 
of this meaning. lt constitutes a sort of vibrant semantical locus. He does not restrict 
or limit the idea of differance, the trace, through one term because that would 
establish a 'master term' and be the antithesis of his proposition. Further to this, to 
focus on one term would negate the movement and difference of exchange that the 
change and momentum of terms articulate. As Derrida states, differance cannot be 
assigned the status of a "master-word" or "master-concept". 108 Consequently, trace, 
supplement, hymen, parergon, pharmakon, dissemination, ore all terms which are 
presented as being interchangeable, but not synonymous with each other. Spacing, 
sans blanc, cent blancs, sens blanc, are further terms momentarily concentrating a 
point of meaning but simultaneously tearing open closure. 109 They are 'quasi-
105 See: "Implications: Interview with Henri Ronse."' in Oerrida, 1981b, p.8. 
106 Derrida,19B1b, p.B. 
107 Derrida, 1982, p.3. 
108 Derrida, 1981b, p.40. 
109 Derrida, 1981b, p.40. 
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concepts', never completely functioning in a stable, knowable 'present' realm but 
float through and insinuate themselves in the gaps in between. They would seem to 
be curiously anchored by a thread of 'imagined' meaning but oscillate and vibrate 
with the possibility of deferral of that fleeting meaning. Such a proposition would 
seem to present the effect of conceptual disjunction in motion in that the terms align 
for a hesitant moment and then separate, caught in a process of repetitive 
displacement. They do not name anything specific so cannot be pinned down, 
contained or closed off. They are not concepts, nor do they belong to a class of 
ideas defining differance, as it too, is neither a concept nor an entity. This process 
manages to generate a conceptual unravelling and alertness resulting in the 
possibilities for the play of meaning to remain in motion. 
Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or a system within 
which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic ploy of 
differences. Such a ploy, difference, is thus no longer simply a concept, but rather 
the possibility of conceptuolity, of a conceptual process and system in general. 110 
As rigorously as possible we must permit to appear/disappear the trace of what 
exceeds the truth of Being. The trace (of that) which con never be presented, the 
trace which itself con never be presented: that is, appear and manifest itself, os 
such, in its phenomenon. The trace beyond that which profoundly links fundamental 
ontology and phenomenology. Always differing and deferring, the trace is never os 
it is in the presentation of itself. lt erases itself in presenting itself, muffles itself in 
resonating, like the a writing itself, inscribing its pyramid in differonce. 111 
This proposition would seem to open up the possibility for a slippage or slight shift 
or displacement of meaning. This process, also referred to as the 'movement' of the 
trace, carries with it an enigmatic quality, its journey or process described by 
Derrida as "necessarily occulted," strangely hidden from 'view' .112 The movement of 
the 'trace', consequently, might be said to be produced as "self occultationn in that 
it allows for the de-situation of differance to occur in a spatial and temporal way. In 
other words, the movement of the trace precipitates a concealment of the same. 
Through this process, differance can never situate itself or be situated completely. As 
110 Derrida. 1982. p.11. 
111 Derrida, 1982, p.23. 
112 Derrida, 1997, p.47. 
the trace moves it simultaneously conceals itself preventing it from being fixed in 
one place. As Derrida suggests, "erasure belongs to its structure". 113 
Differance can then be said to give rise to a sense of undecidability, and through 
this, it prevents the idea of 'completeness' of meaning having currency. As Derrida 
suggests, the play of differences is generative of conditions, which prevent the 
eventuality that: "a simple element be present in and of itself, referring only to 
itself." 114 Differance, then, is presented by Derrida, as a 'ghostly shadow' held within 
any 'decision to be made'. Its possibility offers up a creeping uncertainty regarding 
what we might understand to be there and thus presents a challenge to the idea of 
a fixed or complete meaning. Therefore, it is between and through the malleable 
lines, the 'not quite there' of complete and full meaning, that undecidability can 
arise. lt cannot simply be reducible to a question of 'either' 'or', or a complete 
inhabitation of one position or another. 115 The 'undecidable' consequently resides 
at the very 'origin' of the structure of meaning. 
In order to be what it 'is', a text is on essentially vitiated, impure, open, haunted 
thing, consisting of traces and traces of traces: no text is purely present, nor was 
there some purely present text in the past. 116 
Therefore, in putting forward the possibility of difference/difference, the play of the 
trace already in action, Derrido forwards a subtle but persistent disruption to 
received thinking. We can no longer cling to the metaphysical notions of absence or 
presence that rely on an ideo of completeness: "it is the determination of Being as 
presence or as beingness that is interrogated by the thought of differance." 117 
113 Derrida, 1982, p.24. 
114 Derrida, 1981b, p.26. 
115 Collins, 2000, p. 70. Collins suggests that the trace is: "neither simply present nor absent, the trace is an 
undecidable. The relay of differences (pig, big, bag, rag, rat, etc) depends upon a structural undecidability, a 
play of presence and absence at the origin of meaning. Undecidability at the "origin", between absence and 
presence". 
116 Royle, N. Derrida, London: RouUedge, 2003, p.78. 
117 Derrida, 1982, p.21 
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VIII SUPPLEMENTARY CLAUSE 
We can say then, that meaning arising from the text, trace or writing is expressed 
with, and arises out of, the play of difference/difference. The production of meaning 
is consequently intermittently threaded into and is constitutive of another meanings. 
This is expressed through the idea of the 'law of the supplement' in that the 
supplement is presented as being neither inside nor outside, it neither belongs nor 
does not belong. As Derrida suggests, the supplement is actually neither a presence 
nor an absence, is "neither a plus nor a minus, neither an outside nor the 
complement of an inside" 118, specifically, "no ontology can think its operation" .119 
There is no resolution to be had here. The supplement has an ethereal, pervasive 
spectrality that cannot be contained. Its ghos~y nature, like the after glow of a light 
flicking on the retina of the eye, is there but not there. 
Within language then, is the possibility of reconfiguration, accelerated formations 
that fold back on each other, offering a fragile structure that then breaks away and 
dissolves, floats off and reforms. If we can establish the 'space' between forms as 
being constitutive of their difference and the 'play of difference' as being expressed 
through the trace, text and writing, etc., then this assertion should be qualified by 
restating that the trace is always under erasure, 'sous rature'. The trace is an 
"already absent present, of the lack at the origin that is the condition of thought and 
experience" .120 Language is already involved in a process of self concealment 
and/or self elimination and displacement. In coming into a sort of conceptual shape 
it is already disappearing into unfathomable dimensions and depths knocking 
everything into partial shadow. Here, the possibility of what constitutes absence 
surfaces as a ghostly shadow caught at once flickering but promising to disappear 
and reappear when we least expect it. 
Consequently, Derrida's thought suggests critical possibilities for rethinking the way 
118 Derrida, 1981b, p.,43. 
119 Derrida, 1997, p.314. 
120 Spivak, G., "Translator's Preface" in Derrida, 1997, p.xvii. 
in which absence might be understood. The importance of this thinking might be 
said to principally reside in absence not occurring as a containable or complete 
proposition. From this we can understanding absence as a supplemented term (in 
that it always bears the traces of something else). Absence might be said to possess 
a spectral undertone. This idea of spectrality is one which resurfaces repeatedly in 
Derrida's thought. lt marks a ghostly shadowing, a haunting of one concept through 
another. 121 This suggestion of spectrality, in turn, gives a 'conceptual' purchase to 
the way in which absences might function in this regard because it shakes the 
stability and completeness of meaning and vibrates with possibility. That is to say, 
absence, for example, as with any term under consideration, is already infused with, 
or complicated by relational considerations, which affect the way in which it might 
be understood. The idea of the supplement then again articulates the play of 
difference through which a term might be considered. lt suggests both an addition 
to something and a replacement for something; it marks and erases possible 
meaning. Through generating undecidability this idea challenges the proposition of 
a 'fundamental identity' or 'pure concept.' 
IX THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE: 
mind the gap, textual spacing 
Let us space. The art of this text is the air it causes to circulate between its screens. 
The choinings ore invisible, everything seems improvised or juxtoposed. 122 
The gop, in French l'ecort which con also mean divergence, is that opening to 
difference, to an outside, to on other - to absence and to death - which, in any 
theory based on fully present meaning, will hove been covered over. Derrido' s 
writing uncovers and remarks these gaps. 123 
To risk meaning nothing is to start to ploy, and first to enter into the ploy of 
121 See Wolfreys, J., Deconstruc/ion. Derrida, London: Macmillan Press Ltd.,1998, where he specifically 
considers literary 11110rks in relation to what he refers to as the "hauntological example" of the city's identity as 
being always, already haunted. See also, artist Rachel Whiteread's House, ICA video "Excavating House-
Uncanny Encounters", with Doreen Massey, James LinQ\I\IOOd, Mark Cousins and Joh Bird. 
122 Derrida, J., Glas (trans) Leavey, J.P. & Rand, R., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974, p.75. 
123 Kamut, P., 1991, p.5. 
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diHerance which prevents any word, any concept, any major enunciation from 
coming to summarize and to govem from the theological presence of o center the 
movement and textual spacing of differences. 124 
In considering these thoughts, it might be useful to question whether there exists a 
kind of translucent fold of the 'unknowable' produced through an effect of 
difference. This is a difficult idea which demands a cautious consideration. Part of 
the importance of this is related to how we might think of supposed gaps or absent 
spaces, namely, that which we don't know and that which floats as possibility. This 
possibility is shadowed and conditioned by the 'undecidability' of meaning effected 
by the trace. These strange absences flit across this thought but do not remain long 
enough to be framed. They present as possible stumbling blocks to theoretical 
complacency. As long as this movement of undecidability of meaning persists, these 
spaces can hang tentatively from our thinking, evading our control. We are faced 
with acknowledging that which cannot be contained and with the possibility that 
there might be something at the very limits of our understanding gesturing towards 
'the other'. That is to say, there is something that exists beyond our comfortable 
comprehension, something other than what we know. 
From this, it might be said that differonce makes possible a theoretical tumble with 
an idea of impossibility. lt should not, however, be identified with it, as Derrida 
suggests, the 'quasi-origin'has no identity with that which it originates. 125 In other 
words, differonce can set into play a consideration of impossibility but should not be 
connected to it. There is absolutely no avoidance of the contradictions inherent in 
this strange proposition. Part of what is implied is something beyond our grasp, yet 
somehow, through the effects of the trace, we are open to its possibility. We are 
chasing after the idea of something that we cannot catch. But it is in our awkward 
stumblings that we consider how it might surface and function. In order to negotiate 
this it is necessary to think again around the effects of the trace to consider how a 
sense of limit is negotiated. 
124 Derrida, 1981b, p.14. 
125 Derrida, 1997, p.62. 
The trace effects a sophisticated slippage between ideas. Derrida argues that in 
metaphysical thinking these strange areas of possibility are concealed and erased as 
they disrupt the foundations built and stabilized on the idea of full present meaning. 
There is a need to paper over them, to contain and control their potential for 
movement. This containment is attempted because they rattle and destabilize the 
certainty that metaphysics erects. (As we have seen this normally translates as an 
unquestioned stability that provides a specific hierarchical structure for signification). 
These areas of possibility offer a dynamic space which is sometimes referred to as a 
gap or opening found in the movement of differonce or the trace. 
As a term of reference, this strange 'space' of thought communicates a hole (frou), 
and crucially a weakness (fail/e), or a weak spot (point faib/e). 126 However, this is 
complicated by our understanding of 'hole' which might imply something 
containable. In this context it is suggestive of an opening up onto a possibility which 
is not to be uncovered or contained. An immediate consideration would appear to 
be then how to negotiate an understanding of this space, coming as it does, out of 
an effect of difference. If qualified conditions of engagement were established, we 
might consider the gap to be a kind of opening, a malleable space. Perhaps it 
could be a space which might oscillate with possibilities. However, in all its 
complexities, the gap might also be a space that is difficult to describe, indeed 
riddled with impossibility because its dynamic changes and moves. 127 
So what possibilities does this set into motion? This gap, though non tangible, 
would seem to offer up a critical space whose dynamic is predicated on a lack of 
complete presence, unity or centre. The gap is an opening up, an opening onto the 
possibility of the 'emergence of the mark' which, in turn, is the possibility of the 
other. Importantly, this is an engagement with the possibility of an outside 
understood in relation to alterity. 
126 Dictionnaire du fran<;:als contemporain, 1966, p.490. 
127 Chrisfina Howells considers the way in which Derrida engages with concepts of signification in order to 
ascertain whether an opening, a "taille" might occur that is beyond closure ·outre-cloture". See Howells, 
1998, p.45. 
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This spacing is not the simple negativity of a lack, but the emergence of the mark. 
However, it is not the work of the negative in the service of meaning, or of the living 
concept, the telos, which remains refevabfe and reducible in the Aulhebung of a 
dialectics. 128 
In other words, the possibility of this spacing is not to be confused with what is not 
there but rather relate to what might appear. Moreover, its meaning neither submits 
to the "negative" which would position full meaning against it, nor the te/os, which 
is understood as the end or ultimate object. In a philosophical sense, te/os refers to 
a "constructive reorganisation of all human knowledge in a synthesis, or correlation 
of parts". 129 Both propositions are conceptually inadequate if applied to understand 
the opening uncovered with the movement of the trace. The telos in this context may 
be understood in relation to the Aufhebung, which is a term originally from Hegel. lt 
paradoxically both cancels out and preserves meaning. As Alan Bass suggests, it is 
frequently considered to be untranslatable due to its "double meaning of 
conservation and negation" .130 However, Spivak suggests that it: 
is a relationship between two terms where the second at once annuls the first and 
lifts it up into a higher sphere of existence; it is a hierarchical concept generally 
translated "sublation" and now sometimes translated "sublimation". 131 
Namely, the te/os can not account for the gap because it might be understood in 
relation to hierarchies that depend on sublimation. 132 
What hinges on this possibility of an 'outside' (understood as alterity) is how it might 
be bound into an effect of difference and what this might mean for an 
understanding of absence. Derrida points out that the concept of spacing and the 
128 "Signature Event Context" in Derrida, 1982, p.317. 
129 OED. 1933. 
130 Bass, Alan, "Translator's Introduction" in Derrida, J. Writing and Difference, University of Chicago Press, 
1978. 
131 Spivak, "Translator's Preface" in Derrida, 1997, p.xi. 
132 See Derrida, 1982, footnote 23, pp.20-21 for an in depth consideration of the Aufhebung. The 
Aufhebung, as previously mentioned, has a double contradictory meaning. Derrida suggests that this double 
meaning can only be realised In writing where the play of the trace exists. In order to acknowledge this 
differance, Aufhebung must "write itself otherwise". His solution to this problem is to consider a translation 
that would accommodate this dilemma. Derrida puts forward "/a re/eve", from the verb re/ever because it 
communicates the lifting up of Aufhebung, but also has connotations of relaying and relieving. 
concept of alterity are not synonymous with each other. They do not "signify exactly 
the same thing; that being said, I believe that they are absolutely dissociable from 
each other". 133 Difference, again, is not to be identified with the outside but 
precipitates thinking about the possibility of it. To think about this gap then, is to 
think about instability, something other than what we can know or contain. lt throws 
up questions surrounding what is knowable and not knowable. lt represents an 
opening up to the 'other' through a moment of contradiction, disjunction, an 
undecidability. 
Spacing designates nothing, nothing that is, no presence at a distance, but it is the 
index of an irreducible exterior, and, simultaneously, of a movement, a 
displacement that indicates an absolute irreducible alterity. 13' 
The possibility of absence may be linked to possibility, to an 'exteriority', outside 
what is 'there' and knowable. lt trades on a kind of evanescence, a fading from 
what is grospable, what is removed from our knowing. But whether it is useful to 
consider the 'gap' as a kind of absence is problematic. The implication of absence 
might be there in that a disjunction has occurred, but the gap also might be seen to 
be the expression of a moment of contradiction within the way in which thought gets 
structured. As all concepts are put forward as being affected by, and derived from, 
other concepts, it would suggest that the gap generated in the differences between 
concepts cannot but be contextually determined. Inevitably, meaning can only arise 
from this idea of difference between forms and this 'gap' is circumstantial, dynamic 
and elusive rendering its nature singular and in a direct sense particular to a 
contextual moment. 
The concept of the supplement is not Derrida's, but neither is it simply Rousseau's; 
the 'pharmakon' is not Derrida's, but neither is it simply Plato's; 'hymen' is not 
Derrida's, but neither is it simply Mallarrne's. Of course, Derrida does things with 
these concepts, things that are not necessarily aHributable to the authorial intentions 
133 Derrida, 1981b, p.81. Derrida also points out in this context thal"spacing also signifies, precisely, the 
impossibility of reducing the chain to one of its limits or of absolutely privileging one- or the other." He stales 
that "Differance, above all, is not a substance, an essence, a cause, etc. that could yield some "phenomenal 
deviation", Endnoles, p.107. 
134 Houdebine to Derrida (July 1, 1971), in Derrida, 1981b, p.91. 
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of Rousseou, Plato or Mollorme'. 135 
This is a strange engagement with torn and fraying edges of meaning, a sort of 
shifting of traces. What happens in trying to negotiate the effects of this thought is 
on interesting repetitive gesture, a layering of one set of ideas on another. Traces of 
other traces, of marks and signification, ore at once there and then covered over. 
The force of this thought is played out in the repetitive and inadequate motions used 
to scratch out the effects of the trace. Each motion diverges from the lost, it is 
generative and restated in a slightly different way. The proposition of stable 
meaning is understood os a fictional landscape, each retraced footstep attests to 
movement and change. Ideas push against and across each other. The gap cannot 
be pinned down. What absence might be is repetitively re-inscribed. 
X SHADOWS OF THE UNKNOWN 
DiffEl"rance is therefore the formation of form. But it is on the other hand the being-
imprinted of the imprint. 136 
But a thought of the trace, of dillerance or of reserve, having arrived of these limits 
and repeating them ceaselessly, must also point beyond the field of the episleme. 137 
Returning to the second axis that positions this research, namely, the way in which 
we organise or structure on understanding of absence through specific ways of 
knowing, I would like la consider what Derrido's contribution to this might be. His 
proposition of differance, the trace, "must also point beyond the field of the 
episteme". 138 The Greekepisteme, refers la 'knowledge', and logos, 'explanation'. 
Epistemology, derived from this, is understood os the study of "the nature of 
135 Royle, 2003, p.18. 
136 Derrida, 1997, p.63. 
137 Derrida. 1997, p.93. 
138 . Demda, 1997, p.93. 
knowledge and justification" .139 
Derrido's proposition of differance consequently hits against the epistemological 
frameworks governed by the metaphysics of presence. His thinking complicates and 
disrupts metaphysical precepts by demonstrating that the possibility of full and 
present meaning is illusory. Presence is always necessarily conditioned by absence 
and indeed surfaces in unexpected and ghostly ways. This dynamic is active and 
nuonced. The force of his contribution, in terms of this consideration, consequently 
resides in him taking on the problematic of a metaphysical concept of absence and 
refracting it through the prism of differance. This results in a notably transformed 
way of understanding the way in which absence might signify because it is written 
into every presence in a nuonced way. 
In its enigmatic looseness in definitive terms, difference disrupts and destoblises 
meaning. This looseness is distinct from the rigor held within the core of the idea of 
the trace, which is consistenrly acute. Derrido's ideas repeat in alternating refrains, 
generating slight slips of meaning between terms whilst holding onto on integral 
proposition of difference. As Derrido suggests, in conceiving of the "sheaf" of 
differance, the limitations of its framework of understanding ore unravelled. 
The "sheaf" which you recall is a historic and systematic crossroads; and if is above 
all the structural impossibility of limiting this network, of putting on edge on ifs 
weave, of tracing a margin that would not be a new mark. Since if cannot be 
elevated into a master-word or a mosfer-concepl, since if blocks every relationship 
fa theology, differance finds itself enmeshed in the work that pulls if through a chain 
of other "concepts," other "words," other textual configurations. 1' 0 
Meaning is at once inscribed and effaced, moving away from any possibility of 
secure containment or definitive association. In a more general sense this pushes us 
la face the unknowoble, to consider what is absent from our frameworks of 
knowledge. This possible disruption of meaning has direct implications for signifying 
139 OED 1933 
140 Derrida, 1981b, p.40. 
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practices and specifically has an impact on what might be considered to be the 
epistemological frames governing an understanding of absence in the visual arts. 
This lransformalive and disruptive capacity of the play of difference may be 
understood not simply in terms of the possibilities of rethinking the assumption of 
'full present' meaning, but more widely, in terms of concepluality and critical 
concepts of signification. This consideration includes repercussions for, but is not 
restricted to, issues surrounding identity, gender and the way in which lull 'presence' 
and the unified subject, has been 'normally' implicated in a sense of completeness, 
immediacy and the possibility of an accessible present and 'absolute truth'. The 
trace effects a flickering which gains momentum; small fragments escape our 
theoretical grasp and a disruption to conventional structures occurs through 
contradiction and difference. Meaning is conferred a provisionality because 
everything is already informed and infused with other traces. 
XI SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Through his proposition of the play of difference, Derrida picks up this challenge to 
full and present meaning but forestalls it following the some paHern of inevitable 
closure by preventing a sialic, predictable repositioning of thought. This is achieved 
by seHing an alternating movement into motion that would seem to have no 
possibility for finality and thus cannot be subject to containment on a theoretical or 
conceptual level. This movement occurs through difference effecting a 
provisionolity, an undecidability to meaning which functions on several levels. No 
sense of meaning can be completely full or self same and indeed depends on the 
instability suggested by the shadows cast by other meanings woven into a term. 
The movement of difference, the trace, disrupts metaphysical concepts through 
articulating a differential understanding between terms, which in turn, gives rise to 
the processes of deferral and displacement of meaning. This means that meaning is 
conditioned by the spaces or tensions of disparity and through this, the fulfilment of 
a so-called "complete", present understanding is postponed and repositioned. In 
this way, the play of difference, the trace, arrests the eventuality of 'completeness' of 
meaning and its dependence on a notion of 'presence' so clearly entrenched in 
metaphysical thought. Derrida suggests that meaning can never be fully 'present', 
as everything is already always haunted by the 'other' which is absent. This idea has 
far reaching implications as there is no possibility for a notion of inferiority or a 
'present' sell-contained identity to be established. This premise gives rise to a notion 
of spectrality; there is the suggestion of ghostly shadows held within meaning. This 
consideration is of particular relevance as the proposition of spectrality quietly 
illuminates the way in which the possibilities of absence might be understood. 
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'RIRST. MOTION :QfABSENCE:• 
T.wo hands<and a! rep'eatedrcorifesslon: :Wusoiy,positicins 
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FIRST MOTION OF ABSENCE: Two hands and a repeated confession: illusory 
positions 
13 Douglas Gordon, Confessions of a Justified Sinner (still) 1995-1996. 
I've been haunted for a while by an image of two hands. The image in question is a 
sti ll of two hands taken from Douglas Gordon's video work: Confessions of a 
Justified Sinner (detail) 1995-1996. I find this image compell ing. I had already 
entered into a dialogue with the stil l before viewing the video from which it was 
taken. This was my first point of entry; a still engagement with what had been a 
moving form. I quite liked this coercive dislocation. The fragment was separated 
from one context and placed in another. I have returned to this double image 
repeatedly, in different ways, trying to fathom why I find it so intriguing. Perhaps the 
enigmatic title is a consideration. I have puzzled over its perceptual possibilities, the 
'dialectic of the double' and the way in which meaning is being constructed at that 
particular moment. I decided to try to retain the integrity of the first reading whilst 
gradually negotiating newly uncovered fragments of information about the work. 
Apparently, there is a point in the video where the hand does reach for the neck. 
This is a double grasp played out on two screens. 
The image (see: fig 13) presents a still of two hands set beside each other. 141 lt 
141 In Brown, K., Douglas Gordon, London: Tale Publishing, 2004, Katrina Brown suggests that Gordon's 
work solicits a dialogue between artist and viewer or what she refers to as 'opposing concepts'. This 
exchange is generative of what she describes as a "less finite position" which incorporates the psychical 
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could equally be two heads slopped and held in stasis from this work, but here, of 
this very moment, two hands ore visually captured and frozen in time. Each hand is 
displayed and set up for notice. One hand, positioned on the right, appears in the 
positive, glowing, but not in a benevolent or reassuring way. lt is strangely 
threatening at this moment, slightly clenched, suspended just before the base of the 
screen. A seemingly perfectly normal hand posed unnervingly, with on apparent 
intention to move. it would seem os if lowered slightly it might scramble across the 
block floor and then who knows what it might do. We might suppose, if we ore to 
follow the title of the video, that these ore the hands of a 'Justified Sinner' after all. 
Exoneration from guilt might on the cords, if we ore la believe in such a thing. If we 
let the video ploy we already know the hands ore framed, twice. The first framing 
occurs through reference to author Jomes Hoggs' work The Private Memoirs and 
Confessions of a Justified Sinner published in 1824 from which the work takes its 
title. The second framing takes place through Gordon's use of footage from Rouben 
Momoulion's 1932142 film version of The Strange Case of Or Jekyll and Mr Hyde, 
adapted from Robert Louis Stevenson's The Strange Case of Or Jekyll and Mr Hyde, 
(1886). Bull am going to keep the play button on pause and look again at the still 
before me. 
Perhaps there is malevolent intent in that hand. it is hard to say whether a hand at 
this moment con have malevolent intent without a body appearing to be attached to 
it, but perhaps therein lies something more sinister, something looming. Is it still 
attached to the body or hove the qualities of the whole now been projected onto the 
fragment, and what of the constructed dynamic between the hands? I know 
someone has sinned and it was apparently justified. This is a confession delivered 
right at this moment wavering over an earlier one, now being redelivered, the frame 
of religiosity reconfigured. The possibility of the separated, yet active hand seems to 
space of the viewer in the interpretation of the work. Gor"don's double projections, sometimes employing 
mirroring techniques, problematize the authority of a single screen. Examples of this technique are 
commonly seen in his work; see Hyslerica/1995, and Film Noir(Twins) 1995. Although this seemingly 
appositional dynamic is often the initial framing of many of his works, this proposition is frequently unravelled 
and thrown into doubt as meaning gets constructed. 
142 In Nancy Spector's essay "a.k.a" in Douglas Gordon The Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles, 
The MIT Press. 2001, pp.112-149, she cites the date of release of the film to be 1931 (p.115). 
lap into something else. Perhaps it plays on the ideo of the whole, yet right now, this 
appears to be a distinct impossibility, an imaginary state. The hand has now been 
called to centre stage, twice. The glowing positive hand is mirrored in form by a 
hand posed on the left presented in the photographic negative, consequently a 
darkened hand. What resides with this hand, this negative rush, standing like the 
after glow of a light flicking on the retina of on eye? it is strangely skeletal, a view as 
seen through imagined x-ray specs. Perhaps if there were a move sideways by the 
right hand to the position of the left, one hand might be subsumed into a void, into 
a shadow of itself. But then, that is not clear, which is the void or the shadow, and 
who could differentiate for that matter? I'll move back to the two hands. Two hands 
are projected onto two adjoining, seemingly mirroring screens. This might be 
deceptive. The negative hand floats on a glowing background. Perhaps a 
movement left (of the right screen over the left) might render the positive right hand 
flat, strangely flattened by the intensity of the negative image. lt is hard to soy, let's 
look again. 
In their disembodied states the hands seemed to be filled with latent intent. Is it 
murderous? Will they make crime pay? There will be a confession and I think it is 
safe to say that it will be borne out of a justified sin. Right now, I think the 
positioning somehow demands a dialogue between the two hands and this 
threatens to come. Whilst the right positive hand hovers fleshy and replete I am 
strangely drown to the left, I am visually drown to the negative hand. Then, as if to 
check that it hasn't moved, I move back to the right hand. The negative and positive 
hands are of/not of each other. They are initially set up as visual polarilies but 
actually confound this interpretive path. Both seem to be inscribed into each other 
yet stand separate from one another, held back by the screens. When I pick up my 
reading of the dialogue of the hands again I see something else. This is a 
tronsformalive moment. Press ploy. Jekyll is in the throes of becoming Hyde, and 
Hyde Jekyll, this metamorphosis is never fully completed but loops on indefinitely. 
Wind back to the hands now held in suspended animation. 
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SECTION THREE 
BETWEEN JACQUES DERRIDA AND JACQUES LACAN 
Of key importance here for an understanding of the way in which absence might 
signify is the tension between the kinds of thinking implicated in Derrida's 
proposition of difference and that of La can' s real. The rea/ describes a pre-
subjective state, namely, the state before the 'subject' enters into language and the 
symbolic order where it becomes constituted and situated through the complexities 
of language, sexuality and the social. A sense of the rea/ comes out of the 
experience of differentiation. lt occurs through the limits of what we can describe 
and know, but also through the apparent effects of its loss as the subject emerges 
into the signifying realm. Therefore a consideration of the construction of subjectivity 
is intricately intertwined with the fabric of absence and the positioning of the rea/. 
In a sense, the propositions of differance and the rea/ share the potential for 
generating indeterminacies of meaning, which are constructed through a critical 
dialogue with specific concepts. This includes an engagement with the 
signifier/signified, language, the construction of the subject, ideas of what 
constitutes truth, an engagement with the symbolic order, and notions of sell-
presence and consciousness. These considerations function through disjunction, 
difference, effects of their 'play' of signification and a certain lack of quantifiability as 
propositions. 
Derrida's proposition of difference throws up the possibility of 'reinscribing' the way 
in which absence might signify in that it precipitates a rethinking of, or knocking 
against metaphysical precepts. Lacan's rea/, on the other hand, submits absence to 
a certain kind of structuring engendered by what are considered to be thoroughly 
metaphysical notions. 
41 
For Derrido, Locon's "topology of castration," which assigns the "hole" or lock to a 
a place - "a hole with determinable borders" - repeals the metaphysical gesture 
(albeit a negative one) of making absence, the lock, the hole, a transcendental 
principle that con be pinned down os such, and con therefore govern a theoretical 
discourse. 143 
Consequently, at times, this kind of structuring is arguably informed by the very 
logocentric and phallocentric notions Derrida critiques. lt crucially links the 
possibilities for absence to a specifically gendered construction of subjectivity 
organised around an over arching 'signifier', the phallus. However, his thought also 
gives rise to a space beyond this and importantly, like Derrida's proposition of 
differance, precipitates an engagement with the possibility of uncertainty through 
language, albeit in a different way. These concurrent motions of divergence and 
convergence of thought are further reflected in their common recourse to the 
thought of Martin Heidegger. Their respective thinking intersects and overshadows 
each other in ways that are critically important for the way in which absence might 
be seen to signify. Indeed, at times, both thinkers intersect at the same prism only to 
then refract, resulting in areas of radical incommensurability and tension. This 
theoretical tension is dynamic and complex but allows for the spaces between the 
two propositions to both shadow and play off each other. 
11 THE PROBLEM OF ABSENCE AND THE LACANIAN REAL 
In considering the way in which absence might be rethought in relation to the visual 
arts, I would suggest that Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic thought allows for several 
qualified possibilities to unfold. I feel that these possibilities partially reside in 
exploring that which would seem to exceed the visible or knowable. This entails an 
engagement with the "psychical" which is understood in this context as that which 
pertains to the mind and specifically the 'uninscribed spaces' of the unconscious 
143 See footnote 5 by Alan Bass (ed/trans), in Derrida, J., Margins of Philosophy, Brighton: Harvester Press, 
1982, p.6. where he suggests that Derrida posits Lacan's "topology of castration" confers a containabitity to 
the "hole" which allows the absence to be expressed as a transcendental entity. 
described by Lacan. The possibility of these strange spaces hits against the edges of 
his psychoanalytical framework and shakes them. This would seem to be an elusive 
proposition but I would argue that a different order of absence is invoked which is 
distinctive and complex. Its particular nature, or aspects aHributed to it (in other 
words, the complexion of absence) surfaces in an largely enigmatic way. This 
'emergence' of a different kind of understanding of absence rises in adopting a 
critical engaement with what Lacan refers to as the rea/. I want to argue for a critical 
positioning in relation to an understanding of absence connected to Lacan's 
thought. Although absence is ubiquitous and central in his formulations of the 
subject, surfacing in a radically inter-textual way, there is space for a consideration 
of a particular kind of absence connected to his proposition of the rea/ that occurs 
in two important ways. Firstly, the rea/ suggests a certain kind of absence that 
exceeds the frame of the social and cultural order and in so doing not only sheds 
light on the construction of this order but on its possible disruption. Therefore, the 
real's relationship with the symbolic order both describes and offers the potential to 
unravel its legitimacy. Secondly, this 'anteriority' of the reo/ is only realised-through 
a certain kind of structured engagement with absence which is highlighted through 
the spliHing and decentring of the subject, its foundation on sense of lack and 
subsequent sexualized placement within the symbolic order. The way in which the 
child ' becomes' a subject, in effect, informs and complicates the way in which we 
understand the absence of the rea/. 
Ill LOCATING THE REAL: the imaginary, symbolic and the real 
The Lacanian reo/ is certainly a problematic ideo. lt is presented in on enigmatic, 
and frequently confounding way by Lacan. lt is part of the three part configuration 
he sets out: the imaginary, symbolic and the reo/ (imaginoire, symbolique, reel), 
which describes a psychoanalytic mapping of his understanding of the 'subject in I 
and in relation to the world'. This includes the 'pre-subjective' state which describes 
the condition of the 'subject' before it signifies as such. In order to ascertain the 
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possibilities of the absence the reo/ might effect, it is important to consider it in terms 
of this three part relationship. Lacan's psychoanalytical construction of the subject is 
seen os engaging with these three distinct stoles, which are notably presented as 
heterogeneous, yet interdependent. This condition is articulated through Locan's 
conception of the Borromeon Knot, which he visually describes thus: 
The Borromean Knot, os a visual conceit, illustrates the simultaneous 
interconnection and interdependence, yet singularity of each of the orders in the 
construction of the subject. Taken from the mathematical configuration of the 
Borromeon rings, it presents a topographical model of the real, symbolic and 
imaginary (RSI). 144 To understand the functioning of the orders it must be seen in a 
holistic way. They structurally depend on each other for connection but if one is 
detached then the three cannot function and consequently fall apart. When 
connected, however, they exist in a state of interlocked tension with each other. 
Through this presentation of the Borromean Knot os a method of articulating the 
imaginary, symbolic and rea/, Locan presents equivalent importance to all three 
'circles' however convoluted the relationship might initially appear. 
In setting out this three-port formation, Lacan positions the real in a way that links it 
through the overlapping symbolic and imaginary. In keeping with the visual conceit 
of the Borromeon Knot, an understanding of the reo/ necessarily oscillates around 
the imaginary and the symbolic but lies in tension with them both. The real is 
necessarily part of the formation, but is conditioned by its anterior relation to the 
imaginary and symbolic and remains inaccessible to both. In this regard, Sheridan, 
144 See Sheridan, A., "Translator's note" in Lacan, J., Ecrits: A Selection, London: Routledge, 1989, pp.xii-
xiii. RSI refers to reel, symbolique, imaginaire. 
in his translation of Lacan's work, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-
Analysis refers to its status os 'algebraic x' this term paradoxically conferring it with a 
sense of unquantifiability and strange possibility in keeping with Lacan's spatia l and 
mathematical psychoanalytical schematics.145 
The reo/ marks a pre-subjective state, before the subject enters into language and 
signification, but is understood in relation to the mother's body. In his earl ier 
formulations of the reo/, Lacan identifies this slate with the mother, the maternal. 11 
is presented as pre-social and pre-linguislic as it precedes the imaginary and 
symbolic. This casts a certain light on the mother/woman as absence/ lock, 'other 
than' , and is articulated through a certain kind of structured absence from the 
authority of the signifying field. Although the real is to be understood in re lation to 
these other categories it must not be mistaken, in spite of what its name might 
imply, for reality.146 Secondly, the slate of the imaginary is presented as offering up 
the ideo of the 'world' for the subject, the 'visual register' of the image residing in 
both the conscious and unconscious mind . Whi lst the imaginary might incorporate 
the notion of the imagined, it is still bollosted by what is perceived os 'reality' and 
this conditions its possibilities. Thirdly, the symbolic is understood through the 
subject 'becoming', entering into language and the social order. The dynamic of 
the symbolic channels the subject into a specific kind of ordering, situating it 
through language and sexuality. The subject is therefore understood in relation to 
language and this is considered with reference to Ferdinond de Saussure's thought. 
As we have seen with Derrida's engagement with Saussure, meaning arises through 
the differential relations between signifier and signified and relations between 
signifiers/signifiers, signifieds/ signifieds. The dynamic between two signifiers on the 
same level (horizontal) presents metonymy, whereas the replacement of the original 
signifier for a new one (vertical movement - original retained underneath) becomes 
145 Sheridan, A. , "Translator's Preface" in Lacan, J ., The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 
Penguin Books Ltd., 19n, p.xii. 
146 See Sheridan, A., "Translator's note• in Lacan, J., 1989, p.xii, also Belsey, C., Culture and the Real, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2005, p.S. 
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metaphor. 147 
Consequently, the combinations of differential signifiers/signifiers, 
signifieds/signifieds and signifiers/signifieds effect meaning within language in a 
particular way. The meanings that ore generated ore aligned with the symbolic 
relations that already exist. These symbolic relations ore productive of subject 
relations produced in the wider discursive field. I explore this in more depth in sub 
section VI, Difference and language: the symbolic register. (lt is important to 
mention that there ore qualifications to this framework of meaning, which Locon 
reworks in later texts). I shall discuss this further in relation to language in sub-
sections VI, Difference and language, and V, Linguistic limits. In order to establish 
how the subject emerges into the imaginary and symbolic from the real, it is 
necessary to consider the way in which the subject 'becomes' by encountering what 
Locon refers to os the mirror stage. 
IV THE MIRROR STAGE 
The first step away from the real, towards an entry into the symbolic order occurs 
when the child realises that the mother is separate from him/her. This sense of loss 
and lock motivates the child to find an (illusory) unified, stable image of self (within 
the imaginary) to fill this sense of lack. This need to fill the gap and profound sense 
of loss also extends into on engagement with language. This development marks a 
sense of the loss of the real and is articulated through what Lacan refers to as the 
mirror stage. A consideration of what is referred to as the mirror stage importantly 
positions and conditions this certain kind of absence which comes out of a sense of 
the loss of the rea/. 
The mirror stage occurs when the child first recognises its own reflection. At this 
147 See Grosz, E., Jacques Lacan. A Feminist Introduction, London: RouUedge, 1990, pp.98-103 for an 
excellent in depth discussion of this. 
point, the child begins to negotiate the ideo of the image of itself and the 
relationship of this image to the external world. This is referred to as the specular 
image, understood by the child os a reflection of self but crucially, in identifying with 
this image, or imago, he/she learns that that there is a fictional dimension to this 
presentation. The recognition of self is also then necessarily a misrecognition, or 
inability to recognise, m1konnaissance, a term which Locon identifies with the 
imaginary (and the paternal). and consequently the visual register. In this instance of 
misrecognition another 'other' self is understood although the subject is actually 
viewing a "fragmented body-image" rendering the ideo of any apparent unified self 
os illusory.l48 
We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense 
that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the 
subject when he assumes an image - whose predestination to this phase-effect is 
sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term imago· 149 
In other words, the term imago denotes on idealised image of another person or 
self, which is token into the unconscious. 
Indeed, for the imagos- whose veiled laces it is our privilege to see in outline in 
our daily experience and in the penumbra of symbolic efficacity -the mirror image 
would seem to be the threshold of the visible world, if we go by the mirror 
disposition that the imago of one's own body presents in hallucinations or dreams, 
whether it concerns its individual features, or even its infirmities, or its object-
projections; or if we observe the role of the mirror apparatus in the appearances of 
the double, in which psychical realities, however heterogeneous, ore manilested· 150 
This erroneous perception of self gives rise to a disjunction which creates a spilt 
between the conscious speaking self, which recognises its reflection, and the self 
148 Lacan, Ecrits: a selection. London: Routledge. 2001, p. 5. 
149 Lacan, 2001, p.2. 
150 La can, 2001, p.3. 
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reflected in the mirror. Through this visual dynamic, the subject is paradoxically 
constituted; it becomes a subject through entering into the visual and linguistic 
world, and yet this recognition of self and 'other' establishes that the subject is 
decenlred and divided at the same lime. This configuration speaks of the broader 
relationship and development of the subject to the processes of inter-subjectivity. 
This process also marks the visual recognition of anatomical difference, and 
crucially, through this, the significance of the phallus which visually is the register of 
the penis, but symbolically the marker of power in Lacanian lerms· 151 The child 
recognises the difference between itself (if it is male) and the mother and this is 
communicated in terms of lack, absence. 152 Broadly speaking, this is a dialectical 
relationship between self and other, internal and external, with the subject founded 
on the premise of a central lack. These spaces are articulated as gaps, absences 
and, although presented as a 'non-space' by Lacan, are also strangely, the locus of 
the unconscious which surfaces at this split. 
The mirror stage consequently marks a stage of transition where the rea/ in its 
organic slate is lost to the emerging subject as it recognises its self in relation to 
other and enters into the signifying realm. A sense of the rea/ consequently comes 
out of the effects of its loss (which is connected to the loss of the maternal) and the 
disjunction between the slate of the real and the emerging subject entering into the 
symbolic order. The effects of the rea/ paradoxically find form as ruptures in the 
signifying field and in so doing refer to the absence of the real for the subject. 
V REFORMULATIONS OF THE REAL 
Although we can take these initial propositions as an essential step on the way to 
151 See "The signification of the phallus" in Lacan 2001, pp. 311-322, where he discusses this issue. 
152 Elizabeth Grosz points out that Lacan, in fact, presents female sexuality as supplementary or excessive 
to male sexuality. She suggests that the idea of lack versus excess is destabllzed by Jacques Derrida in 
Dissemination, 1981, through his proposiUon of supplementarily. She argues that Lacan's use of the notion 
of supplementarily cannot, however, be extricated from the central point of reference, the phallus, which 
organises and structures subsequent relations. See Grosz, 1990, p.202. 
unravelling the rea/, it is important to acknowledge that Lacan's formulation of it 
might be seen as part of an evolving and dynamic idea that changes course. This 
development poses certain problems for interpretation and conlexlualizalion as his 
thinking does not follow a linear path. Although these issues are not specific only to 
the rea/, they form part of a wider concern flagged up by suggested changes of 
focus in Lacan's thinking (particularly from 1960 onwards) and have a direct impact 
on its possible conceplualizalion and relationship to an understanding of 
absence. 153 For this reason, I wish to cautiously focus on Lacan's later formulations 
of the rea/, which are partially conlextualised through a poslslructuralisl framing. 154 
This is a problematic framing because although it sets up a critical engagement with 
the normalised assumptions surrounding meaning, thought and language that 
humanist notions legitimise, parts of Lacan's thinking do not fit into its rubric. The 
humanist justification of a 'natural' or 'given' order, and the idea that any one 
source could be the centre of truth, is challenged by positing that everything is 
constructed discursively, is relational and specific to context in postslructuralist 
thought. However, and this constitutes a large qualification, whilst some aspects of 
this thinking connect to the poststructuralist framing, the formation of the real, 
notably, is not discursively constructed. Therefore, the development of Lacan's 
thinking around the rea/ cannot be said to offer an exact parallel to the 
development of slructuralist/poststructuralist thought, however, it is conditioned, at 
times, by parts of it. 
Consequently, Lacan's later interpretation of the reo/ confers on it uncertainty and 
difference and thereby allows it to enjoy a degree of disruptive ubiquity. 11 is 
153 This dilemma may be interpreted as a by product of Lacan's desire to put fo!Ward anti-totatizing 
strategies for an engagement with his thinking. This facet of Lacan's general approach is acknowledged by 
Alan Sheridan who describes his work as being "particularly resistant to interpretation of a static, defining 
kind" "Translator's Note" in Lacan, 1989, p.ix. 
Christian Kerslake in his review "Brain Food" of Bruce Fink's publication: Lacan to the Letter: Reading 
Lacan Closely, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004 in Radical Philosophy, 129, Jan/Feb 2005, 
pp.52-54, highlights some of the problems brought up by an evaluation of Lacan's thought. He suggests that 
to understand his writing as a 'body of work' is to set up a series of paradoxical and somewhat unresolvable 
dilemmas around interpretation. Whilst his work would seem to work against any 'totalizing' gestures, it 
would also seem to elicit close examination thereby invoking, in a contradictory way, a sense of the 
possibility of a closed reading. 
154 See Belsey, 2005, p.4, where she discusses poststructuralism in relation to the real and draws attention 
to the "structural uncerlainty" it generates. 
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negotiated as a space that is radically elusive and through this elusiveness, is 
generative of a dynamic, fraught and resistant status. 11 is therefore conditioned by 
an idea of difference and this is in stark contrast to what has been suggested to be 
his 'structuralist' engagement with the real which contains it as an absence and 
therefore renders it a knowable or manageable space. 155 
The real, I have told you, is that which is in the same place. You will see this in the 
history of science and thaught. 156 
This transition from structuralist to poststructuralist is not definitively mapped out but 
it could be said that the development of his conception of the real is marked by a 
change of locus from the gap between the imaginary and the symbolic, to the gap 
between the symbolic and the rea/. 157 Sheridan, in his translation of The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 1977, for example, suggests that 
Lacan's initial engagement with the rea/ served a particular kind of function: 
The term 'real', which was at first af only minor importance, acting as a kind of 
safety rail, has gradually been developed, and its signification has been 
considerably altered. lt began naturally enough, by presenting, in relation to 
symbolic substitutions and imaginary variations, a function of constancy; 'the real is 
that which always returns to the same place'. lt then became that before which the 
imaginary faltered, that over which the symbolic stumbles, that which is a refactory, 
resistant. Hence the formula: 'the real is the impossible'. 156 
The later interpretation of the real is understood in relation to, or set against, an 
entry into language and consequently the symbolic order. As a result, this describes 
a relational limit but also a signifying process that determines and controls our 
155 See Wright, E., & Wright, E., The Zizek Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999, where, in reference 
to Slavoj Zizek's interpretation of lacan's writings, suggest that his 'modernist' engagement is marked by a 
negotiation with the real as an absence "around which the text/object circulates", whereas his 'postmodemist' 
position is: "distinguished by its preoccupation with an excess of the Real" (sic), p.155. See also p.11, and 
p.13 where they suggest that the seminar on Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959-60) marks a break in Lacan's 
thought which they note as not been entirely negotiated in the English interpretation of Lacan. 
156 Lacan, J., The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 70. 
157 See Wright, & Wright, 1999, p.12 and Belsey, 2005, p.4 7 where she posits that the object of the drive 
gets placed "more firmly at the level of demand". 
158 Sheridan, A., (Trans) in Lacan, J., The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977, p.280. 
engagement with the rea/ and the sense of absence it precipitates. This version of 
the rea/ allows it to manifest in a strangely uncontained and evanescent way. lt 
retains a pervasive dimension yet can only be understood in relation to the 
structured space of the symbolic. As Lacan suggests, this positioning constitutes an 
engagement with praxis "which places man in a position to treat the real by the 
symbolic". 159 lt is the topological dynamic of the symbolic in relation to the rea/ 
which consequently determines possibilities and is constitutive of our grounding in 
relation to the elusive form of this rea/. To get a sense of how this topological 
dynamic functions and the way in which the absence of the rea/ might be 
understood, it is important to consider the way in which the symbolic functions and 
constructs this relational 'absence'. 
VI DIFFERENCE AND LANGUAGE: the symbolic register 
The shadowy location of the rea/ is amorphously presented as residing outside the 
symbolic register. In order to signify the subject rnust enter into language. Only then 
this entry occurs can the subject wield meaning and power and this is informed and 
located by its newly realised sexual identity. This identity is structured by a 
positioning in relation to a visual recognition of the signifier, the phallus, which is 
either present or absent in the child. The logic of this demands that women are 
perceived as castrated and the recognition of this possibility gives rise to a sense of 
loss or lack; an unconscious acknowledgement that castration is possible. However, 
Lacan presents this as a symbolic castration, a subjugation to what he refers to as 
the Name ofThe Father, which is a symbolic appellation. 160 The symbolic lather 
governs as the locus of authority and power and this status is established through 
language. Through this process, the phallus becomes the object of desire and 
manifests through desire for the other which is repressed in the unconscious. 11 sets 
the ground for the advent of the desired object of the drive, obiet a, which is the 
159lacan, 1977, p.6. 
160 See Sheridan, in Lacan, 1977, pp.281-282. 
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signifier of what is absent and hence marks the subject's recognition of what has 
been lost, namely, the real. 
Crucially, from the perspective of language, Lacan casts the phallus as signifier. 
However, the phallus functions essentially as a signified and in a metaphysical 
sense, a transcendental signified because it effectively governs the Lacanian 
psychoanalytical discourse. Lacan takes Sigmund Freud's idea of the unconscious 
being structured like a language and develops it through the prism of Saussurean 
thought. 161 He refers to the unconscious as a 'conceptual elaboration', conferring 
on it the form of a linguistic structure. 162 Although he suggests that this linguistic 
quality allows us to quantify what might exist under the term 'unconscious', in that 
we can grasp an understanding through the workings of language and semiology, 
his interpretation might also be said to produce its own set of problems.l63 As we 
have seen, Saussure proposes that the sign is composed of the signifier and the 
signified. The signifier marks the sign in a visual way and the signified presents the 
conceptual part of the sign. Meaning is derived from the differences between the 
two parts of the sign and between signs. If we go back to the Saussure's terms, it is 
evident that the signifiers are normally seen to 'slide' over the signifieds to achieve 
meaning. As meaning is never fixed in this process of slippage, this motion denotes 
an absence of a concrete interpretation within language. In the case of the 
unconscious, Lacon posits that the signifiers are seen as becoming unattached from 
161 tt is worth pointing out that these linguistic dimensions are already evident in Freud's thinking. He 
employs the idea of "ideational representatives· (Vorstetlungsreprasentanz), and speaks in lenns of a 
"topographical" model in relation la the unconscious. tt is also important la acknowledge the influence of the 
Formalist Roman Jakobson on Lacan's thinking in relation to language. This has specific relevance with 
regard to Lacan's consideration of metaphor and metonymy which he develops from Freud's primary 
processes of condensation and displacement Jakobson develops aspects of Saussure's thought relating to 
these systems of signification and these ideas have direct repercussions for Lacan's positioning of the real. 
See Gmsz, 1990, Chapter 4, Language and the unconscious, pp. 82-114. See also, Hawkes, T., 
Structuralism and Semiotics, London: RouUedge, 2003, pp.59-69, for an in depth exploration of Jakobson's 
thought in relation to signifying structures and Saussurean thought. Hawkes suggests that Lacan has 
attributed his negotiation of the "psychic functions· to the use of the mechanisms of 'symbolic representation' 
as expressed through metaphor and metonymy, p.62. 
162 This idea is prefigured in the work of Freud, although not expressed in the same tenns. See Grosz, 1990, 
p.92. This idea of the unconscious being structured like a language is prevalent in Lacan, 1977, see 
especially, p.149, and p. 203. 
163 Wright & Wright, 1999, for example, cite the point at which Lacan describes the unconscious as being 
"determined by the effects of the signifier" as "dassic" Lacan. They present it in contrast to what they 
describe as his later concern with the "ways in which signification is disrupted", specifically referring to le 
sinthome. Le sinthome Is described as "the singularity in the subject that resists its indusion in the signifying 
chain," p.13. 
the signifieds. Therefore, the process through which difference and consequently 
meaning is understood, is held in stasis. The signifiers become then, that which 
cannot enter into consciousness in a conventional way as they are seen as 
registering 'below the bar'. The signified becomes separated from the signifier and 
as a result, the signifiers fail to gain signification. The unconscious resorts to gaining 
signification through metaphor and metonymy, namely, in non literal ways, 
including the qualities of something being presented as a verbal or written substitute 
for the actual word being described. These processes become the voice of the 
unconscious. 
Consequently, rather than take on the signified/signifier dynamic posited by 
Saussure, Lacon prioritises the signifier, viewing both parts of the sign as signifiers in 
the unconscious. The language of the unconscious is consequently comprised of 
signifiers disconnected from their signifieds. The language of the unconscious 
remains separate from the language of the conscious but as we shall see, emerges 
as ruptures into signifying practices. This idea would seem to precipitate the need 
for a cautious engagement in relation to a dynamic with the real. For Freud, the 
unconscious is to be found in the clumsy stumblings of language. 11 is presented as 
residing in gaps and fissures, surfacing momentarily through splits and ruptures of 
form. 
Impediment, failure, split. In a spoken or written sentence something stumbles. 
Freud is attracted by these phenomena, and it is there that he seeks the 
unconscious. 164 
Lacon views the problematic ofthe unconscious as being a question of " ... an 
'absorption' fraught with false trails, (une recuperation leurree)." 165 The term 
'absorption' allows for an unpredictability and uncertainty of possibility that suggests 
the unconscious to be vulnerable and elusive, yet simultaneously open to interacting 
with a registering framework. This positions a dependency upon the discourses of 
the conscious mind for expression. According to Freud's later theories, the contents 
164 Lacan, 1977, p.25. 
165 Lacan, 1977, p.32. 
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of the unconscious are seen as a series of "ideational representatives" .166 These 
"ideational representatives", which are, in fact, presented as the signs that facilitate 
the 'drive' taking up a position within the unconscious, are interpreted as signifiers 
by Lacan. The unconscious is consequently expressed as functioning through the 
metaphorical and metonymical and these forms are seen as being constitutive of the 
, h. I . , 167 psyc 1ca pnmary processes . 
VII LINGUISTIC LIMITS 
However, Lacan also suggests that the meaning we might ascribe to something 
through language is not necessarily the meaning we might think it to have. This 
differential articulates a space that might be described as an uneasy gap between 
what we know to exist and what might exist. lt points to the complex uncertainty of 
language and its referents. Catherine Belsey calls this gap, this space in between "a 
terrain of unmapped alterity" .168 This unmopped alferity marks an area that exists 
outside of the subject's grasp because it is not accessible through language. This is 
important for a consideration of the reo/ and the problematic of absence, because, 
from this, language falters at the task of describing the rea/. The reo/ cannot be 
represented through words and fails to be answerable to the symbolic. This 
articulates an edge of understanding and present an ideo of the threshold of the 
limits of symbolic interaction and consequently the seeping edges of the rea/. 
As the rea/ remains inaccessible to us os subjects, and it evades the symbolic order 
through failing to signify in language, language might, in this sense, be seen to be a 
condition of its inaccessibility. If we consider this relationship of the reo/to such 
modes of signification then it is important to clarify more aspects of the shadow the 
real casts. As we have seen, Lacan's interpretation of the rea/ presents it as 
166 Grosz, 1990, p.82 
167 Grosz, 1990, p.87. 
168 Belsey, 2005, p.4. 
constituting what is locking in the symbolic order. 169 Sheridan refers to it as: 
the ineliminoble residue of all articulation, the foreclosed element, which may be 
approached, but never grasped: the umbilical cord of the symbolic. 170 
The laHer part of this assertion would seem, however, to both lie in tension with the 
idea of heterogeneity (which marks Lacan's engagement with the imaginary, 
symbolic and real) whilst perhaps holding onto and articulating its seepage. 171 The 
idea of an umbilical cord denotes an organic dependency on the symbolic whilst the 
notion of 'foreclosure' would seem, to a large extent, to indicate a shuHing o/1, a 
condition of absolute inaccessibility. This perhaps goes some way to articulating 
some of complex paradoxes of Lacan's formulation of the real. 
Therefore, the reo/ is presented as an ethereal condition, exisiting as a pre-
subjective stole which floats outside our positioning os subjects. There is the 
suggestion that it ultimately looms in the shadows of and beyond ourselves. 
However, the reo/ remains invisible and inaccessible to us in a conventional 
signifying sense through language. This uncomfortable sense of the reo/forms a sort 
169 Lacan states with regard to the unconscious," ... there springs up a misunderstood form of the un, the 
Un of the Unbewusste. Let us say that the limit of the Unbewusste is the Unbegriff- not the non-concept, but 
the concept of lack", Lacan. 1977, p.26. He posits that the "tack of the lack makes the real, which emerges 
there, as a cork, un bouchon. 'Le bouchon' has several implications in French, including cork, stopper, plug, 
traffic jam or Heat depending on contexl lt communicates a sense of stoppage, blockage, containmenL but 
Sheridan translates it as 'cork'. Lacan states that "this cork is supported by the term of the impossible- and 
the little we know about the real shows its antimony to all verisimilitude." Lacan, 1977, p.ix. I would suggest 
that this translation also introduces a sense of vulnerability and impermanence to this block -a cork can be 
removed after all. 
There are deeply complex and wide ranging issues sunounding the philosophy of negation, the negative 
that are flagged up by a mention of the non-concept. For the purposes of this investigation I want to remain 
with the concept of lack. 1t is worth pointing out, however, that Sheridan notes the play between French and 
German that Lacan employs also articulates a movement between an idea of one (French un) and the 
German negative prefix un which translates as a movement from 'oneness' to 'negation' (see Sheridan's 
footnote 1 in Lacan, 1977, p.26). Lacan's engagement alters this focus from the negative to the idea of a 
lack. This is prefigured by what Lacan refers to as Freud's 'radical category' of '/'impossible', where he 
suggests a movement away from negation is the best approach to understanding how the limits of 
'/'impossible' stand in relation to the subject. Further to this, Sheridan suggests that the space of the rea/ is 
perceived as a "stumbling block" for the symbolic. This resistant positioning constitutes the point at which lhe 
real is referred to as '/'impossible' by Lacan because it articulates the concept of lack, rather than a negation 
or non concept. This has importance for formulating an understanding of the complexion of the real because 
this suggests something that is not negation but lack and this is a relational conceit. See Grosz, 1990, p.J4, 
for example, where she states that the real has ·no boundaries, borders, divisions, or oppositions; it is a 
continuum of 'raw materials.' ·our understanding of it can only be relational, through "the reconstructive or 
inferential work of the imaginary and symbolic orders". 
170 Sheridan, 1977, p.280. 
171 See Lacan's reference to the Bonomean Knot in Seminaire 1974-75. 
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of residual unease in the subject. This unease resides both in the inadequacy of the 
signifying system of language and the impossibility of understanding the sense of 
loss engendered by our consideration of our [past] relationship to the rea/. The rea/ 
manifests in ways that exceed language. Through this positioning a sense of its loss 
is found in the space between the pre-subjective and that which might be described 
in language for the subject in relation to the symbolic order. 172 Consequently, the 
real cannot be discerned via the symbolic because it con never register there. 
Although this describes the apparent condition of the rea/ in relation to its incapacity 
to manifest through symbolic articulation, it does not fully negotiate the undulating 
nature or possibilities of the rea/ in a wider sense. To explore this further, it is crucial 
to consider the wider conceptual basis on which aspects of Locon's rea/ might be 
founded.'" 
VIII HEIDGEGGER AND LACAN 
Like Derrida, Locon's recourse to Martin Heidegger's thought is notably related to 
the exploration of conceptual possibilities, albeit resulting in very different ideas. 
Specifically, in relation to the consideration of the real and absence, I want to go 
back briefly to Heidegger's consideration of the clearing and then his proposition of 
dos ding. Threads of these ideas have some conceptual resonance for the 
development of Locan's ideas surrounding the conscious/unconscious and the way 
in which the loss of the real might manifest. 
As we have seen, Heidegger puts forward the clearing os a strange space of 
172 See Belsey, C., Poststructuralism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp.58-59. See also Wright & 
Wrigh~ 1999, who suggest that Zizek employs the Lacanian real as a vehide to describe how rererence in 
language !ails. They also posit that the real is only revealed through the "structural effects it produces in 
mundane reality" See p.3. 
173 Interestingly, Lacan maintains that although it has been suggested that at one time he was considered 
to be "obsessed with some kind or language, even a Heideggerian one", it was never more than a 
"propaedeutic rererence". See Lacan, 1977, p.18. Nevertheless, a number or Heidegger's ideas would 
appear to surface in lacan's work in relation to the real and would seem to have resonance with a concept or 
it in a way, perhaps, that might be said to exceed his evaluation at this point. 
illumination where beings/being mysteriously come forth in the 
concealing/unconceolment. What comes out of this in terms of considering Lacan's 
real is, firstly, the possibility that there is a disparity between what might be 
described in the clearing and what actually emerges into consciousness. 
Consequently, 'reality' is not given in language but understood according to specific 
conceptual frameworks and certain ways of entities being disclosed. Additionally, 
these ideas relating to presencing, coming into consciousness, and emerging, ore 
not empirically quantifiable. Held within the idea of the bringing forth or going away 
of presencing, is the sense that in coming forth into consciousness absences ore 
necessarily also present. This importantly sets up the idea of a space that is elusive, 
evading categorisation and has no definitive limits. lt oscillates in its relationship to 
what constitutes absence. This idea of presencing challenges the appositional 
premise of spaces of absence and presence because it renders it non reducible to 
this structuring through indeterminacy. These ideas position on uncertain uneasy 
relationship between what emerges into consciousness and what gets described in 
language. 
Whilst it might be said that the rea/ is on indeterminate, uncontained space, I am 
not suggesting that the idea of beings disclosed in the clearing acts as a conceptual 
blue print for the rea/. lt is important to recognise that the clearing and the rea/ 
present the possibility for different orders of absence, which are contingent on the 
conceptual frameworks in which they exist and ore not necessarily reconcilable. 
Moreover, the rea/ arises out of what is seen as a pre-subjective state, before the 
subject signifies and enters into the symbolic order. Everything is seen by Lacon to 
be held within the reo/ in fact, he asserts that there is absolutely nothing lacking in 
the reo/. lt is within the symbolic order that absences ore felt and, indeed, these 
surface os reminders of the loss of the rea/. In order to consider how these 
reminders surface I want to explore the unconscious in a little more depth. 
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IX PSYCHICAL SHADOWS: THE UNCONSCIOUS 
We hove established that once the mirror stage has occurred the subject tries to 
placate its sense of loss through identification with on imaginary unified self. 
However, the subject is not a unified, fixed entity but split through recognition of self 
and other. The ego of the subject is consequently destobilized os it falsely 
presupposes that it recognises the reality of a whole, but this is, os mentioned, a 
meconnoissonce, a misrecognition. At this point of disjunction the unconscious is 
seen to surface. The unconscious is presented by Locon os that which cannot be 
integrated into conscious thought. He confers on it the qualities of language, 
interpreting it through the Soussureon ideo of the signifier. Whilst the signifiers of the 
unconscious cannot emerge into conscious language, they surface in different ways 
to disrupt language and articulate their location outside of the signifying field. 
Locon describes the unconscious os having a "pulsolive function" which 
demonstrates the 'need to disappear; and this is conveyed os on integral and 
important port of its make up. 174 He suggests that the absence of the real emerges 
out of these ruptures, and in so doing, the unconscious "presents you with its 
enigma, and speoks". 175 Consequently, the division of the subject at the point of the 
mirror stage provides an opening for the unconscious to manifest and erupt into the 
conscious space of the symbolic. This, in turn, facilitates the ideo of "another 
locality, another space, another scene, the between perception and 
consciousness". 176 This strange space describes a dimension of the possibility of the 
real. The unconscious surfaces through this enigmatic gap and reminds us of what 
we hove lost. lt would seem to formulate a sort of tentative space, "a non temporal 
locus" according to Locon, elusive, and defying orticulotion. 177 This expresses, 
174 Lacan. 1977, p.43. 
175 Lacan. 1977. p.26. 
176 Lacan, 1977, p.56. See also, Burgin, V., Between, Oxford: Basil Btackwett, 1986, p.97, where Burgin 
employs the concept of between in his artwork. This concept produces a fluidity of meaning that extends 
from multi-textual associative readings (incorporating the positioning and construction of the subject in 
relation to social space), to the idea of the space between perception and consciousness posited by the 
Lacanian psychoanalytical framework. For a practical artistic engagement with these associative processes 
in particular, see Burgin, V., Some Cities, London: Reaktion Books Ltd. 1996. 
177 Lacan, 1977, p. 56. 
perhaps, stains left by suggestion, a retreating and advancing absence marked 
through a certain kind of differencing. This differencing relates to the 'becoming of 
the subject', the difference between signifying os a subject by entering into language 
in a way that is conditioned by absence, and remaining in a pre-subjective stole. In 
effect, this differencing is occasioned by eruptions of the unconscious at the point of 
the split of the subject, reminding the subject what has been lost. 
In considering these other apparent flashes of the effect of the loss of reo/, 
intermiHent rays of light might be shed on its possibilities. For example, the 
unconscious, Locon suggests, is situated "in the dimension of a synchrony", in other 
words, it occurs simultaneously with other stoles. The unconscious surfaces through 
ruptures in the conscious, into the signifying realm and alludes to the absence of the 
reo/. 178 Through this, Locon introduces the ideo of the gap serving what he refers to 
os on uontologicol function" .179 
Ontically, then, the unconscious is the elusive- but we are beginning to 
circumscribe it in o structure, o temporal structure, which, it can be said, has never 
yet been articulated os such. 180 
This positions a certain kind of relationship to being that is articulated through the 
intermiHent surfacing of the unconscious. He refers to this space os occurring in the 
"structure of a gap" and locales it within the realm of the pre-onto/ogica/ os on 
unreolized entity. 181 As a consequence of this, the unconscious enjoys a slippery 
status when it comes to registering but finds expression nonetheless. In this sense, 
the unconscious does not gain general synonymity with the rea/, but is threaded into 
an understanding of it. Wright suggests that: 
Yet although the real cannot be written, there is one place where it does establish 
176 Lacan, 1977, p.26. 
179 Lacan, 1977. p.26. 
160 Lacan, 1977, p.32. Lacan suggests that the ontic dimension of the unconscious resides in the split 
• ... through which that something, whose adventure in our field seems so short, is for a moment brought into 
the light of day- a moment because the second stage, which is the dosing up, gives this apprehension a 
vanishing aspect", p.31. 
161 Lacan, 1977, p.29. 
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itself as writing, where its traumatic effects are inscribed -namely, in the 
. 182 unconsoous. 
In this regard, the effects of the rea/ importantly mark out the possibility for a 
resistance to conceptual closure, as this ill-defined possibility for absence might be 
articulated as uncertainly. 
The broad complexion of the rea/ in relation to the problematic of absence has so 
far been considered in terms of possible theoretical and philosophical shadows 
positioning the rea/ and its relationship to signifying processes. One last 
consideration of the absence of the rea/ relates to the shadows cast by what might 
be seen to lie in the wake of the rea/, the expression or by-products of its apparent 
loss. 183 As we have seen, what might be understood as expressions of the loss of the 
rea/ are articulated in two ways. The loss of the rea/ is expressed in an amorphous 
manifestation through the unconscious and it is also expressed through signifiers of 
desire. In the latter instance, signifiers of desire replace the lost rea/ articulated at 
the level of the drive through mediating object, objel a. 
X DRIVING TOWARDS ABSENCE: from DAS D/NG to OBJET A 
Lacan initially retains the term dos Ding to refer to the object around which the drive 
moves. He takes the term from Heidegger's use of dos Ding, where he proposes 
that Heidegger develops a "dialectic around a vase" and gives dos Ding the role of 
182 Wright & Wright, 1999, p.4 
183 In the process of attempting to negotiate an encounter with the real, Lacan refers to the tucM which he 
interprets as being 'the encounter with the real', dting it as "the object of concem" with which Freud engaged. 
This encounter never comes to fruition and presents as anything from the trauma to the phantasy [sic]. See 
also, Lacan, 1977, pp. 52-54, where he acknowledges his reference to the tuche as being taken from 
Aristotle. (See also p. 60.). 
"uniting celestial and terrestrial powers around it in an essential human process". 184 
In other words, in his discussion of a vase which is seen to encircle emptiness, 
Heidegger gives dos Ding quite monumental unifying properties that reach upwards 
and below. However, Lacan wishes to reduce this complexity and see dos Ding in 
terms of it being simply a signifier and a signifier of "nothing other than of signifying 
as such" at that. 185 
Lacan locates Dos Ding, within the psyche, marking the place in the speaking being 
of the lost rea/. it is perceived as the signifying form which creates the void or the 
emptiness at the centre of the rea/. He suggests that dos Ding is beyond the capacity 
of our imagination and consequently we attempt to attribute an object with the 
"value of representing the Thing". 186 This is interpreted as a form of sublimation by 
Lacan and this idea of 'emptiness' he refers la as being highly "determinative" in 
this context."' 
This Thing, all forms of which created by man belong to the sphere of sublimation, 
this Thing will always be represented by emptiness, precisely because it cannot be 
represented by anything else- or, more exactly, because it can only be represented 
by something else. But in every form of sublimation, emptiness is determinative. 188 
At this point in his thinking, Lacan argues that dos Ding is 'veiled' and this condition 
determines our relationship to it. He puts forward the idea that it is the part of the 
real (or what he refers to as the primordial real) that is connected to the signifier. 
Dos Ding is strangely articulated through the 'refound object' and comes to be 
represented by something else. The processes of understanding dos Ding and its 
placement, he suggests, are located beyond the pleasure principle. He suggests that 
the creation of an artistic object serves to represent dos Ding as signifier, in fact that 
"all art is characterised by a certain mode of organization around this emptiness" 189 
184 See Lacan, 1992, p.120. 
185 See "Seminar IX" in Lacan, 1992, espedally pp. 120-122 
186 See Lacan, 1992, pp. 125-126. 
187 Lacan, 1992, p.130. See "Seminar X", pp. 128-138, in Lacan, 1992 
188 Lacan, 1992, p.130. 
189 Lacan, 1992, "Seminar X", p.130. 
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which is seen as the catalyst for desire. 190 
He later develops and expands this idea and dos Ding evolves into what he refers to 
as objet a. In their inception, both dos Ding and objet a are elusive and enigmatic 
terms. Lacan locates dos Ding within the psyche in the speaking being to mark the 
place of the lost real. Objet a is located at the level of demand and describes that 
which is perceived as being able to fill the gap created by the loss of the real. 
Sheridan points out that Lacan wants objet a to remain untranslated which adds to 
its mystery. 191 lt incorporales a notion of the 'other' through the 'a' which is 
'aulre'and is distinguished from the 'Autre' (the Other}. 192 
... the interest that the subject takes in his own split is bound up with that which 
determines it- namely, a privileged object, which has emerged from some primal 
separation, from some self-multilation induced by the very approach of the real, 
whose name, in our algebra, is the obiet a. 193 
The way in which objet a is seen to function is understood through the expression of 
desire is at the level of the drive. Lacan rejects the distinction made by Freud 
between the sex and the death drive. He combines the two, consequently giving the 
drive a paradoxical quality of pleasure and finality, a strange but compelling 
complexion of death and desire. As objet a can be a signifier for this drive, it can 
signify and therefore be expressed as a symptom of our loss. The movement of the 
drive would appear to be fundamentally a negotiation of desire and pleasure in 
search of the lost real. The movement of the drive towards the compensation for this 
absence is consequently expressed around objet a. Objet a does not exist in the rea/ 
but is constitutive of its loss. 194 
190 Of interest here, also, is lhe point Lacan makes about Freud's consideration of religious practices and 
lhe "obsessional traits" surrounding lhem. He argues lhat religion, regardless of its manifestations, attempts 
to avoid emptiness, however, it still presents as a central concern. 
191 Sheridan, "Translator's Note" in Lacan, 1977, p.282. 
192 Belsey points out lhat Lacan marks objel a from lhe Autre, (lhe big Olher), which she describes as 
"language itself', p.47. Belsey refers to lhe real as a "psychic reminder" which is presented as a forbidden 
maternal object, wilh lhe suggestion lhat it marks lhe place in lhe speaking being of lhe lost real. However, 
she suggests lhal it appears to be !here in (as] a sort of exile. See Belsey, 2005, p.70. 
193 Lacan, 1977, p.83. 
194 Wright suggests lhat Zizek interprets Lacan's objel a as covering over lhe gap of lhe loss of lhe real and 
Objet a, then, might be said to provide a provisional marker for the rea/, to be 
productive of an indicator for the subject that can be read on a signifying level. The 
advent of Objet a signals a strange sort of temporary fill in for the absence that is 
the loss of the rea/. lt marks desire for what has been lost, coupled with the 
impossibility of this desire ever being fulfilled, as it exists beyond the pleasure 
(motivated by the drive). 195 This would seem to be a manifestation of the absence of 
the rea/ expressed through objet a as the object of the drive and mediated through 
the production of signifiers alluding to this loss. The point of signification introduces 
on entry into culture and need for the production of cultural objects. This need is 
driven by the desire for jouissance, which is seen as a move or gesture mode 
towards to the lost rea/.196 This strange absence, created by the loss of the reo/, 
motivates desire and through this (crucially for the visual arts) the production of 
cultural objects. 
This consideration of absence demands then, a critical engagement with the limits 
and possibilities of Lacan's psychoanalytical frame. If we can make a distinction 
between the complexion of the absence connected to the loss of rea/ and the effects 
it precipitates, then we are dealing with an idea that makes a mark on our psychical 
spaces. The only tangible aspects of it are articulated through the effects of its loss 
which surface as ruptures into signifying structures. In other words, the effects of the 
in so doing becomes the "sublime object of ideology", see Wrighl &Wrighl. 1999, p.3. In lhis regard. Besley 
points oullhal Zizek's interpretation of objel a as the sublime object connects to lhe Kanlian sublime which is 
a position of "negative pleasure". She argues lhallhe posmon lhal Zizek adopts is one which does not 
account for lhe positive dimensions evident in Lacan's engagement with an idea of sublimation. See Belsey, 
2005, pp. 143-148. Belsey suggests that objel a fills lhe gap created by lhe facllhat lhe real is lost to lhe 
subject. 
195 Belsey suggests lhal what is experienced as desire, is elusive, as il presents in an unconscious way. 11 
comes out of, however, lhe 'consequence of lhe gap' which delineates lhe loss of lhe real, hence the need 
for 'love-objects' to filllhe void and articulate our desire. See Belsey, 2005, p.59. 
196 Sheridan suggests lhallhe lenn jouissance does not find adequate translation in English. 11 might be 
compared to 'enjoyment' bullhiS does not hold lhe sexual implications it has in French. He suggests lhal 
Lacan use of jouissance does not square wilh the sense of equilibrium lhe tenn pleasure implies, and would 
therefore seem to be "beyond lhe pleasure principle". See Sheridan in Lacan, 1977, p.281. 
Wrighl & Wrighl, 1999, p.13, suggesllhallaler Lacan presents what he refers to as lhe sinlhome as 
representing lhe part of lhe subject which refuses lo be incorporated into lhe signifying chain. 
Problematically, it is seen as articulating lhe idea of the "unbridled signifier". The dilemma presented by the 
sinlhome would seem to be one which places lhe subject in a position of choice between lhat which he/she 
knows is !here, but is excluded from him/her via lhe symbolic, and lhat which represents lhis impossibility. it 
is presented as "the fragment of a meaningless letter, lhe reading of which procures an immediate jouis-
sance or meaning-in-the-enjoyment • Zizek's interpretation of lhe sinlhome is fundamentally as a negative, 
subtracting idea. See Wright & Wright, 1999, p.17. 
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real surface as expressions of desire, to fill the loss of the real. 
There can be absolutely no doubt that there is a real. That the subject has a 
constructive relation with this real only within the narrow confines of the pleasure 
principle, of the pleasure principle unfarced by the drive, ... the point of emergence 
of the love object. 197 
The real cannot be quantified in any tenable way so a consideration of it is, in part, 
like running after moving shadows. As a consequence, we can sift through what the 
real would seem to present as an effect of its passing, but its nature cannot be 
pinned down for classification. lt is easy to critique what might be said to hinge on 
an engagement with the real in relation to the problematic of absence, but the 
resolution is not one with well-defined edges. Perhaps this peculiar elusiveness is the 
point. The real delivers a strange question that can only be answered in part, and at 
that, only with critical hesitation. I would suggest that what is at stake here is 
something that goes beyond interpreting the real as an empty void. lt offers a 
particular kind of absence that is contingent, throwing up questions surrounding 
what might be determinable. In considering the real in relation to a concept of 
absence, a space of possibility arises that has wider resonance and application for 
considering absence and the visual arts. Ultimately, considering the real as a 
particular kind of absence is to think about spaces of meaning, of mediation and 
possibility, and therefore, to think about the limits of our knowledge in relation to 
signifying practices. 198 Lacan's real lies at the edges of the knowable and as such is 
a proposition that challenges the way in which we might understand the effects of 
absence in cultural production. 
197 Lacan, 1977, p.186. 
198 Calherine Belsey cites the real as the point at which culture fails. See Belsey, 2005, p.14. 
XI THE SPACE OF ABSENCE 
lacan is principally concerned with what happens when a desire for knowledge 
uncovers not a presence but an absence - a discovery that unmasks oil processes of 
signification. 199 
If we are to consider the way in which absence signifies in relation to Lacan's 
psychoanalytic frame, then several concurrent but paradoxical organising principles 
appear to be in action. Going back to the axes set up in Section I, I would suggest 
that the way in which Lacan puts forward the how and why of understanding what 
constitutes absence is structured in a very specific way. We can pull through certain 
very obvious threads such as the 'becoming' of the subject, when the subject splits 
at the mirror phase and an identification between self and other is established as a 
gap. The entry of the subject into signification and language is founded on a central 
lack in the subject which represents the lost (absent) real and the decentring of the 
subject. The subject is then positioned according to a symbolic order, which is 
structured around sexuality and therefore lack or possession of the phallus, and this 
determines absence from the authority of the signifying field. These strange gaps 
and absences constitute the limits established around the subject in relation to the 
signifying field. However, it is in the strange proposition of the real that these 
epistemological limits gel challenged. The organisation, or structuring of these 
'absences' occurs through Lacan's particular psychoanalytic framework. The real, 
however, although conditioned by the very structured absences Lacan formulates, 
importantly leaves shadows within the spaces of our knowledge. In many senses, 
aHempting to consider the way in which absence signifies necessarily involves 
floating outside the structures presented by Lacan. This allows us to think about 
meaning that is not dependent on accepting structures as they might seem. 200 In 
other words, a critical consideration of his thought has to both engage critically with 
some parts and disengage with others. 
199 Payne, M., Reading Theory. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993, p.91. 
200 Grosz suggests that a "critical ambivalence" is almost certainly the most productive positioning for an 
analysis and engagement with Lacan's thought. See Grosz, 1990, p.190. 
.· --
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Heidegger's premise that we must question how we understand Being has 
resonance for this consideration. If we understand Being to be based on 
preconceived, established parameters, then an acceptance of these foundational 
ideas will have repercussions for the limits of our understanding. Furthermore, these 
assumptions can erroneously point towards a definite horizon by which, as 
Heidegger puts it, the understanding "of to be" is "fulfilled"?0 ' The rea/ should 
similarly be seen to offer no hope of attainment or resolution if it is to position a 
critical absence. 
The rea/ is not an absence that is subject to definition, but a complicated, multi-
layered problematic which moves in and out of focus and inevitably throws up 
increasing numbers of related questions. The idea of the rea/ facilitates a qualified 
theoretical manoeuvrability, its effects sometimes mitigated, sometimes enhanced by 
the friction existing between the ideas it presents. As it can hold no intrinsic meaning 
in itself, its complexion is understood in relation to the signifying structures we 
understand. The idea of this strange absence, I would argue, is not a negative one 
because it surreptitiously reveals what is contingent on our understanding as 
subjects and through this our relation to what might be seen to be 'other'. lt refuses 
symbolic containment and this has repercussions for us trying to grapple with our 
own limitations. 11 offers up the possibility of a disjunction in our conceptualization 
regarding what we can know and control. This has specific resonance for the 
placement of the subject and the idea of its fixed placement202 
I would suggest that if we make a distinction between the complexion of this 
absence and the effects it precipitates we are dealing with an idea that stains our 
psychical spaces with a sense of difference. Although we can make a tentative 
gesture towards the latter (its effects), through considering its tangible ruptures into 
signifying structures, the former {its complexion) must remain as an absence outside 
201 Heidegger, 2000, p.96. 
202 See Pile, S., The Body and the City. Psychoanalysis, Space and Subjectivity, London: RouUedge, 1996, 
p.142, where he discusses Lacan's thought and the illusory nature of subject placements. 
our grasp. We are confronted with something that con never be fulfilled in a 
signifying sense, ond consequently marks a resistance to conceptual closure. With 
the proposition of the rea/there is no definitive resolution, only a suspension. As an 
absence the rea/ is articulated, crucially, as uncertainty, and this is a critical tension 
which is qualified by contingency. 
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SECON0iM()TI()N OFABSWCE: 
Self'reReded; se/fdoubled::Raltagainst:the'miimr. stage 
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SECOND MOTION OF ABSENCE: 
Self reflected, self doubled: Rat against the mirror stage 
14 Janiela Eyre 
Fish Merchant's Daughters , 1996. 
The strange double figures presented in Janieta Eyre's photographs appear at first 
glance to be rather odd sets of twins. Each figure is duplicated, identical ly dressed, 
standing up right and facing forward, as if to attention. In spite of the theatricality of 
the backgrounds set up, the staid positioning of the figures creates a sort of visual 
compression, faced flat and front-wards. This visual foreshortening holds each pair 
still and posed as if they were bizarre human figurines on a shelf waiting to be 
moved. This is qui te strange because the pairs ore somehow rendered partially 
inanimate through structured body composure. With arrested wooden limb gestures 
and fixed body positions, the figures ore held tight to the spat as if in a line ur for 
identification. And here, identity would seem to be at stake. The figures could be 
twins, not fraternal, but possibly identical , their features so similar to one another. 
But looking closely at them they could also be intriguing doubles o f one, self 
replicated and re-presented as two. This is, in fact, what they o re. 
In this thought of doubling the subject is reflected back to itself, a recognition that is 
visually repeated and reflected back to the viewer. In this strange doubling back The 
Fish Merchant's Daughters (see: fig. 14 ) and Tweeling, 1996 (see: fig. 15) each 
stand side-by-side forming different poses as if to complicate the fact that they ore 
each, in reality, analogically sound. The fish Merchant' s Daughter is duplicated to 
create a fictional return. 
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15 
16 
In Lost Persons (see: fig. 16) a small black and white photograph of a single, 
upright body floats between the two figures as if to suggest the source of a now split 
self, the single whole body located somewhere distant and irretrievable, a paper pin 
up of something lost. 
There would seem to be something odd about the reflection of a 'self' in the mirror; 
one person in a visual dialogue with her/ himself. Something jarring occurs that 
makes me look again at these photographs. The placement of these human 
'figurines' invokes a deliberate halt, which in turn, is expressed flatly in their address. 
The figures hit hard against what seems to be a physical limit and this could be a 
mirror. lt is as if the camera lens is a mirror. Of course, in a reflective sense, it is. 
The self-conscious visual relationship between the fictional twins and the lens 
replicates the relationship of self to the mirror. 
But there is something more than an immediate, but confused, visual analogy to 
Lacan's mirror stage that comes to mind. The double image certainly reflects the 
conceit of a split self. In recognising that it is the same person I could go further and 
suggest that through the peculiar repl ication of self, a visual alteration occurs which 
could articulate a misrecognition, a meconnoissance of self. But it is in the 
compelling condition of these fictional doubles at the point of recognition, which 
causes the most profound disruption. These are fully developed characters from a 
surreal theatrical production. Oddly constructed historical moments are brought into 
focus. The subject is decentred and divided at the same time but with the weight of 
experience already established. This is very strange. Remarkably, the artist manages 
to communicate the gap between self and other through a complicated il lusory 
conceit. The forceful sophistication of the elaborately dressed 'selves' holds the 
relation to the signifying field in tension. In filling the gaps, more absences appear. 
Jonieto Eyre 
15 Tweelings, 1996. 
1 6 Lost Persons, 2000. 
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ifHIRD MOTION1 GP, ABSENCE: 
Into ihe shadows: .Woman ·ofihe 'l'>unes. 
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THIRD MOTION OF ABSENCE: 
Into the shadows: Woman of the Dunes. 203 
203 Woman of the Dunes (Suna no Onna) directed by Hiroshi Teshigahara, Japan 1964 (b&w), 119 
minutes. 
Consider the space in between, the flickering space where thoughts are forming 
along an osci llating theoretical edge. This is a darkened space cast from something 
discernible, something at this very moment of engagement. This space has mobi lity 
and fluidity of form . Forms chase other forms in no particular direction but the 
possibi lity o f depth is there, waiting in the shadows, repealing its possibility at every 
turn . 
A man climbs a hill of sand in a vast expanse of desert. lt appears to be a truly 
arduous task. His footsteps are heavy, each step at once a partial ascent and 
descent. His journey is marked by a weary, but determined pace. Soon he will be in 
the depths of a dune trapped with the woman of the dunes. 
Resigned to the task of removing sand from the steadily fi lling dune cavity where her 
home resides, the woman of the dunes carries out the same action of removal 
again and again. The sand slides back into the vacated form frustrating the 
possibility of keeping the shape of her home surround stable and contained. Each 
repeated movement creates an incremental change of depth. She can never know 
how much sand wi ll move during the day or night, nor what quantities of sand wi ll 
slide or be swept downwards into the void by the wind. Each repeated motion acts 
out the possibi li ty of being submerged, partially or completely by the drifting sand. 
Each heavy pail of sand dragged across the pit of the dune speaks of a desire to 
prevent the dune cavity from being filled in and the house being covered with layers 
of sand. 
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Right now she appears complicil in this Sisyphean lask.204 Soon another person, a 
man, will unknowingly be drawn into the paHern of the sand's removal in the depth 
of the dune. The sand will drift down, its course undeterred. Two people will then be 
forced to intervene in the sand redistribution, the path of its movement adjusting 
around two bodies in motion pushed on by external landscape tremors and the 
ferocity of the wind. 
This task is sometimes played out in partial light, and frequently in the darkness, 
illuminated only by a gas lamp. Motivated, as the woman says, by "love of one's 
own place", this is a task she habitually carries out until dawn. Her lime is measured 
in repelilious acts. Time renders the dunes fluid. Radiating structures appear 
choreographed in the sand. 
When the man aHempts to scale the wall of the dune to escape, it crumbles away 
offering him no firm fooling. He struggles up the descending slope and fruslralingly, 
slides back to his starting position. With the slightest seismic movement the sand 
floats down, liquid now it would appear. The sand threatens to bury the house and 
the people within it. 
The man asks for the woman to call someone in authority. He is a Professor of 
Entomology carrying out field research. Someone will soon realize he is missing. He 
has left his room with research books open and money in his jacket pocket. 
Someone will be looking for him now. 
The sand cascades down os if liquid, the vulnerable edge fliHering away. Plateaux of 
sand break away and a staggered waterfall of sand cascades down, paradoxically 
simulating at once sliding planes of water and ice. 
204 The myth of Sisyphus is described in Albert Camus' seminal text The Myth of Sisyphus, (1942) pp. 107-
111 (originally published in France by Gaillimard, 1942). This particular text offers a consideration of literary 
works including the work of Franz Kafka and Fyodor Dostoyevsky in relation to Absurdity. 
The man desperately wants to escape from the pit where he is imprisoned, but he 
has no means of escape. 
The woman comments that if there were no sand, then no one would notice her, 
and the same would apply to him loo. 
He comments that he collected insects because he thought they were useless. 
He tries to escape and in his flight falls down another hole, this lime it is in a swamp 
area. He is pulled out by the villagers and is made to return to the pit of the dune. 
He discovers that his experiment to trap a crow in a covered bucket has revealed a 
process that allows water to collect. He leaves the pit of the dune and returns 
voluntarily, excited by his discovery. 
Seven years later, the Court of Family Affairs announces a verdict on the 
disappearance of the man Junpei Niki, born 7th March, 1926. The E:ourt 
acknowledges his absence for the last seven years and consider him to be a missing 
person. 
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SECTION FOUR 
PAINTING AS A FAULTY VEHICLE FOR ABSENCE? 
My belief is that the colour of today, right now is the colour of transparency - of the 
gleam or brilliance of metal. And then perhaps in the future, in the very near future 
if will be the colour of the stealth bomber; that is: an absorbent colour that has no 
reflection, a colour that traps all radiation, the colour of a crater, a black hole 
colour, a colour like the coating on an aircraft that absorbs those waves trying to 
detect its presence from far away, this will be the colour of the future, a colour in 
reverse
205 
Certainly, it might be justifiably argued, from a socially and historically informed 
position, that painting would seem to be an ironic and somewhat misplaced choice 
as a vehicle for a critical engagement with absence, offering a rather flawed, 
contradictory, theoretical alignment.206 This is largely due to the fact that painting 
has been historically weighted with commanding a specific authority and has been 
conferred with establishing a certain type of 'presence' as an act and an object.207 
This status has inevitably, in part, been due to inherited connections to the well-
established, modernist rubric of 'the primacy of the visual' and the specificity of 
medium.208 The relationship of painting to certain dimensions of 'presence' is well 
205 Virilio, P. interviewed in 1993, cited in Residual Hope exhibition pamphlet, to accompany exhibition 
(November 4 - November 30, 1993), with Michel Oupuy, Lawrence Carron, Michel Dector and Eric Cameron, 
curated by Sharon Brooks at S.L Simpson Gallery, Toronto, Canada. Interestingly, Brooks also cites a 
quote from Janine Marchessault in the film Possession, 1988: "White is not the absence of colour, it is the 
colour of absence" to contextualize the exhibition. She posits !hallo consider the idea of residual colour is to 
position painting in a positive forward looking position that resides somewhere between "the colour of 
absence" and "a black hole colour" as this, she argues, creates another space. This, again, might be seen to 
be positioning absence in terms of visual conceits, however, the idea of the 'residual' opens up uncertainties 
relating to this positioning. 
206 See David Green, "Painting as Aporia" in Harris, J., Critical Perspectives on Contemporary Painting. 
where he points out that painting is still largely considered in relation to "the precepts of theories of modem is! 
art" as it lends to be understood in relation to "singularity, specificity and autonomy", (pp. 81-107). 
207 In Derrida, J .• The Truth in Painting, London: The University of Chicago Press. 1987, Derrida posits that 
"discourses on paintings are perhaps destined to reproduce the limit which constitutes lhem, whatever they 
do and whatever they say: lhere is for them an inside and an outside of the work as soon as lhere is work,· 
p.11. 
208 Rosalind Krauss, for example, in her preface to A Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Age of /he Post-
Medium Condition, London: Thames and Hudson, 1999, pp.5-7, expresses her desire to bury the term 
'medium' "like so much critical toxic waste", so heavily weighted it has become with its inextricable links to 
Greenberg and a reductive interpretive model. She removes herself from the reach of these past shadows by 
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worn territory in that it is largely marked out by taking Clement Greenberg's 
formalist concerns relating to shape, support and the flatness of the surface of work 
(which might be said to be prescriptive in terms of the authoritative presence of 
painting) and Michael Fried's positioning of the 'presentness' in modernist art into 
account. 209 Fried, in his oft cited 'seminal text' "Art and Objecthood" (Artforum 5, 
1Oth June 1967) posits that the mediums of painting (and sculpture, for that matter) 
provide the possibility for what he refers to as a "continuous and perpetual present" 
through its constitutive parts, declaring that "presentness is grace".210 This critical 
framing accounts for a specific kind of containment or positioning of ideas focused 
on the 'purely visual' with a sense of immediate presence and which is, in turn, 
informed by a certain kind of temporality. Although it has come under repeated 
challenges, this thinking has surely left a rather deep residual impression on the 
possibilities of painting. In fact, these frames of thinking might be said to have some 
impact on a contemporary engagement with it, albeit, for the most part, one which 
is critically and often purposefully distanced from its precepts. Consequently, it could 
be said that whether critically positioned in relation to it or not, this scholarship has 
become a part of interpreting painting's lexical possibilities and limitations because 
it holds and retains a certain kind of theoretical shadow over proceedings. Further 
to this, I would argue, that in a wider sense this shadow has affected the status of 
painting as a contemporary critical inquiry because is it now arguably located 
arguing for the acknowledgement of a crWcal distance from the received meaning of the term whilst justifying 
retention of it because it 'opens up' onto the 'discursive field' she is considering. 
209 See Greenberg, C. "Modernist Painting" in Frascina, F., and Harrison, C., (Eds), Modern M and 
Modernism: A Critical Anthology, London: Harper and Row and Open University 1982. See also Pollock, G., 
and Rowtey, A. "Painting in a Hybrid Moment' in Critical Perspectives on Contemporary Painting, Uverpool 
University Press, 2003, pp.37-79, where, in reference to this, they discuss the idea of painting being seen as 
the 'site/sight' of self presence which has relevance for both the artist and the person viewing the work. 
210 See "Art and Objecthood" in Fried, M., M and Objacthood, pp.167-168. 
The problematic of 'presentness' is also described and explored by Catsou Roberts in the catalogue 
Presentness is Grace. Experiencing the Suspended Moment, Amolfini, Bristol, 2001. With reference to 
Michael Fried's text "Art and Objecthood "in Artforum, 5 (10 June 1967), which was viewed as positioning 
'presenlness' as a retort to Minimalism, Roberts considers its connection to the sublime and transcendence. 
See especially in this publication: 'The Absolute Present of Things'. See also in this regard, Robinson, D. 
The Materiality of Text and Body in Painting and Darkroom Processes: An Investigation Through Practice, 
University of Plymouth, 2003, p.135, where she suggests that Fried attempts to "ground metaphysical 
thinking concerning the concept of 'presence' in the material facticity of painting". See also Fried, M. "Art and 
Objecthood" in Art and Objedhood, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1998, pp.148-172. 
For an excellent consideration of 'blankness' in relation to the symbolic worth of Eva Hesse's art work, 
with specific reference to the psychoanalytic thought of Melania Klein. see Fer, B., "Bordering on Blank: Eva 
Hesse and Minimalism" in Nixon, M., (ed), Odober Files 3: Eva Hesse, MIT Press, London, 2002, pp.56-85. 
See also Gilbert-Rolfe, J., "Blankness as Signifier" in Beauty and the Contemporary Sublime, pp.108-123. 
squarely in the defensive realm. 211 
Consequently, I was initially faced with some particular problems which included; 
firstly, how was I to approach rethinking absence through painting practice, 
negotiating painting's problematic strands, and secondly, how might this be 
undertaken without falling under the weight of previous conceptualisations of 
'absence'. My approach involved trying to think through problems in terms of 
pushing against boundaries, which were both lexical and pragmatic. In other words, 
my engagement has been with the discursive and linguistic limits constructed around 
absence and how this might inform an understanding of how absence might be 
rethought in the visual arts. Therefore, it has not been my intent to take on the status 
of painting, moreover, to be held by the limitations of inherited critical discourses. 
However, most certainly, any contemporary engagement with painting necessarily 
inherits the weight of these problems (and perhaps the way in which they have been 
understood, or in some cases, reduced). What I wish to suggest is that painting is 
not somehow devoid of possibility for thinking through this idea of absence. In fact, 
to be habitually drawn back into these models of thinking relating to a modernist 
engagement with presence and authority creates a certain kind of impasse. To what 
extent any of these shackles may be cast away is debatable. However, I would 
suggest that the extent to which these particular frames of thinking might be pushed 
211 Additionally, through this, there are the practical and seemingly contradictory considerations of how the 
image might function through the presence of the mark and how this might be reconciled with a notion of 
absence. This particular question has not been my concern as it sets the 'presence' of the mark up against 
blankness. For a consideration of blankness's possibilities, however, see Gilbert-Rolfe, J., where he 
discusses it relation to what he refers to as the contemporary visual world at large. He suggests that the 
'social' function of blankness has, from a recent historical perspective, been set within the framing of a space 
for the sign, either offeiing "absence or potentiality". This kind of positioning marks a specific appositional 
engagement with the possibilities of the absence of the sign, however, Rolfe suggests, this has now 
changed. He argues that blankness must not be thought as absence or lack, indeed, discusses it relation to 
what he suggests is its 'teleology' in that he suggests that it is conditioned by a connection to all things in an 
immediate way. 
• ... if blankness originated as a necessary absence, a condition of erasure, clearing, which makes 
possible a level of clarification-the maximum mobility of the sign-unimaginable (as it were, literally) without it, 
humanism and the traditions to which it gave rise seem to have maintained it in that condition, allowing it to 
be no more than a precondition for the emergence of the pure and unimpeded idea, which is to say, a 
necessary absence (a contemporary version of which would be an approach to formlessness that only 
wanted to see it in terms of the unformed). • He posits that blankness at one time marked • the absence of the 
sign by being a sign for absence", however, he suggests that it now functions as: "the sign of an invisible 
and ubiquitous technological presence". 
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or understood provides on insight into the very points of strain, of possible failure of 
anticipated meaning that moves towards seeing how discourses ore functioning. 
These hove been cautionary steps to attempt to understand how pointing might 
have on awkward reconciliation with a rethinking of absence. What has come out of 
this process, to a certain extent, has gone beyond what is containable, namely, the 
excess of the artworks, and this has been pivotal for a rethinking of the edges 
associated with painting. What painting might be has also to be rethought. 
11 REFLECTION ON PRACTICE 
What I found necessary then, in light of this, was to establish first how 'absence' 
might be negotiated through the practical research so that a sense of how it might 
be normally understood would be gained. This consideration was critically 
positioned in relation to some of the discourses I perceived to be constructed 
around absence in the visual arts. The intent was certainly not, however, to chose 
'absence' as a constructed image or conceit, os previously discussed in Section I, as 
this was part of the problematic I was trying to unravel. This consideration 
constituted part of the first axis of my research. This axis positioned how and why we 
might categorise something as being visually generative of a sense of absence 
according to the discourses constructed around absence. 
My initial research into the discourses constructed around absence and the visual 
arts revealed there to be a limited number of common and repeated conceits used 
to describe approaches to absence. Absence was frequently understood in relation 
to concepts of materiality referencing object/body/place. These references 
incorporated the phenomenological (where the meaning of objects (phenomena), 
was constituted through our consciousness of what they are), or the psychical where 
a visceral reaction was marked. Moreover, artworks were always described 
according to the appositional framework of presence and absence which did not 
take into account the strategic and methodological complexities employed by the 
artists and demonstrated in the works at hand. I was interested in exploring the limits 
constructed around absence and the visual arts. Coming out of this initial research, 
I took the idea of the psychical and place as a broad starting point for my practical 
investigations. I wanted to explore the limits of this particular discursive thread to see 
how absence might signify in this context. 
My explorations began firstly with the compilation of a photographic resource of 
different buildings (see attached appendices pp. 86-87). The photographs were 
then used to make up a series of photomontages. I subjected the works to a sort of 
visual erasure, hollowing out buildings and filling windows with oversized gestura) 
marks. The works were conflated shells of buildings with exaggerated graffiti, marks 
and textures. I considered how for the interior and exterior of the building could be 
visually confused. I attempted to explore how absence was signifying in relation to 
ideas of absence and place. The photomontages presented a specific kind of 
understanding of absence which was characterised by a phenomenological and 
psychical undercurrent. In other words, the photomontages were still bound into the 
identified discourses around absence and place. Furthermore, the process was 
conditioned by the construction of absence in that I was attempting to work through 
a specific conceit that related to the connection of absence and place. I wanted to 
explore this idea further and thought that the movement of video would add a more 
experimental and performative dimension to the process. 
I began work on a series of video sketches at night.212 The clips produced included 
footage following the movement of light flashing across empty buildings at night, 
walking down deserted corridors in institutional buildings, and panning across the 
interiors of abandoned buildings. This approach carried on from the 
photomontages but was distinct from it in that it offered the possibility of movement 
and therefore perhaps a more sophisticated visual exchange of ideas in the edit. I 
212 I refer to the video work as "video sketches" because they were experimenting with ideas rather than 
attempting to present a narrative or finished work that might be seen to represent absence. 
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wanted to take advantage of this process and to present the images in a way that 
allowed them to work actively together. In order to facilitate this approach, I created 
a split screen and edited clips to work alongside each other in a way that 
encouraged a visual exchange across the two screens. In effect, I edited two parallel 
sections to work alongside each other. Through this approach I was also able to 
explore what was suggested by the transposabilities of images. In other words, the 
dialogue that could be constructed across the movement of the two screens was 
productive of another level of interpretation. When the double channel screen 
played, the two parallel images worked alongside each other and allowed for other 
meanings to emerge. Occasionally, I was able to orchestrate the images in a way 
that they played off each other such as in the movement of light flashing across both 
screens in independent shots. Sometimes I was able to edit the images so that they 
appeared to be connected to each other. The movement of the video had a visual 
dynamic which allowed for absence to signify in several different ways within the 
framework of absence and place. At limes the images had a strange spectrality 
about them appearing as ghostly shadows flitting across the double screens. 
The video work was a collection of experimental pieces with some parallel images 
achieving a greater degree of success than others in terms of exploring the way in 
which absence might signify. Importantly, however, these explorations allowed two 
distinct and at times contradictory engagements with absence to occur. Firstly, one 
engagement was related to the difference between the sets of images on the double 
screen which was suggestive of a differential register. Secondly, the other 
engagement was related to the way in which absence signified through the 
psychical; in other words what arose unconsciously and imaginatively from the 
interplay between the screens. What surfaced out of this consideration was an 
understanding of absence arising from the two engagements. 
Consequently, in considering the video work and photomontages, in tandem with a 
critical engagement with the discourses constructed around absence and the visual 
arts, I decided to have two separate theoretical propositions. I wanted these 
propositions to deal critically with the some of the problems coming out of this 
exploration but to also play on the differences in the way in which absence might 
signify. This thinking resulted in section 11 Jacques Derrida: absence and the 
proposition of difference, which offers a critical engagement with the way in which 
absence might be rethought through Derrida's proposition of difference. The 
proposition of diHerance allows for a re-inscription of the way in which absence 
might signify by rethinking metaphysical precepts which are founded on the 
hierarchical opposition of absence and presence and the assumption of full and 
present meaning. Section Ill Jacques Lacan: the problem of absence and the 
Laconion real, presents a structured psychoanalytical engagement with a concept of 
absence that is reflective of what might be considered, in Derridean terms, to be a 
metaphysical engagement with absence in that it is contained and defined. 
However, Lacan's proposition of the reo/ suggests an absence which cannot be 
contained or defined. Whilst the differences between Derrida and Lacan's concepts 
of absence reflect the nuanced and complex interweaving of understandings 
possible in art practice regarding absence, importantly, this also flags up areas of 
indeterminacy and the advantage of provisionality of meaning in this project. 
The first stages of the next body of work, carried out through painting practice, went 
back to the discourses constructed around absence and place. The paintings were 
carried out with an idea of absence and place and the conceit of the empty room in 
mind. I wanted to see how far the suggestion of this construction of absence and the 
room could be pushed. Whilst not wanting to literally paint a room, I experimented 
with the linearity of the room enclosure and the suggestion of spatial forms. I 
wanted to play with the way in which absence might be understood in this context. I 
found this metaphorical engagement frustrating and limiting. lt immediately 
generated questions relating to conceptual frames. An understanding of absence 
appeared to be working on the edges of the phenomenological. I found that I 
couldn't push the edges of this engagement very far without hitting against very 
definite limitations relating to pictorial conventions and an empirical understanding 
of absence. Crucially, there seemed to be a disjunction between working through 
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established discourses constructed around absence and the possibilities of thinking 
through art practice. This disjunction seemed more acute when working through 
painting practice due to the very particular limits imposed on the possibilities of 
painting (as mentioned, these limits relate to the precepts of modernist thinking and 
the interpretive and analytical approaches to content outlined by Rogoff). Further to 
this, the disjunction was reflective of the dialectic of theory and practice in that the 
paintings presented a possibility for thinking that could not be contained by a 
conventional use of theory. 
I found the process of exploring absence in a programmatic way was useful for 
practical analysis but it did not account for what actually happens in art practice 
where the exchange between ideas occurs over time and is not predictable. The 
processes I employed in my studio practice involved a continuous contemplation of 
ideas that were reworked and rethought between the works in progress and those 
completed. Further to this, the discourses constructed around absence didn't 
account for the spaces of indeterminacy and incommensurability that art practice 
can offer. I had discovered this disparity reflected in my contemplation of artists' 
works and through my own painting practice. I found that the arlworks, through the 
strategies and methodologies of the artists, always positioned an intellectual 
wildness that exceeded the discourse constructed around them. This excess was 
realised through the inadequacies of a single frame of reference to contain the 
complexities of the artworks, which in turn positioned my methodological strategy. 
Rethinking absence through art practice did not function entirely on the 
epistemological procedures customarily outlined by doctoral research because it 
also worked through and against edges, limits and flaws generating a sense of 
excess. Working through the normalised ways of interpreting absence enabled me 
to consider the limits of engagement and the points of failure. Acknowledging the 
conceits normally connected with the way in which absence was seen to signify 
allowed me to push through and against edges. This recognition allowed me to go 
back to what thinking through art could offer that moved beyond the discourses 
normally used to contain absence. At times this consideration hinged on accepting 
that there are limits to what we can know and describe. Whilst an understanding of, 
and a working through, the interpretive and analytical frames constructed around 
art works by extant art criticism was a necessary stage in the development of the 
practical research, I found the movement away from these approaches to be 
liberating. This movement away resulted in paintings which were concerned with 
erasure, mark making and working through processes which both had resonance 
with, yet challenged, the different registers of absence. My painting practice 
produced works that I considered to be the synthesis of the research. The paintings 
as a body of work, in working through the limits constructed around absence and 
painting as a practice, reflected the highly nuanced and complicated relationship of 
theory to practice. Although the paintings that dealt with the spatiality of an empty 
room could be said to evoke a sense of absence, this was quantifiably distinct from 
the work which arose from exploring the different concepts of absence because it 
could not be contained in the same way. 
Ill REFLEQION ON THE METHODOLOGY 
The methodological structure for this research was determined by the evidence of 
gaps between the different ways of handling absence. In exploring the different 
interpretations of absence and the visual arts and working through the discourses 
constructed around absence in my painting practice, I identified an excess {that 
which appeared to exceed the extant art critical discursive frames). This excess was 
exemplified in section I Absence and the visual arts, in the work of Rachel 
Whiteread, Doris Salcedo, Luc T uymans and Klaus Scherubel and in the Fifth motion 
of absence: 20 paintings beyond the frame. The complexity of the artworks pointed 
to a disjunction between what the extant art critical writings proposed in relation to 
an understanding of absence and the arts and what was actually realised through 
the artworks. This disjunction was also evident in my own painting practice where I 
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established a critical position in relation to the limits constructed in and around 
pointing. 
In identifying and selecting the separate explorations of absence which included: the 
engagements with interpretive art critical analysis of absence and the arts, Jocques 
Derrido's proposition of difference, Jocques Locon's reo/ and the limits of pointing 
practice, I was able to set up a mop of conceptual possibilities to address this 
disjunction. 
Importantly, os I thought that art practice in a research context is normally presented 
in a way that evaluates its contribution only in on interpretive and analytical way (os 
identified by Rogoff), I wonted my art practice to be understood within the some 
frame of engagement os the rest of the sections of the thesis. I wonted the art to 
position its own thinking and concept of absence. In this way, the art practice could 
function in a performative way rather than being only understood os a visual 
illustration of absence. In this regard, the motions of absence function os important 
facets of the methodological strategy. The motions of absence arise from the 
thinking in each section, with the filth motion of absence presenting my 20 
paintings. The fifth motion of absence is a visual working through of the limits of 
pointing and the way in which absence might signify. 
This particular methodology both produced and addressed the tensions and gaps in 
available visual and theoretical discourses to also demonstrate absence. Through 
this structuring, the methodology was able to retain provisionolity and through this, 
was able to demonstrate a critical response to limits imposed on thinking. 
IV CONTRIBUTION TO THE SIGNIFICATION OF ABSENCE 
Although I found the discourses constructed around absence and the visual arts to 
be characterised by particular conceits including place, degrees of moteriolity 
relating to the body/object/place, the physical and loss, I found there to be no 
extended critical discourse on absence in the arts. Therefore, this research supplies 
on enquiry which incorporates approaches, knowledges and proposals on a topic 
which has been much 'spoken' but which has very noticeably lacked extended 
critical attention. 
In exploring the various models of absence presented I was able pull through 
certain threads which typified the way in which absence was considered to signify 
according to the identified discourses. Interpretive critiques or what might be 
considered to be the 'usual' or 'common' critiques of arlworks started from the 
assumption of an a priori concept of absence. This concept is based on the 
metaphysics of presence, setting up absence in an oppositionol way to presence. 
This research into rethinking absence has attempted to demonstrate the need for an 
acknowledgement of the limits constructed in and around the discourses connected 
to absence and the visual arts. The strategies and methodologies employed by 
artists in their art works disrupt this a priori approach to absence used to describe 
the works. Going back to what the artwork con offer, I have worked through the 
limits constructed around pointing practice and an exploration of absence. I hove 
carried out a critical consideration of different concepts of absence which are 
conditioned by a metaphysical understanding of absence as expressed in aspects of 
Jocques Lacon's psychoanalytical thought. I hove also considered challenges to this 
thinking specifically in reference to Jacques Derrida's proposition of diHeronce. 
These considerations hove contributed to my critical rethinking of the way in which 
absence might signify. 
The methodology also crucially attempts to offer the re-inscription of the way in 
which absence might signify through the motions of absence. These textual 
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insertions, incorporating wriHen and visual works, explore and comment on 
rethinking absence through art in a way that is not covered by the other components 
of the research or the usual discourses. The motions come out of the thinking in 
each section and work through the way in which absence is signifying. Through their 
performativity, the motions reflect on the discourses constructed around absence 
and the embodiment of rethinking absence through art practice. 
As the sections of this research have demonstrated, absence is not reducible to one 
approach or another but plays on the commensurabilities and gaps or differences 
between the different concepts presented. Therefore, the methodology ensures that 
absence is rethought within and between the different visual and wriHen sections. 
Of crucial importance to the signification of absence is the point that the 
methodology has both produced and addressed the tensions and gaps in available 
visual and theoretical discourses to also demonstrate absence. The methodology 
consequently carries out and demonstrates the performativity engendered by the 
ortworks. Namely, the artworks invoke an approach to rethinking absence which is 
not containable by a singular frame of reference but is understood in the differences 
between approaches. Furthermore, through this methodology, the question of 
excess (positioned by the idea that the artworks suggest something that exceeds the 
discourses constructed around absence and the visual arts) is demonstrated across 
the different registers. 
67 
!fGI:JRT/1\MOTIOf':.l OFABSENCE: 
Spectfrility!and shaclows:. video work. absence: 
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MOTION OF ABSENCE: 
Spedrolity and shadows: video work absence. 
18 Video work sti ll, Absence, 2003. 
The abandoned building is not completely empty, but it is void of people. A section 
of an internal corner is revealed like feint on a page by a passing car light. The car 
provides a definite light source, but is a moving object that passes quickly. The 
revealing light is gone in a lightning flash. The covered windows of the building 
offer a thin viewing strip which lets in a blade of light to sever the darkened wall. If 
you stand up close you can discern vague forms. A slow diffusion of light to the 
building lets shadows move and flicker across battered internal structures. 
Juxtaposed, sometimes fused, traces of light and dark explore forms in an 
undulating movement. You can sit here in the darkness and wai t to see what is at 
once revealed, then concealed . Each pass of a car light casts a variable shadow 
throwing the form of the building into question. Each passing illumination suggests 
something that is there and then gone, but the structural form remains wai ting in the 
darkness, intermittently revealed. 
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19 Video work still, Absence, 2003. 
20 Video work sti ll , Absence, 2003. 
The initial movement of the darkened shape is slow, sometimes fa ltering. lt is as if 
the images were coming to terms with the possibility of concurrent movement, an 
awkward coupl ing and Qvening out, but not for long. Spaces unfold at that instant, 
shadows convene and disperse. The darkness suddenly holds a frame of light which 
moves eerily, shuddering across one window, at once floating and insinuating itself 
across to the adjoining window. Shadows move across the interior form, and 
passing lights flicker suddenly across both frames at once, as if orchestrated only to 
be illuminated in tandem. At that very moment both images visually connect 
through a movement of light as if part of the same possibil ity. In momentarily 
appearing to be part of the same space, the images present a connection strangely 
residing within the realm of the psychical. Then, held for only a couple of seconds, 
there is a momentary f lickering of light and a visual transposi tion occurs. The 
glowing interior of the night hut strangely fl ickers and moves. Its luminous form 
visually slips into the light of a passing car as it flashes across a derelict interior. 
Then the tandem images start to slip apart. Held within this illuminated motion is a 
residual shadowing which resonates visually and psychically with the reflected 
image. A shadow caught gliding from one set of circumstances to another is held 
for a moment and then dissipates, leaving an incomplete visual impression. The 
form on the left has gone, but it has already implicated itself in the reading of what 
is to come and what has been. Perhaps it is all of these things. lt can be seen 
everywhere in already unfolding spaces beyond the immediate possibility of a 
specific location. Doubling back on itself, it is held within the suggestion of 
movement. The transposability of one image onto another leaves a visual imprint 
fused with spectral flickers in the darkened corner of the night. 
70 
V TOWARDS A CRITICAL REFRAMING 
What came out of the practical work was a consideration of the nature of the 
dialogical exchange between visual elements. Something surfaced out of this 
exploration of the edges of the discourses constructed around absence, relating to 
place and ghostly shadows, that put another set of questions into motion. There was 
something that exceeded this consideration relating to rethinking the way in which 
absence might signify. The spaces of the visual offered up a distinctly different 
proposition. Whilst necessarily being constitutive of a constructed sense of absence, 
they also held the possibility of creating a space of indeterminacy; a non 
containable, non resolvable set of ideas emerging out of what was known. 213 
In pursuing this idea, I hit against the limits of what could be understood in 
epistemological terms, namely, what is seen as knowable in relation to discourses 
around absence. Through this, I would suggest that the engagement with the visual 
precipated something that went beyond the limits of the knowable. 214 lt allowed for 
the positioning of an approach that came at the problem another way. This offered, 
a way of rethinking of what absence might be in relation to the visual. Although the 
understanding of how absence might signify is certainly, in part, understood through 
an engagement with recognised discourses constructed around it, and these are 
governed by particular ways of knowing that are largely structured by the 
metaphysics of presence, I want la suggest that it is in the very nature of what the 
visual positions, through its dialogical tensions, that a particularly forceful possibility 
for signification relating to rethinking absence might lie. I would suggest that the 
213 For an excellent consideration of the problematic issues surrounding the fine art doctorate within 
research culture, see Madeod, K & Holdridge, L., Thinking Through Art. Reflections on art as research. 
London: Routledge, 2006. See Barfield, N., "Spatial ontology in fine art practice", p.107, where he discusses 
the tensions between the demands of research and the characteristics of practice. 
214 See Etlinger, B., 'Metramorphic Border1inks and Matrixial Borderspace', p.125 in J.C. Welchman (EdJ 
Rethinking Borders, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. She also Bertelsen. L., "Matrixal 
Refrains • where she posits that painting allows for an engagement with what she refers to as the 'invisible' 
which is deemed to be 'beyond appearance'. This notion of something being 'beyond appearance' might, she 
suggests. have a connection to Lacan's work but also cites Deleuze and Guattari's INOrk In relation to the 
Idea of thinking beyond representation. Although Bertelsen argues that what comes forth in Ettinger's INOrk, 
(what Is 'rendered visible') is the feminine, IINOuld position my argument in a different way. I am not 
necessarily arguing for a 'making visible', (although that can be part of it), what has come out of my research 
is a space of intelligible visual reasoning that is generated through the dialogicai relationship of pieces of 
work. 
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visual positions something which always exceeds the discourses constructed around 
it. In the explication of the visual, the workings of particular epistemological frames 
ore revealed. However, it is in the adequacies of these frames to contain that 
something else slips through the gaps and points towards that which we don't know. 
I would argue that we need this awkward coupling of that which is discernible and 
that which is not, as it marks something that is beyond this, namely what I see os the 
intellectual wildness of the visual. lt provides on unfolding space of intelligibility that 
is contingent on the complex process of visually thinking through on ideo. lt allows 
for the description of thought between ideas to surface that is subject to a fugitive 
stability, occurring on the edges of what con be controlled. These limits ore 
simultaneously, curiously bound, yet strangely outside of the specific frames of 
knowing that govern the reception of visual language in this context215 
The paintings produced have been both the condition and synthesis of all these 
tensions. In thinking through the dynamic and fraught collisions of meaning 
surfacing out of the considerations of this research, spaces have arisen that are 
strangely inarticulable. In pushing against containment, these spaces are constitutive 
of on absence of sorts, held in tension with what we think we know. A critical, 
concurrent engagement with the intersecting axes of how and why we might 
describe something as suggestive of absence in the visual arts, and how this 
understanding might be structured or organised through ways of knowing, has 
helped to sketch out the inadequacies and limitations, but also the possibilities of 
the discourses constructed around absence. Derrida and Locon offer very different 
ways to rethink the way in which absence might be understood, provoking a 
rethinking of the processes of signification and what motivates cultural production. 
These considerations hove infused the two axes with uncertainty and critical tension. 
In putting forward the proposition of rethinking absence through a series of 
215 Certainly, part of this consideration may be said to be on the edges of what David Green has flagged up 
as the inadequacy of the terms used to critically establish painting. for example. See especially, Green, D., 
"Painting as Aporia" in Harris, J. {Ed), Critical Perspectives on Contemporary Painting, pp. 81-107. 
diologicol tensions, which ore, in effect, different orders of absence answering to, 
or refusing, different epistemological demands, I hove attempted to suggest that a 
possibility for re-inscription resonates with and across all these ideas. lt is in the 
tensions and disjunctions of signification that the critical force of absence is 
rethought. 
With that in mind, I want to move onto the filth motion of absence: 20 Paintings: 
beyond the frame. 
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lfT/FTH:MOT/ON OFABSENCE: 
~0 Paintin!ls: ibe~of1dithl'l frame 
FIFTH MOTION OF ABSENCE: 
20 paintings: beyond the frame. 
21 
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wtillpresupposftiO!il iiid C1illunJ 
n:\~i'tfiC!'S" w•:-=-R'!Ied as 
me parocular ~ .... e ...... 
laaiii was too mteated in 
theory, not mtel't'Jted eoou&h m 
p&tients ; IJid both bis t.beonts and 
hts pellents suffel't'd He pve ,.. 
to much unhapptntS1 aJid brtm-
~be is cited as a ea- m 
many 5Wadea. But be also p'I'C 
Afe81 lda1 tl) ps)'dloualysis in 
France. Indeed he Jlllde it - to 
the Fm!Ch that n wu an asenli· 
ally French phenommon. 
..... f4Mia,., tlda aeotloa of ftle o.,..... ... wlU ,. back to lb 
ttw.• .... ' ..... ,. Piu.' lt wDllaclade a wider r ... e .. 
,__... U"tlol" u well u Ita uaal featana •• lullloa ... 
100411, ...... Uld llealth 
,IN_81DE : P.- Raollel Trlckett •• ~abed eoUeaea ; Paul Ln,- oa 
Hlao......_ka ; P.57 SallT Braalptoa-fullloa ; P.J8 .r-et 
W•tu oa a a .. eaq aketolaiJook 
i) 
Article clipped from the Observer newspaper (Sunday Plus section). 
Undated, marked cutting (c.l980-l ) found in second hand copy of Lacan, J., The 
four Fundamentals of Psycho-analysis, London: Penguin Books, 1977. 
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APPENDIX 11 Selected photomontages from sketch book (2002) 
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APPENDIX Ill Studio shot of hotel montages 2003. 
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APPENDIX IV Date stamped library books withdrawn from the library, July 2006 Date stamped library books from Rolle College, 2006. 
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Conferences attended: 
2006 Art and Trauma, ICIA University of Bath. 
2006 Contents. Discontents.Malcontents, AAH conference, Leeds. 
2006 Arl Switched on: A Symposium on Don Flavin, 
Courtauld Institute of Art, London. 
2005 AAH Summer School, Glasgow School of Art, Glasgow {paper presented). 
2005 Reception - Conception, AAH conference, Bristol. 
2005 Critical Spaces, (Phoenix Arts Centre), University of Plymouth (Feb.). 
2004 Land Water Symposium, University of Plymouth 
2004 Critical Spaces, University of Plymouth. 
2003 Land Water Symposium , University of Plymouth. 
2003 Collaborative Practices: ICIA, University of Bath. 
All research workshops held at the University of Plymouth 2002 - 2005 !including) 
David Cross (Cornford & Cross). 
Modes of Presentation~ 
Landscape Research Group 
Writing into Practice. 
Exhibitions visited (selected) 
2006 Ori Gersht, Spacex Gallery, Exeter. 
2006 Rachel Whiteread, Tote Modern, London. 
2006 Ugo Rondinone, Zero built a nest in my navel, Whitechapel Gallery, London. 
2006 Don Flavin: A Retrospective, Hayward Gallery, London. 
2005 Barbara Kruger, ICA Glasgow. 
2005 Kerlin Gallery, Dublin. 
2005 Temple Bar Gallery, Dublin. 
2005 Dorothy Cross, IMMA, Dublin. 
2005 The Green on Red Gallery, Dublin. 
2004 The Atlas Group, 40 l Richmond, Toronto. 
2004 Archive Gallery, Toronto. 
2004 Present Tense, Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto. 
2004 Mark Lombardi, Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto. 
2004 Andre Stilt, Chapter Arts Centre, Cardiff. 
2003 Paul McCarthy, Tote Modern, London. 
2003 Eyes, Lies and Illusions, Hayward Gallery, London. 
2003 Chila Burman, Institute for Contemporary Arts, University of Both. 
2002 Richard Long, Kosho lto, T ate St Ives, Cornwall. 
2002 Darrin Martin, New York based artist, Queen Street. 
2002 Love, Labour and Loss, RAMM, Exeter. 
2002 Videotheque, contemporary video, St Ives, Cornwall. 
2002 Listen to Britian: Works by Victor Burgin, Arnolfini, Bristol . 
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